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writing, a blur
a step, a fuzzy dream not quite forgotten
a scar cannot fade.
a trophy, collecting dust not measuring achievement,
conveys breadth
no beginning yet ending.
my insides came out and wept.
distraction: employment, hellish, pain,
walking then hobbling then unable to move.
CUT CUT CUT. walk WALK.
sleeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeep
still pain; no way out
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ABSTRACT

THE DEMOCRATIC STANDARD OF CARE
IN TORT LAW
Gregory Jay Hall
Stephen R. Perry
Social life is inherently risky. Who should bear the costs of accidental harm? That
issue has been traditionally addressed in tort legal doctrine under the concept of breach of
the negligence standard of care. Trial courts provide juries with instructions that, put
roughly, direct the jury to decide whether the defendant’s conduct fell below what a
reasonably prudent person would have done if in the defendant’s circumstances. Without
further judicial direction on that issue, the jury effectively has excessive discretion in
rendering a verdict. Such discretion opens the door for at least two kinds of potential
injustice. Juries could treat like cases differently, and juries can easily ignore or fail to
give due consideration to a society’s diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions
of the good as to what constitutes reasonable prudence. To mitigate such, I have created
“democratic standard theory.” I claim that a theory based on the overarching moral and
political commitments of the Kantian tradition can only specify what constitutes
negligent breach if it incorporates, as facts, the actual values of the individuals who are
subject to the risk at issue. Since individuals’ comprehensive conceptions of the good
conflict, majority rule, constrained by constitutional essentials, should determine what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. Thus, in each dispute over
negligence in tort, democratic standard theory sets the stakes of negligent risk, especially
the costs of accidental harm, in accordance with the values of as many as possible of the
individuals locally affected by the particular kind of act at issue.
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Introduction

Social life is inherently risky. Since individuals’ actions regularly intersect with other’s
actions, even the most careful people regularly subject themselves and others to risk of
accidental harm. Some risks are more likely to occur than others. Most of the time, no
one intends to harm anyone. Nevertheless, given the enormity and frequency of actions,
over time accidental harm is bound to occur causing, at times, substantial costs including
property damage, medical costs, lost wages, pain and suffering, disability, or even death.

1

Action Interests v. Accident Security
Despite the pervasive chance of harm, each individual has an interest to act as
each wishes and to pursue her own objectives (broadly construed). More fundamentally,
individuals must act in various ways to sustain their lives and, if possible, to secure
rewarding lives. Let’s refer to these interests as one’s “action interests.”2 At the same
time, each individual has an interest in being free from accidental harm to his body and
property.3 Let’s refer to this interest as “accident security.”
Individuals often diminish their own accident security to pursue their action
interests. Similarly, another individual’s actions can diminish one’s own accident security
in ways that do not further one’s own interests. Even when another’s actions could
potentially further one’s own interests, that potential does not usually make, from an ex
ante or ex post perspective, the risk worthwhile—let alone offset any resulting harm.
Thus, as individuals pursue their action interests, those pursuits simultaneously diminish
their own and others’ accident security. Such are the risks inherent in ongoing social life.
Since risk of accidental harm is ineliminable, how much risk should we tolerate in
our society?4 What kinds of risks should we allow others to inflict on us? What actions in

2

My formulation of the unavoidable trade-off between security and freedom is influenced by, among
others, George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in the Law of Torts, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 550 (1972). See
also Gregory C. Keating, Irreparable Injury and Extraordinary Precaution: The Safety and Feasibility
Norms in American Accident Law, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 15-16 (2003); Arthur Ripstein, The Division
of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1829-37 (2004).
3
I am not taking a position of whether these are primary or secondary interests or better described by
other terms since nothing in the forthcoming argument hinges on those issues. I am using “interests”
similarly to how Stephen Perry does in Torts, Rights, and Risk, in Philosophical Foundations of the Law of
Torts, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW OF TORTS 38, 55-58 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014)
(defining interests as certain aspects of human wellbeing that are core or fundamental).
4
By using the terms “accident” and “risk,” I mean to exclude instances where an individual intentionally
or knowingly harms another person’s body or property. Those instances, I presume, deserve a separate
inquiry, well explored in criminal law theory.
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what contexts do we want to be able to perform even if those actions risk accidental harm
to others? When accidental harm occurs, who should bear the resulting accident costs?
These questions extend beyond the legal issues in tort law that concern courts and
lawyers. These questions pertain, in a variety of ways, to insurance companies, workers’
compensation funds, regulatory agencies of many stripes, businesses, government at all
levels, and the daily work-related and non-work-related decisions of individuals.

Negligent Breach and Two Kinds of Injustice
This dissertation examines an important issue at the center of these broad and
pervasive questions. Put roughly and simply, the issue is, in lawsuits over accident costs,
how should we determine if the defendant’s conduct was negligent? More specifically,
what criteria should determine whether a defendant’s conduct fell below the negligence
standard of care such that, ceteris paribus, the defendant should be assigned the
plaintiff’s accident costs? Unfortunately, the answer is not simply “according to the law.”
This issue has been traditionally addressed in tort legal doctrine under the concept
of breach of the negligence standard of care. Several components in addition to breach of
the standard of care must be established for a negligence claim to be successful such that
the court will assign to the defendant the plaintiff’s accident costs. Therefore, following
John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky,5 I use the phrase “vulnerable to a negligence
claim” to mean that, assuming all other necessary components of a negligence claim are
satisfied, the “vulnerable” party should be assigned the accident costs at issue. Other

5
John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733
(1998).
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remedies might be appropriate as well such as punitive damages. Yet, I am primarily
referring to compensatory damages unless otherwise stated. Using “vulnerable” also
points to the fact that the harmed individual has the option, legally speaking, of pursuing
a negligence claim against another party but is not forced to do so. Neither the
government nor another individual (aside from surrogates) can (or should) be able to
pursue the claim if the harmed is not disposed to do so. As an aside, wrongful death
claims are not exceptions here because the survivor is also harmed and is seeking
compensation for that harm.
The applicable legal standard for negligent breach can be expressed in a sentence
or two. However, that standard gives the judge or jury excessive discretion in
determining breach. That discretion opens up the possibility of two kinds of injustice.
The first kind of injustice is familiar in the context of adjudication. To determine
negligent breach, trial courts provide juries with an instruction that, put roughly, directs
the jury to decide whether the defendant’s conduct fell below what a “reasonably prudent
person” would have done in the defendant’s circumstances. Due to the malleability of
that “reasonably prudent person” jury instruction, unbiased, fully informed individuals
can and regularly do disagree with particular jury verdicts, even when the jury in question
was dutiful, unbiased, and well-intentioned (collectively referred to as “dutiful”). Thus,
depending on which individuals happen to end up in the jury box, one dutiful jury could
tender a verdict for the defendant in one case while another equally dutiful jury, using the
same legal standard, could tender the opposite verdict—even though the acts of both
defendants were the same in all morally relevant respects. Treating (morally) like cases
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differently is the hallmark of injustice. Let’s refer to the first kind of injustice as disparate
treatment.”
The second kind is familiar in other issues of liberal political theory due to one of
liberalism’s major starting premises. Liberalism assumes that diverse, competing, and
irreconcilable comprehensive conceptions of the good will (and should) persist in a
modern society. To paraphrase John Rawls, there is no one social end—except justice.6
Put differently, no single conception of the good should be privileged ab initio. I refer to
this kind as the “privileged ab initio injustice.” Given that assumption, the task of
political theory is to devise legal institutions that treat all individuals with fairness or
justice even though they hold differing conceptions of the good.
Regarding negligent breach, in a diverse society, each conception of the good may
entail a different view on what constitutes negligence in particular circumstances or, in
the terms of the jury instruction, the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in context.
For ease, I often speak of each of these conceptions of the good as a “group’s view,” and
that phrase should be understood loosely. Putting these ideas together, the second kind of
justice pertains to whether a jury verdict in a negligence suit shows due regard to each
group’s view, that is, due regard to that society’s diverse, irreconcilable, and competing
conceptions of the good. For example, a jury may tender a verdict for the plaintiff that
has all of the following three attributes.
1. The verdict reflects a conception of the good that the defendant herself
does not endorse.
2. The verdict and the way it was reached did not give any consideration
to the conception of the good held by the defendant’s group.
6

John Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 159, 162 (1977).

5

3. The verdict reflects another group’s view, and, thus, that group’s view
is privileged ab initio vis-à-vis the defendant’s group’s view.
A verdict such as one with these three attributes is illiberal and, thus, unjust. Several
aspects of the second kind of injustice need to be spelled out, and I do so in future
chapters. For brevity, I may refer the injustices of disparate treatment and privileged ab
initio as the “two kinds of potential injustice,” “both injustices,” or similar.
Let me illustrate the above ideas with drivers’ use of mobile telephone
technology. As background, consider first the extent of harm involved from this kind of
activity. In 2014, 3,179 people were killed, and 431,000 people were injured in crashes
where a driver was distracted by performing other activities, including texting and
phoning while driving.7 In total in 2012, 33,561 people died from automobile crashes and
an estimated 2.36 million people were injured.8 Obviously, the resulting monetary costs
from automobile accidents alone are astronomically high. “How much risk is tolerable?”
and “Who pays for each accident?” are questions with high stakes. In response,
legislatures in forty-six states have passed laws forbidding drivers from texting while
driving.9 The legal status of phoning while driving is less clear as illustrated in the
following simple yet realistic hypothetical.
Suppose Eman and Woomin accidentally collide while driving automobiles.
Eman was phoning while driving while Woomin was not phoning, breaking any traffic

7

U.S. Department of Transportation, Key Facts and Statistics, http://www.distraction.gov/stats-researchlaws/facts-and-statistics.html.
8
U.S. Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Highway Deaths
Over the Past 5 Years Remain at Historic Lows, (2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+
Releases/NHTSA+Data+Confirms+Traffic+Fatalities+Increased+In+2012.
9
Governors Highway Safety Association, Distracted Driving Laws, (2016), http://www.ghsa.org/html/
stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html.
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laws, or doing anything else that would even minimally increase the dangerousness of her
driving when compared to normal driving. The accident would not have occurred if Eman
had not been phoning while driving. Both Eman and Woomin suffer bodily injury and
property damage to their vehicles. Was Eman’s phoning while driving negligent? If put
before a jury, the jury will be instructed to decide if Eman’s phoning while driving
conformed to the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.
As for disparate treatment, one jury may determine Eman’s conduct was
negligent. Meanwhile, another jury in the same courthouse drawn from the same jury
pool could determine that Adood’s (identical) phoning while driving, which led to a
separate collision, was not negligent. Such may occur due to the malleability of how the
jury may interpret the “reasonably prudent person” jury instruction—even if both juries
are dutiful. This disparate treatment between Eman and Adood is the first potential kind
of injustice.
As for the second kind of injustice, suppose that Eman, Woomin, and Adood’s
accidents occurred in their town where reside individuals with three diverse,
irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good.
•

Group One thinks that since phoning while driving is reckless in all
situations, the reasonably prudent person would never phone while
driving.

•

Group Two thinks the reasonably prudent person, if so inclined,
would phone while driving in most situations.

•

Group Three thinks that the reasonably prudent person would phone
while driving only in low-risk situations, such as when few others are
on the road.

7

Suppose, for illustration purposes, that Eman’s jury is composed of only individuals that
hold Group One’s view and Adood’s jury is composed of individuals that only hold
Group Two’s view.
In such a scenario, the reasonably prudent person jury instruction does not
necessarily require Eman’s and Adood’s juries to consider, even minimally, any of the
other two group’s views as to phoning while driving. On the contrary, if anything, this
jury instruction makes it appear as if there is only one legitimate view (or only one social
end) on that issue. Not surprisingly each jury renders a verdict that reflects their own
group’s view and does not consider any of the other two groups’ views. Such renders
each jury’s own view privileged ab initio both to Eman’s and Adood’s detriment.
Liberalism prohibits such. So, given that existing jury adjudication has the potential of
rendering a verdict where one of many conceptions of the good is privileged ab initio, the
jury’s verdict may be illiberal and, thus, unjust.

Neglecting Breach
In the past several decades, theoretical issues in tort law have increasingly
received attention with theorists primarily drawing from two of the major Western
philosophical traditions. The interest in tort law resulted as part of, and in reaction to, the
development of the broader Law and Economics Approach, which largely draws on the
utilitarian philosophical tradition. One of the Law and Economics Approach’s most
vociferous adherents, Steven Shavell, describes it as a discipline that analyzes “law’s

8

effects on behavior.”10 Like its parent discipline, economics, the Law and Economics
Approach uses models “to predict the manner in which ‘rational’ parties would act in the
face of various incentives.” While various versions have been advanced, the Law and
Economics Approach’s general model for negligent breach seeks to balance the possible
burdens of precaution that the defendant could have undertaken against the possible harm
that the defendant risked by refraining from any foregone, additional precaution.
Following common usage, I refer to this approach as the “balancing test.” The law and
economics paradigm often states this conception of negligence in terms of a formula.11 A
person is negligent when the burden of a possible precaution (B) was less than (<) the
probable loss (PL).12 A person is not negligent if, for all relevant precautions, B > PL.13 If
a defendant in a tort claim was negligent in her act that led to the accident (and the
plaintiff was not), then the defendant should bear the costs the plaintiff incurred from the
accident. To apply the balancing test to extant law, the Law and Economics Approach
uses the balancing test to determine what the reasonably prudent person would have done
in the defendant’s circumstances.

10

STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, vii (1987).
Richard Posner’s claim about utilitarian or economic interpretation of negligence in tort began as a
descriptive claim. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-34 (1972).
Posner thinks that courts have been using a utilitarian-type economic analysis to determine whether or not
an act is negligent. Posner at 34. Later, Posner extended this his claim to be a normative claim. Richard
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 103, 110 (1979). Weinrib
interprets Posner as making this extension. Ernest J. Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307, 307 (1980). I address the utilitarian form of negligence as a normative
theory.
12
Posner at 32. Note that we are analyzing the ex ante choice. So, there is uncertainty where the benefit
or loss will occur and how much that benefit or loss will be.
13
In an early article, Ernest Weinrib characterizes negligence in terms of “its balancing of the risk to
which the defendant exposes the plaintiff against the defendant’s burden of precautions.” Ernest J. Weinrib,
Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 428 (1987). Weinrib later departs from this view
as explained below.
11
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The Law and Economics Approach and its balancing test for negligent breach
have gained much adherence in legal academics and appellate courts, and for good
reason. In contrast to the bald and, thus, malleable reasonably prudent person construct,
the balancing test, especially when phrased as a mathematical equation, offers a
seemingly precise answer to what constitutes negligent conduct. It also provides a
seemingly objective solution to the two kinds of injustice sketched above.
In reaction to the Law and Economics Approach, commentators have critiqued the
utilitarian-esque balancing test and have advanced alternative theories of tort law. These
alternative theories are often referred to as “rights-based” or “non-consequentialist.”
Hereafter, I loosely refer to all non-consequentialist theories as “rights-based theories”
because the term “rights” indicates a central characteristic of most (but not all) nonconsequentialist theories of tort law.14 Below I more carefully distinguish between nonconsequentialist theories that seek to rely on the overarching theoretical commitments of
the Kantian tradition versus theories that find their justificatory basis elsewhere.
While rights-based tort theories have extensively and insightfully analyzed many
aspects of tort law, surprisingly, they have neglected the issue of what constitutes breach
of the negligence standard of care, which includes the concept of the reasonably prudent
person. Such is especially strange since most of these theories were responding to the
Law and Economics Approach’s analysis of tort law and that approach’s central tenet is
its model of the reasonably prudent person, namely, the balancing test.

14
Note that Stephen Perry uses “rights-based” in a similar way in his Torts, Rights, and Risk, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW OF TORTS 38, 55-58 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
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When the issue of negligent breach arises, some rights-based theories merely
gesture vaguely to social norms. Almost across the board, these theories primarily rest
their justification on their descriptive accuracy of prominent cases in tort law. While
descriptive accuracy displays some merit, rights-based theories have devoted relatively
little ink to negligent breach, the one issue that the Law and Economics Approach
addresses directly, centrally, and with purported mathematical precision.
One reason that rights-based theories have neglected the issue of negligent breach
involves how some rights-based theories carve up the theoretical landscape related to
negligent breach. One prominent rights-based theorist, Jules Coleman, explicitly contends
that the issue of negligent breach falls outside the domain of his rights-based theory.15
Other theorists seem to agree, at least implicitly, because they scarcely address negligent
breach.16 Similar to judicial jury instructions, existing tort theories rely on the jury to
decide, with excessive discretion, if the defendant breached the negligence standard of
care.
Perhaps one reason the Law and Economics Approach to tort law has retained
dominance in much of legal academia over rights-based theories is that balancing test
theories clearly address the issue of negligent breach, the very issue that rights-based
theories address so briefly and vaguely. If so, then rights-based theories need to provide a
more clear, complete, and determinate answer to what constitutes breach of the
negligence standard of care in order to compete against the balancing test.

15

JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, 32 (2001). There is some confusion here about the
relation of corrective justice and theories of tort law, which I clarify below.
16
See below where I analyze prominent theories in this camp.
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To that end, I have created what I call “democratic standard theory.” This theory,
like many rights-based theories, relies on the overarching moral and political
commitments of the Kantian tradition rather than the utilitarian tradition of the Law and
Economics Approach. I contend that the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition do not specify a universally correct answer to what constitutes breach of
the negligence standard of care without needed facts. This tradition can only specify what
constitutes negligent breach if it incorporates as facts the values of the relevant
individuals. More specifically in democratic standard theory, I contend that, for each kind
of act, the standard of care should reflect the values of as many individuals as possible
who are locally affected by the kind of act at issue. Since individuals’ values conflict,
majority rule, constrained by constitutional essentials, should determine what constitutes
the negligence standard of care. Thus, in so doing, democratic standard theory sets the
stakes of negligent risk in accordance with the values of as many of the relevant
individuals as possible.

Scope
This dissertation focuses on “accident law” in the United States. So, unless
otherwise specified, I am referring only to the law in the United States—even though my
positive theory is applicable to most, if not all, secular legal systems. Even though I focus
on legal practice by lawyers and the courts, I do not mean to imply that I think the extant
accident law, either abstracted from or situated within the courts, is theoretically the most
important or best place to examine, from a normative perspective, the various political
institutions that a society uses to assign the costs of accidents in various contexts or any
12

of the broad questions presented above. Theories that take seriously the “structure”17 of
accident law sometimes take it too seriously to the extent that they give short shrift to the
justification of its existing accident law practices.
I focus on accident law as practiced by lawyers in the courts because that is one
major arena where these issues are discussed. I hope that, after identifying the hollow
parts of accident law in this context, we can address these questions more clearly from a
non-institutional perspective as well as within its current institutional structure.
Although I focus on tort law, several aspects of a typical tort claim and some
related theoretical issues are not directly part of my inquiry. I am not directly addressing
the following issues.
1. What constitutes accidental causation of harm, including the complex concept of
outcome responsibility?
2. What is risk and can imposing risk alone constitute a harm?
3. What types of harm (e.g., physical, economic, and emotional harm) should be
compensable?
4. How should one quantify adequate compensation for accidental harm? More
specifically, does the amount of compensation need to restore, as much as
possible, the harmed to his pre-accident state or something else?
My theory, just like any of its near competitors, must necessarily work in concert with
theories of these other moral components of a negligence claim. In that light, my theory

17
I am not asserting that attention to these structural or institutional elements is unimportant. Rather,
attention to such has not been accompanied by, and perhaps have stultified, inquiries into justification so
much so that for some just pointing out that a theory does not explain or conform to the status quo tort
structure supposedly counts substantially against that theory. Jules L. Coleman, The Economic Structure of
Tort Law, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 4196, 1241-42 (1988) (book review) (arguing that the
economic theory of tort law, to its detriment, provides no explanation about the structure of tort law
including its limited, bilateral focus on particular parties who were involved in a past event); Ernest
Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485-526.409-503 (1989) (emphasizing causation
and bilateral parties as essential features of tort law that the economic theory of tort law and others get
wrong).
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will stand or fall alongside theories of the other components, most especially the duty of
care and outcome responsibility. At the same time, my theory does not rely on any
particular version of these other theories. Even better, my theory is likely consistent with
or supported by multiple plausible theories for each of the other components. For now, I
am assuming that the most persuasive theories of these and other issues in accident law
are consistent with this dissertation’s thesis.

Methodology
My methodology differs from most other existing tort theorists. Other tort
theories, many of which I address below, are enmeshed and do not venture much beyond
existing legal practice. They largely strive to make sense of the relevant case law
according to a preferred ideological packaging. Unlike most theories, my theory puts the
normative issues first and treats the institutional arrangements as to be determined
afterwards. In some ways, much of my critique of other tort theories and the defense of
my own theory is an attempt to put forward my methodology as more illuminating than
the methodology of existing theories. Nevertheless, some awkwardness results, as if my
theory and its rivals are not always joining issue. In what follows, I strive to identify this
awkwardness with the hope that doing so highlights the underlying methodological
difference rather than a substantive disconnect.
Due to the two potential kinds of injustice, further normative work on negligent
breach can attempt two tasks. First, it can attempt to argue that the existing process of
adjudication of negligent breach can and should be modified to mitigate or eliminate
potential injustice. Such is not my task in this dissertation, even though I briefly address
14

towards the end some aspects of jury adjudication. In fact, my thesis is explicitly and
almost necessarily agnostic about if or how the process of jury adjudication should be
modified or whether it should be eliminated altogether. So, this dissertation is not
advocating for the modification or the elimination of jury adjudication or that the
legislature or some other political institution or process should resolve accident disputes.
I emphatically do not rely on or idealize the substance or process of jury
adjudication especially their deliberations. Instead, I advocate rigorous experimentation
to test jury adjudication’s effectiveness against alternative viable mechanisms in
implementing the recommendations of this dissertation’s normative conclusions. This
experimentation is necessary especially in light of the work that has shown that jury
deliberations can be random, bizarre, and inconsistent. Put differently, I first seek to
establish the most defensible criteria for determining what constitutes breach of the
negligence standard of care. Only thereafter do I recommend a sustained inquiry and
experimentation to discover what mechanisms best instantiate these criteria.
The second normative task to mitigate or eliminate potential injustice is to provide
additional or more specific criteria for determining whether a kind of act is negligent.
This type of normative task is the endeavor of this dissertation, as should be noticeable
from the above sketch of democratic standard theory. Such criteria would augment or
replace existing legal doctrinal statements about negligent breach, although not all of it
must be explicitly communicated to the jury. Likely, it will have revisionist implications
for adjudication or litigation strategies lawyers adopt in light of such revisions.
For these reasons, I contend that the normative criteria should determine the
institutional process of resolving disputes over accident costs rather than the other way
15

around. In fact, any reliance on existing or alternative institutional processes is hollow
without an underlying normative theory justifying any of those processes. Thus, it seems
that we must ultimately start, in a sense, with normative theory, even if we similarly must
evaluate that theory based on our considered convictions, which, of course, may have
been significantly influenced by existing institutional mechanisms including jury
adjudication.

Road Map
Chapter One examines extant accident law and theories that purport to describe
that law. While I have multiple aims in that chapter, the main point is fleshing out my
claim that existing accident law and practice provide juries with excessive discretion to
determine what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. Such leaves the
door open for the two kinds of injustice mentioned above. Chapter Two sketches the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition pertinent to the issue of
negligent breach. I then examine alternative theories of tort law and find that each fails to
adequately address the issue of negligent breach. Each theory either neglects the issue or
its justification, and, thus, leaves unmitigated the potential injustices, or there are
difficulties particular to that theory. I also critique theories that focus on jury adjudication
to explain and justify negligent breach.
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Chapter Three defends democratic18 standard theory. To address disparate
treatment, democratic standard theory provides determinate and complete criteria for
determining breach of the standard of care. To solve the problem of privileged ab initio,
democratic standard theory argues that a democratic approach treats with fairness
individuals with diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good.
Importantly, democratic standard theory provides a robust justificatory basis for why
such breaches constitute legal negligence.

18
I am not using “democratic” in the way that much of the literature on assessing public’s beliefs about
risk uses it. There “democratic” is contrasted with “technocratic” to distinguish between perceptions of risk
by laypeople as opposed to risk analysts with formal training. As a few authors point out, neither kind of
perception is necessarily more objective and often these kinds of perceptions differ in what aspects of the
risk they deem important. K.S. Shrader-Frechette, Perceived Risks Versus Actual Risks: Managing Hazards
Through Negotiation, 1 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH AND SAFETY 341, 342-54 (1990). Democratic standard
theory does not prioritize or elevate the technocrat’s or the layperson’s view. Instead, each view is
potentially a source of information to determine the values of the relevant individuals related to the act at
issue.
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Chapter One

Two Potential Injustices in Accident Law

As mentioned above, the first kind of injustice is familiar in the context of adjudication.
Its essence is that the discretion permitted by the negligence jury instruction too easily
allows morally relevant cases to be treated differently at law. As exemplified below when
I critique the Restatement (Second)’s descriptive theory, several ambiguities that surface
even when the Restatement (Second) tries to flesh out the meaning of the reasonable
person standard. Those same ambiguities lie too in the reasonably prudent person jury
instruction. So, neither of these statements of law is able to unambiguously provide a
single, determinate answer to what constitutes negligent breach in all cases. Without
such, one jury could assign one plaintiff’s accident costs to the defendant in one case
18

while another jury, using the same legal standard, could tender the opposite verdict—
even though the acts of both defendants were the same in all morally relevant respects.
Again, treating (morally) like cases differently is the hallmark of injustice.
The second kind of potential injustice is related to and can be the cause of the first
kind of injustice. The second kind of injustice is familiar in other issues of political
theory. More specifically, liberalism assumes that diverse, competing, and irreconcilable
comprehensive conceptions of the good will and should persist in modern societies. With
that as one of its major starting premises, the task of political theory is to provide legal
institutions that treat individuals with these differing conceptions of the good with
fairness or justice. For example, Rawls uses the original position (at least in A THEORY
OF JUSTICE’S

version of Rawlsianism) and (later) the idea of overlapping consensus (from

Rawls’s POLITICAL LIBERALISM) to illuminate commonalities among diverse,
irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good. By capturing those commonalities
in Rawls’s principles of justice, political institutions that adhere to those principles of
justice treat individuals with fairness even though those individuals hold diverse,
irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good.
On the issue of negligent breach, the potential injustice is that a verdict, in
substance or how it was decided, may not respect the society’s diverse, irreconcilable,
and competing conceptions of the good. In the status quo, to determine negligent breach,
the judge or jury is supposed to decide, in the context of an adversarial court proceeding,
whether the defendant’s conduct fell below what a reasonably prudent person would have
done. The problem is that, in a diverse society, there may be more than one view on what
constitutes the conduct of a reasonably prudent person. Suppose a political entity (i.e., a
19

nation or one of its subdivisions) contains three groups each with a different view on
what the conduct of the reasonably prudent person would be in a particular context. In
such a scenario, the judge or jury may render a verdict in the lawsuit based on only one of
the groups’ views in a way that does not treat with justice or fairness the other competing
conceptions of the good in that society.
Thus stated, in the abstract, the problem about various groups’ competing views is
abundantly clear. When we address specific conduct in context, it is easy to get tangled
up with a sense that there is some absolute truth about the reasonableness of that
particular conduct, especially when one examines conduct within one’s own culture. In
contrast, different views on what constitutes reasonable conduct are salient when we
encounter people from other parts of the world. Such is even more striking if one is living
abroad or traveling in a way in which one is immersed in another culture.
Based on my firsthand experiences in the Philippines, it is common for a parent to
ask her ten-year-old son to climb, without any safety device, a tree, usually fifty-feet tall
(but often much taller, up to around ninety feet), to cut down coconuts out of mere
hospitality for unexpected, uninvited, previously unknown visitors. While experiencing
amazement mixed with concern as the boy climbs the tree, many Westerners would also
experience shock at the parent’s request and the resulting spectacle. As for another real
example, Filipino parents would regularly leave only an eight-year-old daughter to care
for her four (or more) younger siblings while the parents were working in fields far away.
Such acts contravene Western values about exposing children to the risk of danger such
that a Westerner who acted similarly would be blameworthy, according to Western
values, especially if a child was harmed as a result. In a diverse society, values as diverse
20

as these may be held by individuals that live among one another. In a diverse society, we
must provide due consideration to the various, competing views of what is reasonably
prudent conduct when determining negligent breach.
As Rawls puts it, “there is no social end except that established by the principles
of justice themselves, or else authorized by them.”19 The current tort adjudication process
and its use of the concept of the reasonably prudent person can easily lead the judge or
jury, even when dutiful, to tender a verdict as if one single group’s view of what
constitutes the reasonably prudent person alone embodied the “one social end” against
which Rawls warns. Without further theoretical guidance, the law and adjudication of
negligent breach has the potential of being illiberal and, thus, unjust.

Current Law of Negligent Breach
To demonstrate the potential kinds of injustice, we must flesh out the landscape of
accident law. Even though courts regularly resolve disputes about who should pay the
costs in particular accidents, articulating the doctrine of accident law is challenging for
two reasons.
First, as numerous judges ruled on different cases over centuries, judges in the
United States and, in earlier times, England developed what is now accident law as found
in the United States common law. In doing so, judges developed the legal doctrines of the
duty of care, the reasonably prudent person, negligence, strict liability, breach of the
standard of care, and correlated doctrines. Since no single judicial decision fully
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John Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 159, 162 (1977).
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articulates any of these doctrines, theorists have offered descriptive accounts of each
legal doctrine by piecing together judicial decisions. In some cases, as we shall see, their
descriptive accounts, perhaps unintentionally, also include prescriptive elements or
elements that interpret the process of legal adjudication.
The second difficulty pertains to the fact that it is impossible to create a list or
code of all of the possible kinds of negligent acts. Contrast the Model Penal Code, which
was developed from, and improved on, common-law-based criminal law and previous
codification attempts.20 The Model Penal Code attempts to state in sufficient detail the
kinds of acts that are criminally punishable. One reason for a code is to put individuals on
notice before they act, so that they know in advance what conduct would subject them to
criminal punishment.
In the realm of accident law, such a code would be much more difficult, if not
impossible. The limitations of human foresight combined with the seemingly infinite
ways to perform acts and endless ways diverse acts can intersect make impossible an
exhaustive list of the possible forms of negligence. Listing or interlacing the negligent
conduct from all court cases to date would not even begin to provide an adequate, let
alone exhaustive, list.
For example, it is obvious that even accidentally causing a fire in one’s home can
lead one to be legally responsible for harm to one’s neighbors. However, very few
individuals sufficiently appreciate that something as simple as failing to regularly remove
lint from one’s clothes dryer, including the lint trap, the vent, and inside the dryer can
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Markus Dirk Dubber and Paul H. Robinson, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323-24 (2007).
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cause a lint-based fire or even a major explosion. Over a decade ago, I witnessed in
person a vivid demonstration where safety engineers used mere lint-like dust in
commonplace conditions to cause a massive explosion. Nevertheless, I cannot attest that
my own lint reducing efforts since then have been sufficient. That points to a related
issue. Even if an attempt was made at a thorough list of potentially negligent acts,
effectively communicating that information to individuals such that it would change their
conduct and have a meaningful reduction in negligence would be no easy task.

The Negligence Standard in Jury Instructions
Due to the nature of this area of law, in numerous lawsuits over accident costs,
judges developed standards rather than legions of discrete rules to evaluate a party’s
conduct when its propriety is disputed. The central and most important one is the
reasonable person standard. Judges also developed other standards to deal with special
categories of acts, such as alleged professional misconduct. Yet, in the current law, these
other standards are often based on the reasonable person standard in various ways. So, I
focus on the central standard for negligent breach, the reasonable person standard, with
the expectation that my remarks can eventually be expanded to explain all other standards
of care in accident law. I start that project, at the end of this dissertation, by extending my
theory of negligent breach to the domain of strict liability. Interestingly and perhaps
surprisingly, my theory has both explanatory power for aspects of the legal doctrine of
strict liability as well as revisionist implications.
Due to the often haphazard nature of the common law, forty-eight out of the fifty
states have pattern or recommended jury instructions that judges may use to communicate
23

to juries the meaning of legal negligence or, in other words, the negligence standard of
care.21 Based on a study of these jury instructions, Patrick Kelley and Laurel Wendt
conclude that most define negligence as the failure to exercise ordinary care.22 In most
cases, ordinary care is further defined as the conduct of a reasonably careful or prudent
person. In court, in the presence of both parties and their respective legal counsel, the
judge instructs the jury on the issue of the standard of care with her jurisdiction’s
recommended instructions or her own to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was
what a reasonably prudent (or careful) person would have done.23 If no jury, the judge
determines explicitly which party prevails in the lawsuit and implicitly the issue of
negligent breach, presumably, according to approximately the same criterion that is
reflected in pattern jury instructions. While the jury is optional for the parties, for ease of
exposition, I usually refer to the more common practice of trial by jury in negligence
cases. Such should not be interpreted as an exclusion of the possibility of a judge rather
than a jury determining the issue of negligent breach.
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Patrick J. Kelley and Laurel A. Wendt, The Actual Practice: What Judges Tell Juries about
Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 595 (2002). The authors
note differences among the states’ instructions that they think are meaningful. Id. at 622. These differences
are not relevant for my purposes. Also, note that I searched for and could not find any relevant
modifications to pattern jury instructions after Kelley and Wendt’s piece. So, I conclude that their findings
are still the status quo on the points which I reference.
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Id. at 622.
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Id. See model jury instructions for the states. Here is an example of jury instructions formulated with
the terms “reasonably careful.” I adapted it from Vermont’s pattern jury instructions to the case of Woomin
and Eman: Woomin claims that Eman was negligent in phoning while driving. Eman was negligent if he
was not reasonably careful in phoning while driving. That does not mean that Eman had to use the greatest
possible care, like an unusually cautious person. Rather, he had to exercise the same care a reasonable
person would have done in her same circumstances, taking into account the foreseeable risk of injury
caused by her actions. Not every injury is caused by negligence; sometimes accidents happen even when
people act reasonably. Vermont Civil Jury Instruction Committee, Negligence (2008), http://www.vtbar.org
/User Files/Files/WebPages/Attorney%20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructions/Negligence.htm.
As exemplified here, the jury is asked to determine if the person behaved “reasonably careful,” but they are
not told how to determine what “reasonably careful” behavior is.
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Usually, neither recommended instructions nor the judge’s own instructions
further guide juries on how to determine the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in
the typical (as in non-specialized) case.24 Shortly after judicial instructions, the jury
ultimately deliberates and returns a verdict for one party or the other. In that process, the
jury implicitly or explicitly decides what constitutes negligent breach, albeit only in that
one particular lawsuit. Put differently, in rendering a verdict for the plaintiff, the jury
implicitly or explicitly decides that the defendant’s act, in the circumstances of that
particular case, was negligent.
A defendant verdict does not necessarily mean that the jury determined whether
or not either party’s acts were negligent. Deficits in one or more of several other vital
aspects of the plaintiff’s suit could have led to a verdict for the defendant. I do not
address scenarios where the plaintiff’s negligent breach is at issue because different
courts handle this possibility in different (doctrinally complicated) ways, an adequate
discussion of which would distract from this dissertation’s central thesis. Also, if the
theory that I defend in this dissertation prevails, extending my theory to the issue of
plaintiff’s negligent breach and exploring how it interrelates with other aspects of
existing accident law doctrine, such as comparative and contributory negligence, is a
viable and likely successful follow-up project.
In sum, in the prototypical case, the only official jury instruction as to negligent
breach is the (non-specialized) reasonably prudent person instruction addressed above.
Different dutiful juries can reach different conclusions on what the reasonably prudent
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In some jurisdictions, the juries are told to use common sense. Kelley at 602. But, that too does not
provide precise content as to what constitutes the conduct of a reasonably careful person.
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person would have done. In such deliberations, juries do not necessarily consider with
due regard the society’s diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good.
As a result, existing jury adjudication can lead to the two kinds of injustice detailed
above.

Possible Checks on Jury Adjudication
After the jury deliberates, they return a verdict usually without officially detailing
how they resolved particular sub-issues or any part of the rationale behind their verdict.
No official judicial or governmental follow-up specifically ensures that the jury heard,
understood, or followed any legally substantive judicial instruction. The lack of any
official detail behind the jury verdict has earned the jury deliberation process the
description of being a “black box.”25 As a protection against extreme jury verdicts, there
are three possible checks on the jury’s discretion as to negligent breach as well as other
issues:
1. The trial judge could reverse the jury’s verdict by ruling, upon motion from
one of the parties, that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict that
the jury in fact tendered.
2. Upon appellate review, the appeals court could determine that issue of
negligent breach in the opposite way from what the jury’s verdict may
indicate.
3. Intermittently, state legislatures have enacted statutes that alter specific
aspects of their jurisdiction’s accident law, often in response to an unpopular
result in a well-publicized court case. Such does not alter the outcome of any
past case, but it attempts to influence future analogous cases. While some
statutes have been enacted, keep in mind that legislatures have not broadly
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codified accident law like they have done with the criminal law, as
exemplified by the Model Penal Code.26
While these checks are available, they are not always employed or successful when
employed, with the indirect check through legislative override the least likely due to its
difficulty. Even though the first two checks are easier to attempt, they do not eliminate or
necessarily mitigate the two potential injustices. As for disparate treatment, since prior
jury trials by themselves are not precedent, utilizing any possibly inconsistent outcomes
in other trials on appeal would be difficult and likely ineffective. Regarding privileged ab
initio injustice, requesting the trial or the appellate court to reverse a jury verdict does not
necessarily mean that either court will duly consider the society’s diverse, irreconcilable,
and competing conceptions of the good in reviewing the issue of negligent breach. Either
court could merely substitute its own preferred view in lieu of any view reflected in the
jury verdict. Each court could use some version of the balancing test, and many appellate
courts do. Nevertheless, the balancing test does not necessarily treat with fairness the
diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good. Instead, it is likely just
one of the available conceptions of the good that need due consideration along with
others.

My Purely Descriptive Theory of Negligent Breach
Based on the above points, a pure description of the extant law of negligent
breach is tricky. In my view, the best pure description is as follows:
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Mixed Descriptive Theory of Negligent Breach – Conduct constitutes
negligent breach if the judge or jury determines, in the context of an
adversarial adjudication, that the conduct fell below what the reasonably
prudent person would have done in the defendant’s circumstances.
I intentionally mix the reasonably prudent person jury instruction with adjudication
simply because just stating the reasonable person standard is incomplete, to a substantial
extent, as a statement of legal doctrine. Put more strongly, a purely descriptive account of
the law of negligent breach that does not explicitly include adjudication, in addition to the
reasonable person standard, would be hollow, minimally helpful, and myopic.
At the same time, stating anything more than my Mixed Descriptive Theory is
likely a normative interpretation of the way jury adjudication should employ the
reasonable person standard rather than a pure (or even a mostly pure) description of the
legal doctrine. As we shall see below, other descriptive theories make the error of saying
too much when they purport to purely or primarily describe the law of negligent breach.
We could continue to specify other aspects of adjudication including:
•

how the jury pool is selected;

•

how any particular set of jury members is selected from that pool; and

•

general instructions to the jury such as not to discuss the issues with
the parties, their lawyers, or each other (until the jury deliberates).

I discuss more of these aspects below. All of these parts are meant to be captured when I
use the phrase “in the context of an adversarial adjudication.” To say anything more
about what conduct is likely to be deemed negligent, we need to know the various views,
related to the conduct at issue, held by those individuals likely to be selected as jurors at a
given point in time. Nevertheless, we cannot spell out the law of negligent breach with
more statements of legal doctrine. Therefore, further specification of the existing legal
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doctrine beyond my Mixed Descriptive Theory, apart from providing more details about
adjudication, is a misguided project. That is why this dissertation’s project is largely
normative, not descriptive.

Restatements of Tort Law
Despite the elusive nature of accident law and its adjudication, a nongovernmental organization, the American Law Institute, has promulgated descriptive
theories of accident law, where each successive version supersedes the previous one.
Even though I suggest above that any descriptive attempt in accident law, apart from the
one that I specified above, is misguided, analyzing prominent attempts at providing
descriptive accounts, especially the Restatement (Second) of Torts, illuminates:
A.

key aspects of the issue of negligent breach;

B.

the flavors of possible, plausible normative theories of breach; and

C.

the pitfalls of a more detailed description of the existing legal
doctrine of breach.

More specifically, I analyze below the Restatement (Second) of Torts, perhaps in
excruciating detail, because in it are the ambiguous threads that can and have been used
to weave plausible normative theories of breach. To clarify, I am not claiming that
normative theorists actually received inspiration or borrowed ideas from the Restatement
(Second). Likely, theorists were inspired by the same case law from which the
Restatement (Second) drew.
Nevertheless, I will parenthetically highlight aspects in the Restatement (Second)
that seem like “fore-shadows” of the normative theories that I address later. The
Restatement (Second), while much less important in many ways, may be likened, in one
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aspect, to works such as Plato’s REPUBLIC and Thomas Hobbes’s LEVIATHAN.27 In
dissecting each of these works, one finds not only the main views for which each is
renowned, but one can also find shadows of related or possibly competing “Truths,”
metaphorically projected on the wall of Plato’s cave. More concretely, in the Restatement
(Second)’s ambiguous threads we can find ideas that point toward the normative theories
that I identify below.
Aside from its historical and any prognosticatory worth, for decades the
Restatement (Second) of Torts generally influenced black letter law, appellate review of
jury verdicts, and directed verdict practice in trial courts.28 Furthermore, few other
overarching code-like statements of accident law were even available during this period,
and none were obviously better than the Restatement (Second)’s account. One of these
few accounts, PROSSER ON, TORTS was also a renowned account of tort law during that
same period (and continues to be influential).29 Nevertheless, Prosser’s account of
negligent breach and the reasonable person standard is quite similar to that found in the
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PLATO, REPUBLIC (George Maximillian Anthony Grube & C. D. C. Reeve trans.,1992) (c. 380 B.C.E.);
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (John Charles Addison Gaskin ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1651).
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Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person
Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 814-815 (2001). Below I point out how the Restatement
(Third) also fails to adequately guide judges and juries in determining the standard of care.
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Some appellate decisions have followed the phrasing of Prosser on Torts (2d Ed.) of the reasonable
person standard in terms of the “community ideal of reasonable behavior.” WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS (2d ed. 1955); Cermak v. Hertz Corp., 28 N.J. 568, 569 (1959); Sheets v. Pendergrast, 106 N.W.2d
1, 4 (N.D. 1960); Bowens v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 102
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N.J. Super. 563, 587 (App. Div. 1990); Daniel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 239 N.J. Super. 563, 587 (App.
Div. 1990); Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 60 (1993); Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 390
(1993); Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300, 312 (App. Div. 1994). However, it is not clear
whether Prosser and these courts were merely rehashing the Restatement (Second) of Torts (for which
Prosser was a reporter) or whether the court intended to validate one interpretation of the Restatement
(Second) while invalidating competing interpretations.
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Restatement (Second), with some of the key phrases verbatim. Such is not surprising
given that Prosser was one of the reporters (i.e., authors) of the Restatement (Second). As
a close sibling, Prosser’s account suffers from the same ambiguities that I identify below
in the Restatement (Second).
Even though negligent breach is one of the essential elements of a tort claim, the
Restatement (Second) has influenced this issue much less, if at all, compared to other
aspects of tort law. That is partly due to the fact that courts have been reluctant to adopt
any statements of law, aside from the reasonable person standard, as legal doctrine
(understood narrowly) for negligent breach. As I argued above, in order to be accurate
and helpful as a pure description of the law, any additional theory would need to add to
my Mixed Descriptive Theory information about adjudication and the conceptions of the
good of the potential jury members instead of specifying further rules, standards, or
prohibited conduct.
In other areas of law, legal theorists directly piece together cases to articulate
what a particular legal doctrine requires. Yet, that approach is not viable in for negligent
breach since judicial opinions do not address the problems raised in this chapter. Judicial
opinions also do not provide any other information that could definitively resolve the
identified ambiguities below. As mentioned above, listing or interlacing the various
negligent actions from all court cases would not provide adequate guidance about what
constitutes negligence or what the reasonable person would do because of the seemingly
infinite ways to perform acts and endless ways acts can intersect.
In reviewing a trial court’s application of the reasonable person standard,
appellate courts have often quoted or cited the Restatement (Second) for the relevant,
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authoritative law. Other judicial opinions seem to be trying to solve or wrestle with the
theoretical abyss, pertaining to this issue, that the Restatement (Second) itself does not
fill—and actually obscures. Since the Restatement (Second) was officially superseded, I
contrast its account of negligent breach with a markedly different version that the
American Law Institute has recently promulgated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
In the following sections, as I explain how the Restatement (Second) defines
negligent breach, I also point out that, despite perhaps superficial appearances to the
contrary, its account is incomplete—even as a description of this particular legal doctrine.
Simultaneously, the Restatement (Second) says too much and, thus, errs and misleads by
describing one possible interpretation of jury adjudication. More important to my
normative project, the Restatement (Second)’s account, standing alone, does not contain
the theoretical resources to determine what constitutes breach of the negligence standard
of care in all cases.30 Thus, these theoretical gaps create the potential for the two potential
kinds of injustice, which I aim to mitigate or solve with my theory. In fact, my
overarching objective in critiquing this and other existing theories is to show that there is,
in fact, such a theoretical gap, a gap that has been largely neglected.

Ambiguities in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Generally, across most theories of tort law and in actual law practice, to win a
negligence tort lawsuit, the plaintiff must show that, among other things, the defendant
breached a standard of care when she performed the act that actually and legally caused
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the plaintiff’s harm.31 In the Restatement (Second), a defendant did not breach the
standard of care if she did at minimum what a reasonably prudent person would have
done in her circumstances.32 The Restatement (Second) defines the reasonable person as
follows:
The words “reasonable [person]” denote a person exercising those
qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which
society requires of its members for the protection of their own interests
and the interests of others.33
From this first definition, it is already dubious that the Restatement (Second) is merely
restating the law. While its definition has aspects that resonate with some uses of the term
“reasonable,” in fact, it is defining the phrase, “reasonable person,” in a particular way
that is familiar to lawyers but likely unfamiliar, in its particulars, to most jurors. Nothing
in Kelley and Wendt’s analysis of pattern jury instructions indicates that juries ever hear
any of the terms, “attention,” “knowledge,” “intelligence,” “judgment,” and “protection,”
nor is the jury told that these categories should be filled out by what “society requires of
its members.”
It is certainly possible that an idiosyncratic judge has fashioned jury instructions
along the lines of the Restatement (Second)’s verbiage. Oddly and idiosyncratically, in
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Pennsylvania, appellate courts have incorporated the Restatement (Second)’s verbiage to
articulate what constitutes “reasonable diligence” in its “discovery rule.” 34 The discovery
rule must be met for a plaintiff to establish that he sought to discover the cause of his
injury with reasonable diligence for the purpose of tolling (i.e., adjusting) the statute of
limitations on the plaintiff’s tort claim.35
To demonstrate reasonable diligence, a plaintiff must establish that he
pursued the cause of his injury with those qualities of attention,
knowledge, intelligence and judgment which society requires of its
members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of
others.36
Those courts arguably used this verbiage in idiosyncratic and perhaps legally
questionable ways. Due to the overall paucity of use of the verbiage in the case
law, which is itself noteworthy, as well as the verbiage’s noticeable absence in
any pattern jury instructions, I assume that juries (virtually) never hear these
words in jury instructions in regard to the defendant’s alleged negligence in the
typical tort case in Pennsylvania as well as the rest of the United States.
Instead of purely describing the law of negligent breach, the Restatement
(Second)’s reporters (i.e., authors) are interpreting what takes place in the process of jury
adjudication as to the issue of negligent breach. Importantly, instead of identifying itself
as an interpretation of adjudication, the Restatement (Second) presents its interpretation
under the guise of being pure legal doctrine. This point is clearer when illustrated in the

Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 510-11 (2006); Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 543 (2005);
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Super. 264, 292, 505 A.2d 973, 988 (1985); Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 271, 453 A.2d 342, 347
(1982).
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following example. “Reasonable person,” by itself, will not bring up, in all contexts, the
concept(s) of “protection” of one’s “own interests and the interests of others.” As a
somewhat trivial example, if one asks what is the conduct of a reasonable person when
ordering take-out food over the phone, answers would likely pertain to patience rather
than anything related to protection of anyone’s bodily integrity or property. Consider an
example where safety is at issue. Suppose five people are fishing on a boat. Asking what
the reasonably prudent person would have done in that setting could just as easily be
about buying enough bait and picking a good location to fish as, say, making sure one is
hydrated and the boat has life preservers. So, what the reasonably prudent person would
do, in part, depends on context and can likely refer to aspects far removed from what the
Restatement (Second) states.
In the context of a jury adjudication in tort, the plaintiff is claiming that the
defendant acted in a way that did not adequately protect his interests. Usually, the jury
will have also heard evidence and argument about whether the defendant’s act was proper
or cautious enough. When the judge instructs the jury regarding the reasonable person in
that context, perhaps many jurors may, but need not necessarily, associate some aspect of
“protection of interests” or similar and the “reasonable person,” assuming nothing else in
the process goes awry. For instance, a juror could think that the reasonably prudent
person largely protects her own interests rather than her own interests and the “interests
of others.” By defining that phrase in terms of the protection of interests or the actor and
others, the Restatement (Second)’s description of the law inserts into the concept of
“reasonable person” the one possible interpretation of the context in which jurors hear
and interpret the phrase “reasonable person.” So, the Restatement (Second)’s
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description of the law is only plausible if we consider the reasonable person standard in
the context of jury adjudication. Most importantly, that description, under the guise of
legal doctrine, inextricably includes one, but not the only, possible interpretation of jury
adjudication in a negligence suit.
Obviously, context is always important to a person’s understanding of words and
phrases. Yet, such is a spectrum where some words have more narrow definitions that are
relatively inflexible in a variety of contexts while others rely largely on context. The
phrase “reasonable person” or “reasonable” by itself gets much of its content from the
context. That is part of the virtue of that term given that this area of law does not lend
itself to ex ante specification. Contrast here the term “murder” in the model penal code.
While “murder” too can have various meanings in different contexts, the penal code goes
to great pains to specify the elements of murder and its several gradations. Nothing in tort
law or its adjudication is even remotely comparable as an attempt to more precisely
articulate to the jury what constitutes the “reasonable person” (or the broad category of
negligence tout court).
Putting my earlier point differently, the Restatement (Second)’s reporters are
stating their interpretation of jury adjudication going well, when jurors fulfill their duties,
or when the process does not substantially break down for any one of a number of
reasons (many of which may not involve even the slightest nefarious intention from
anyone). Yet, this interpretation of negligent breach has normative content. It is more
akin to an ideal that, according to the Restatement (Second), jury adjudication may or
should aspire to achieve.
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In much of what follows in this chapter, I take seriously the Restatement
(Second)’s articulation of negligent breach as what it claims to be, a description of tort
legal doctrine. I show that this self-proclaimed description cannot completely and
determinately resolve even uncomplicated disputes over accident costs without
substantially relying on jury adjudication to correct its ambiguities or provide substantial
missing content. Moreover, in the arguments that follow my primary aim is not to
highlight the vices (or virtues) of the Restatement (Second), but instead, I aim to
highlight what philosophical issues must be addressed to create a defensible normative
theory of negligent breach. So, the reader need not assume that I take the Restatement
(Second) to be of independent interest—apart from the curious hodgepodge of ideas that
it contains.
Returning to the Restatement (Second)’s definition of the reasonable person, that
definition indicates the purpose of this concept and the categories of qualities that are
purportedly important to this concept. However, it does not tell us exactly how those
qualities should be instantiated in specific situations. For instance, would the reasonable
person phone while driving? Would phoning impede too much her attention and perhaps
judgment while driving? Again, the jury does not hear these qualities. So, the
Restatement (Second) leaves it up to the jury’s discretion, without further judicial
guidance, to implicitly or explicitly identify these qualities and add substantial content to
them in order to resolve such questions and tender a verdict.
Related to a previous point, it is understandable why neither judicial decisions nor
the Restatement list the specific qualities for each category needed under what
conditions. The variety of acts individuals can undertake, the complex ways acts can
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intersect, rule of law principles, and the limits of human foresight make it impossible to
create even a minimally comprehensive list of the conduct of what the reasonable person
would do under various conditions. Nevertheless, some person (e.g., the judge) or group
(e.g., the jury) needs to (implicitly or explicitly) provide content to these categories for
the Restatement (Second)’s definition to have any relatively specific content.
The Restatement (Second) does state that these categories of qualities (attention,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment) are filled out by what “society requires of its
members.” At the same time, again, the jury never hears this society-phrase. Instead, the
Restatement (Second) seems to be interpreting the process—that, when the jury reaches a
verdict, their verdict (ideally) is based on what society requires of its members. The
Restatement (Second)’s assumption is that, when the jury determines the conduct of a
reasonably prudent person, the jury will base that determination on society’s formal or
informal requirements. Again, the context and process are written into the Restatement
(Second)’s account of negligent breach. In other contexts, a person could base such a
determination on a god’s will, his own idiosyncratic view, or his emotional response to
the scenario presented. Even more problematic, some research suggests jury verdicts can
be haphazardly decided and may have little to do with the underlying law or issues
presented in the trial.
One may be tempted to take a more direct line, in a sense similar to the
Holmesian power-centered view mentioned above, in understanding the Restatement
(Second)’s account of jury adjudication of negligent breach. One could focus on the fact
that the jury’s verdict directly and largely determines who among the litigants is assigned
the accident costs. In so doing, the jury is the “society” (or its representative) and the jury
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requires certain conduct of society’s members by virtue of the jury rendering a verdict for
one of the litigants.
While this interpretation contains some insight, it contains a strained reading of
the Restatement (Second)’s text. Specifically, there is a disjointed leap, theoretically
speaking, from the jury rendering a verdict for one party where primarily money damages
are at stake to conceptualizing the jury as the society that requires all members to employ
certain levels of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment for the protection of
their own interests and the interests of others. Moreover, in any particular instance of jury
adjudication, the jury’s verdict pertains directly only to the litigants in that case. Any
further impact is nil, small, or occurs long after the jury renders a verdict. Nevertheless,
this possible yet strained interpretation further shows how the Restatement (Second)’s
account suggests a cauldron of diverse, even conflicting ideas, any one of which could be
developed into a more precise normative theory of negligent breach.

Which Society?
Since ultimately my theory addresses the following issue by using the term
“group,” I employ that term in explicating the Restatement (Second) although it uses
either “society” or “community” as if such were univocal in every sense. The
Restatement (Second)’s society-phrase, quoted above, is ambiguous regarding the
relevant “society.” Is it the neighborhood, the town, the county, the nation-state, the
hemisphere, the world? Rather than political boundaries, the society could be delineated
by historical ties or cultural similarities. In a diverse nation, a jury could plausibly
respond to such a question, “Which society?” In that hypothetical dialogue, the jury’s
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question asks which among the many, competing voices or views in a society speaks on
behalf of that society. This issue is especially important in a society with diverse,
competing, and irreconcilable comprehensive conceptions of the good. Suppose a
political entity (i.e., a nation or one of its subdivisions) contains three groups each with a
different view on what the conduct of the reasonably prudent person would be in a
particular context. In such a scenario, spelling out “reasonably prudent person” in terms
of what “society requires” does not add unambiguous content unless such spells out how
to determine from among the views of the three groups what “society requires.”
In actual litigation, this ambiguity issue does not explicitly arise. When the judge
instructs the jury on negligent breach, the judge does not explicitly ask the jury to
determine what society requires of its members or anything comparable. As a result, jury
adjudication does not explicitly deal with the issue of which group in the society
determines negligent breach. Nevertheless, the problem does not disappear because, by
not explicitly broaching the issue, jury adjudication allows the jury to implicitly or
explicitly adopt the view of almost any of the competing groups in a society. So, without
something like the society-phrase appearing in jury adjudication, the hypothetical
dialogue imagined above does not occur. The issue underlying the Restatement
(Second)’s ambiguous society-phrase does not get explicitly addressed.
The jury verdict is not likely to be diametrically opposed to the views of many of
the competing groups in the society. Otherwise, the judge may reverse the verdict upon
motion of the losing party. So, we can safely assume that most verdicts are at least
loosely consistent with the view of one or more of the groups in a society. However, such
is hardly a satisfying resolution to the underlying question of which group’s view should
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determine negligent breach. Even worse, without adequately considering and properly
weighting the diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good at play
existing jury adjudication creates the potential for the privileged ab initio injustice
Moreover, pointing out this ambiguity in the society-phrase is useful because it
calls into question the propriety of using jury adjudication to determine negligent breach.
Different well-intentioned, capable juries may render different verdicts for the same
lawsuit. Each of those juries could simply be expressing different, conflicting views from
different groups in the society, as suggested above. For example, one jury could adopt the
regional view on an issue while another jury could adopt the national view on the same
issue. So, two individuals whose conduct was the same in all morally relevant ways could
receive different verdicts. Again, different outcomes for two identically situated
individuals is the epitome of injustice. So, the way that jury adjudication obscures the
“Which society?” issue makes this kind of injustice possible.
From a different but related angle, the ambiguity in the Restatement (Second)’s
society-phrase points to a normative question about the justification of any theory—
including existing jury adjudication—that determines negligent breach. My normative
theory, democratic standard theory, specifies that the relevant “society” should include
those individuals who are locally subject to the risk from the kind of act at issue in a
lawsuit. In my words:
NEGLIGENT BREACH occurs when an individual’s conduct falls
below the standard of care that is supported by the values of the most
individuals who are locally affected by that kind of act.
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In explicating democratic standard theory, I try to defend a workable and plausible
theoretical tool to identify those relevant individuals. Locally affected individuals can
themselves have competing views just like the views of one region of a nation can vary
from the views of the nation as a whole. As its name may belie, democratic standard
theory employs constrained, majority rule to determine which of the competing values in
a diverse society determines negligent breach. As mentioned above, only after these
theoretical issues are resolved can we then determine, through experimentation, whether
existing jury adjudication, something similar, or an entirely different mechanism best
approximates these normative requirements.

What Kind of Requirement?
Returning to the Restatement (Second), it adds to its denotation of the reasonable
person the following:
Standard of the “reasonable [person].” Negligence is a departure from a
standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk.37
To briefly revisit the above “Which society?” ambiguity, the use of “community” here
instead of “society” suggests that the relevant group is smaller than the whole world and
consists of a group with some commonality. However, the text does not explicitly define
its previous use of “society” in terms of community. Thus, if the two phrases indicate two
different relevant groups, the Restatement (Second) contradicts itself.
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Even if we interpret “community” as superseding or coextensive with the
Restatement (Second)’s use of “society” as the relevant group, the neighborhood, the
town, the county, the state, the nation-state, and even groups not exclusively within a
political or geographic boundary remain viable candidates for what constitutes the
community. Hence, the first ambiguity regarding the scope of the society remains.
Moving on, another ambiguity with the society-phrase involves three possible
interpretations of the nature of society’s requirements. First, what “society requires of its
members” could be the actual social norms or conventions (hereafter, collectively
“norms”) of a particular society.38 These norms could be codified in bodies of laws or
regulations. For example, society may codify driving norms that developed organically.
Norms could also remain informal without explicit validation by any part of the
government. An example of a possible uncodified norm is: On a pedestrian path you own,
as soon as possible, clean up debris or liquids that cause dangerous conditions. The
norms-based interpretation of the reasonable person standard may seem to follow from
the Restatement (Second)’s text because a social group (society) is doing the requiring.
This possible interpretation can be likened to Stephen Perry’s theory (addressed
subsequently) where negligent breach is an act that contravenes the “accepted pattern of
social interaction.” Additionally, George Fletcher uses a related idea for one part of his
theory of negligent breach. Fletcher terms as “background risks” all of the risks that
accompany daily social life. Another plausible way to describe background risks is “the
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grouping of the risks from conduct in conformity with the norms and patterns of daily
social life” (my wording). Here, again, we see an embryo of normative theory that is
contained in one possible way of interpreting an ambiguous aspect of the Restatement
(Second)’s account of negligent breach.
The second possible interpretation is that “society requires” whatever actual
members of a society would require based on those members’ preferences. This
preferences-based interpretation differs from the norms-based interpretation because the
current members of society may prefer in some instances to deviate from their extant
norms. Under the preferences-based interpretation, the Restatement (Second) still needs a
way to aggregate the possibly conflicting preferences of many individuals into what
“society requires of its members.” Would majority rule or would technocrats synthesize
the competing preferences of society’s members?
As mentioned above, democratic standard theory resolves this ambiguity by
arguing that constrained majority rule, limited to only the issue of what constitutes breach
of the negligence standard of care, best resolves the conflicting values in the relevant
society. Furthermore, what matters in most cases in democratic standard theory is the
actual values of the individuals locally affected, similar to the preferences-based
interpretation of the Restatement (Second)’s requirement.
Finally, since “reasonable” is often a term in moral discourse, the society-phrase
could refer to the requirements of morality. The demands of morality are often phrased in
terms of what a social group would require of its members.39 In this morality-based
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interpretation, the requirements of morality would fill in the details of what the
reasonable person would do. Since the moral point of view may not depend on the
idiosyncrasies of any particular individual, a specific, actual group of individuals may not
need to be identified as the relevant society. If so, then the morality-based interpretation
may avoid the above ambiguity regarding society’s scope.
The separate theories of Ernest Weinrib and Arthur Ripstein have similar
morality-based flavors. Weinrib extols the moral concept of liberty as the governing
concept for negligent breach while Ripstein adds equality as well. As we shall see,
Weinrib’s and Ripstein’s theories seem detached or only loosely connected to actual
preferences of individuals or norms—just as the morality-based interpretation of the
Restatement (Second)’s account of negligent breach would likely be.
In the rest of its text, the Restatement (Second) does not definitively identify
which of these three interpretations of the society-phrase it endorses. Some parts of the
text hint at one interpretation while other parts hint at another interpretation or are
ambiguous. For instance, the above-quoted use of “community” in the reasonable person
standard suggests something less than the moral point of view, something particularized
to a specific group of people. If so, that usage suggests, without favoring one over the
other, the norms-based or the preferences-based interpretation of the society-phrase.
On the other hand, “community” could be a term indicating the moral point of
view because a community may, by definition, require its citizens to follow the
requirements of morality. Moreover, another part of the text may suggest, at first
appearance, the morality-based interpretation. It reads as follows:
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The standard which the community demands must be an objective and
external one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good or bad, of
the particular individual. It must be the same for all persons, since the law
can have no favorites.…40
The Restatement’s further qualification that the “reasonable person” standard be
objective41 favors the morality-based interpretation because the moral point of view is
often associated with an objective point of view.42 In contrast, society’s preferences or
norms may not be objective but may rather be the result of the mere wants or religious
beliefs of all or part of the individuals in the community. Furthermore, stating that the
standard must be external also suggests the moral point of view because such would be
external to the society’s preferences or norms.
At the same time, the preferences-based and norms-based interpretations are still
viable because the rather-than-phrase could mean that the standard is objective and
external only relative to any particular individual in the community instead of objective
and external to the whole community. At the same time, the morality-based interpretation
would also be objective and external relative to any particular individual. So, none of the
three interpretations are definitively ruled out.
The idea expressed in the phrase, “[The standard which the community demands]
must be the same for all persons, since the law can have no favorites,” may push us
towards the morality-based interpretation. Requiring the same standard for “all persons”
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suggests the moral point of view because the requirements of morality are usually the
same for all (similarly situated) persons without favoritism. In contrast, community
norms and preferences vary between communities which may lead to differential
treatment between those communities. However, the norms-based and preferences-based
interpretations are not ruled out because “all persons” could refer only to all persons in
the community. If so, a community’s requirements would apply without favoritism to all
individuals in that community. Still, the Restatement (Second) does not conclusively
exclude any of the three possible interpretations of the society-phrase.
To reiterate, my objective is not to focus on the Restatement (Second)’s
shortcomings as if immensely important in itself, especially given that the Restatement
(Second) has been superseded and the particulars of the text analyzed above were likely
never included into actual jury instructions. Rather, these three interpretations are of
interest also because they each identify important issues that pertain to a defensible
normative theory of negligent breach. Each of the normative theories surveyed hereafter
wrestles with one or more of these issues, which are smoldering within the Restatement
(Second)’s text.
Before moving on, the current dominant view in academic circles regarding
negligent breach is also foreshadowed in the Restatement (Second) as follows:
Weighing interests. The judgment which is necessary to decide whether
the risk so realized is unreasonable, is that which is necessary to determine
whether the magnitude of the risk outweighs the value which the law
attaches to the conduct which involves it.43
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On its face, this text presents a definition of unreasonable risk as if that definition
seamlessly coheres with the prior text quoted above. In fact, this text could be intended as
a clarification of the prior term, “unreasonable risk,” which the Restatement (Second)
included in its “standard of the reasonable person.” Upon inspection, the weighinginterests test obscures further the legal doctrine of negligent breach, while also spelling
out another thread with which one branch of normative theory has woven extensively.
First, let’s examine the weighing-interests test, as above, taking seriously the
Restatement (Second)’s purported descriptive project. Weighing interests to gauge
whether “the magnitude of the risk outweighs the value which the law attaches to the
conduct” may not always lead to the same conduct as doing what society requires of its
citizens even under any of the three interpretations of the society-phrase.44 For example,
society’s norms or preferences may not require that citizens avoid phoning while driving
even though the magnitude of the risk of an accident may and probably does outweigh
the value which the law attaches to phoning while driving. Thus, the weighing-interests
test may conflict with the norms-based or preferences-based interpretation of the
reasonable person standard.45 If so, then the weighing-interests test provides yet another
definition of reasonableness rather than clarifying the prior criteria and their ambiguities.
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Second, the Restatement (Second) does not specify how to determine “the value
which the law attaches to the conduct” in the weighing-interests test. Setting aside the
awkward personification of the law, the law does not function like a stock market where
one can look up any particular conduct and discover its value. With a charitable
construction, the weighing-interests test bears similarity to the Learned Hand test. Put
roughly, the Learned Hand test determines negligence by comparing the weighted
magnitude of risks against the costs of further precautions in performing the conduct at
issue. Some legal commentators claim that weighing interests according to the Learned
Hand test is exactly what a reasonable person would do.46 Following that vein, the Law
and Economics Approach to negligence endorses a utilitarian-esque morality-based
version of the Learned Hand test.47 Here too, a thread, which was incorporated into the
Restatement (Second), has been refined into a widely lauded, normative theory of
negligent breach.
Within the four corners of the Restatement (Second), the weighing-interests test
could be a clarification of the morality-based interpretation of what society requires of its
members. On the other hand, the Restatement (Second) does not explicitly equate the
weighing-interests test with its prior use of what society requires of its members. Instead,
the Restatement (Second) baldly offers both as explanations of what is reasonable.
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Furthermore, a utilitarian version of the weighing-interests test is not the only
moral theory available to flesh out the morality-based interpretation of the society-phrase.
Instead, that interpretation could be based on intuitionism, pragmatism, virtue ethics,48 or
rights-based theories. While all of these moral theories may perhaps agree on what the
reasonable person would have done in some cases, in other cases the theories propound
conflicting answers.49 Since the Restatement (Second) merely formulates the weighinginterests test without clearly identifying it as the definitive interpretation of the
reasonable person standard, the inclusion of the weighing-interests test exacerbates rather
than resolves the ambiguities noted above
To summarize, I list the ambiguities discussed above and then reiterate my
arguments thus far in this chapter.
1.

Which society? - Since reasonable person theory does not specify
how to delineate the relevant society/community, it provides
conflicting answers when different societies/communities require
conflicting actions from the same individuals.

2.

Society’s requirements - Reasonable person theory is ambiguous
whether the society’s requirements are based on social norms,
preferences of a group, or moral requirements.

3.

Weighing-interests - The Restatement (Second) mentions the
weighing-interests test but does not clarify whether this test is the
definitive account of the society-phrase or somehow supplements
it.

With these ambiguities, the Restatement (Second)’s theoretical resources are not able to
unambiguously provide a single, determinate answer to what the reasonable person would
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do in specific circumstances. Without such, the Restatement (Second)’s account relies
heavily on jury adjudication to assign accident costs without making that reliance or its
details explicit. These ambiguities demonstrate how malleable and how many different
ways a jury could interpret the reasonable person standard making disparate treatment
injustice as likely as juries are varied.
Misguided in the other direction, the Restatement (Second) also provides
superfluous details found nowhere in jury instructions or trial court practice. Thus, its
account deviates from the pure description of legal doctrine by including those details
that it purports to pertain to the content of the legal doctrine of negligence. Instead, the
Restatement (Second) speculates on what might or should be taking place in jury
adjudication of negligent breach and in so doing it mixes together the reasonably prudent
person jury instruction and its Reporters’ interpretation of adjudication.
In contrast, my mixed descriptive theory of negligent breach is drastically
different yet accurate in describing the “law” on that issue. My mixed theory makes the
adjudication explicit and acknowledges the excessive discretion given the judge or jury to
determine negligent breach. With excessive discretion, the judge or jury fills in the details
of what the reasonable person would have done largely based on adjudication itself and
their own possibly competing conceptions of the good. Given that adjudication does not
necessarily require that a judge or jury give due consideration to the diverse,
irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good as they related to the issue of
negligent breach, existing adjudication leaves open the potential that one conception of
the good is unjustly treated in effect as privileged ab initio, to the detriment of one of the
parties to the lawsuit.
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As I have pointed out periodically, the Restatement (Second) contains
ambiguities, the resolution of which paves the way toward some plausible normative
theories of negligent breach. Perhaps sensing the injustices looming in existing
adjudication of negligent breach, the normative theories surveyed in subsequent sections
wrestle with ideas like those exemplified in the obscure threads in the Restatement
(Second) in an effort to provide the decision-maker more normative guidance, guidance
that their advocates assume or hope is also soundly justified.

The Restatement (Third) of Torts
The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Torts has superseded its
Restatement (Second). To unify and simplify the Restatement (Second)’s account of
negligent breach, the Restatement (Third) replaces it with a single, more focused account
of negligent breach. That account hearkens back to the weighing-interests test in the
Restatement (Second) and is one version of the Law and Economics Approach to
negligent breach. In general, the Law and Economics Approach has dominated much of
the legal academy and has been well-received by numerous appellate courts. Even so,
what, if any, influence the Restatement (Third)’s version or text, in particular, has or will
have on courts, the law, and legal academia has so far been unclear.
Relevant to this dissertation, I contend that the Restatement (Third), like its
predecessor, is not a purely descriptive account of negligent breach. Rather, its account is
primarily normative. Regardless, as its reporters explicitly acknowledge, on its own
without adjudication, its account does not provide complete, determinate criteria for what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. That fact alone opens the door for
52

both kinds of potential injustice, namely, both disparate treatment and privileged ab
initio.
I address the Restatement (Third) for multiple reasons aside from it now being the
current version of its kind. First, the elimination of much of the text prominent in the
Restatement (Second) is an implicit acknowledgment that that former account said too
much resulting in the internal tensions and ambiguities that I mentioned above.
Second, as one version of the Law and Economics Approach, I use the
Restatement (Third)’s account as a contrast to the other approaches of negligent breach.
My aim in this dissertation is not to persuade the reader that Law and Economics
Approach is unsatisfactory on its own or compared to rights-based theories. Much ink has
already been persuasively spilled to that end. Rather, I am merely offering the Law and
Economics Approach as a contrast—especially to highlight how directly and precisely it
addresses negligent breach, the very issue that rights-based theories neglect or disavow as
within the domain of their theories.
In fact, in a bit of irony, the Law and Economics Approach’s theory of negligent
breach is its central and motivating idea of its entire account of negligence. Its theory of
negligent breach virtually reduces all of the other traditional elements of a tort claim to
this one concept. The irony is that the Law and Economics Approach has achieved
dominance in legal academia by focusing almost entirely on the very issue that the rightsbased theories have neglected or even explicitly excluded from the domain of their
inquiry. In my view, the rights-based approach to negligence law only stands a chance at
counterbalancing the Law and Economics Approach if the former can provide a
compelling theory of the issue that the Law and Economics Approach centrally
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addresses, namely, what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. So, my
aim is to develop the best theory of negligent breach based on the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition so that, in a future work, I can showcase it as a
compelling alternative to the Law and Economics Approach to negligence and especially
to its pride and joy, the balancing test. Even though my project in this dissertation is not
to refute the Law and Economics Approach to negligent breach, I provide a sketch of
some of the arguments against it.
The Restatement (Third) begins the section on negligence with the following:
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all
the circumstances.50
This statement hearkens back to aspects of the Restatement (Second) and most pattern
jury instructions. However, unlike those texts, the Restatement (Third) immediately
follows that statement with the following:
Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may
ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of
harm.51
Again, these factors remind us of the weighing-interests test in the Restatement (Second)
and the Learned Hand test from the Law and Economics Approach. Some key differences
are noteworthy. Although the factors are not arranged as opposite sides of a mathematical
formula, the Reporters’ notes explain the foreseeable likelihood of harm and the
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foreseeable severity of harm should be balanced against the burden of precautions to
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.52 The Reporters declare that this formulation
supports the “‘balancing approach’ to negligence.”53
While the Reporters claim, “The balancing approach rests on and expresses a
simple idea,”54 that idea is not as simple as it may first appear. That idea is:
Conduct is negligent if its disadvantages outweigh its advantages, while
conduct is not negligent if its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.55
This idea is too simple, or better yet too general, because other bad conduct (e.g.,
criminal conduct, illegal conduct, immoral conduct, bad etiquette) can plausibly be
described as conduct where the “disadvantages outweigh its advantages,” and one does
not have to be a utilitarian for this idea to hold. What does all of the work is how we spell
out the disadvantages and advantages. The Reporters may sense this excessive generality
because they go on to add:
The disadvantage in question is the magnitude of risk that the conduct
occasions; as noted, the phrase “magnitude of the risk” includes both the
foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable severity of harm that
might ensue. The “advantages” of the conduct relate to the burden of risk
prevention that is avoided when the actor declines to incorporate some
precaution. The actor’s conduct is hence negligent if the magnitude of the
risk outweighs the burden of risk prevention.56
Although the Reporters’ notes give their negligence test an appearance of mathematical
rigor, it creates additional problems. Each of the following problems shows why the
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Restatement (Third) fails to provide complete, determinate criteria for what constitutes
breach of the negligence standard of care without substantially relying on adjudication to
provide most of the missing substance and, thus, opening up the door for both kinds of
injustice.
First, harms, risks, and the burden of risk prevention are difficult to measure for
numerous reasons extensively explored in the literature of multiple disciplines.57 Second,
even if each factor can be accurately measured, it does not mean that each can be
measured or translated into a single unit (e.g., happiness), which suggests that instances
of these factors may be incommensurable.58 Third, sometimes the magnitude of risk is
not known, which some, including Sven Ove Hansson, have termed “uncertainty.” 59
Hansson claims that most situations of accidental harm are instances of uncertainty rather
than actors behaving with known risks.60 Without known risks (or at least reasonably
knowable risks), the Restatement (Third)’s formulation of negligence is unhelpful for a
large subset of accidents.
The Reporters think they have a rough solution to the problems of measurement,
incommensurability, and uncertainty, at least for common activities. They write:

57

The Reporters also admit some problems with measurement especially the severity of harm, when
anticipated harm is personal or emotional injury, and the burden of precaution, when it is intangible. Id. at
31.
58
The Reporters seem to acknowledge this difficulty when they state that the balancing test does not
permit the “comparison of common elements.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm §3, Comment h, 35 (2010).
59
Sven Ove Hansson, Ethical Criteria of Risk Acceptance, 59 ERKENNTNIS 291, 293 (2003) (“Strictly
speaking, real-life decisions are almost always made under conditions of uncertainty, but we often choose
to simplify our description of them by treating them as cases with known probabilities, hence as decisions
under risk.”).
60
Id.

56

[W]hen the claim of negligence relates to how a party conducts an activity
that most people generally engage in and are familiar with, such as
motoring, the jury’s knowledge of the circumstances of the activity
reduces the need to evaluate the party’s conduct in the formal terms of risk
magnitude and risk prevention burdens.61
The jury’s familiarity with the factors in the balancing test substitutes for the need to
formally quantify the factors in a way that all are commensurable, according to the
Reporters.
The Restatement (Third) explicitly includes jury adjudication to fill out the
meaning of its terms, a notable acknowledgment compared to the Restatement (Second)’s
seeming lack of self-awareness on its inclusion of its preferred interpretation of jury
adjudication. However, one problem with this solution is that it merely supposes that
such balancing is what the jury is in fact doing. In reality, we have little information
about jury deliberation. The “black box” nature of that process seems to be a virtually
insurmountable barrier to such information, at least without extensive (and expensive)
social scientific experimentation and study.
Second, the Restatement (Third)’s solution effectively abandons the seeming
mathematical rigor when it substitutes the specified factors for the jury’s beliefs about
those factors. It is true that, with jury adjudication, we are always working with the jury’s
beliefs about whatever is at issue. However, again, the balancing approach loses its
mathematical rigor unless jury members individually or collectively turn out to be adept
at these estimations. Furthermore, it raises doubts about whether or not jury adjudication
is the best process for making these determinations. Bureaucrats, armed with computers
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and actuarial tables, are much more likely to be adept at performing the estimation and
balancing that the Restatement (Third) seeks.
Third, the jury does not hear about the Restatement (Third)’s factors from the
judge’s instructions about negligence. Instead, the judge usually instructs the jury to
determine whether the defendant conduct was what a reasonably prudent/careful person
would have done in the defendant’s circumstances. So, the Restatement (Third) is making
a few big inferential leaps in proposing that the jury overcomes (at least some of) the
need for the formal rendering of the factors without the jury every hearing the factors that
it proposes to determine negligent breach.
Due to some of the reasons above and others that the Reporters themselves
mention, the Reporters surprisingly admit that “the approach to negligence described in
this Section is not one that . . . generates determinate results.”62 Instead, the Reporters
leave that task to the jury. The Reporters state as follows:
Rather, the approach identifies important variables for the jury to take into
account in evaluating whether the actor was unreasonable; the jury’s
responsibility is to render an informed judgment in light of these
variables.63
For my purposes, that admission validates or lends support to my main claims regarding
the Restatement (Third)’s theory of negligent breach as well as my claims above about
existing legal doctrine of negligent breach. Those claims are as follows:
1.

62
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The Restatement (Third)’s account of negligent breach, standing
alone (that is, without adjudication), will not provide complete and
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determinate criteria for what constitutes breach of the negligence
standard of care.
2.

Existing legal doctrine of negligent breach is hollow without
adjudication, in which an institutional actor (judge or jury) has
wide discretion. (Perhaps, including the balancing test in the jury
instructions may limit that discretion a little.)

3.

Due to the malleability of that “reasonably prudent person” jury
instruction, one dutiful jury could tender a verdict for the
defendant in one case while another equally dutiful jury, using the
same legal standard, could tender the opposite verdict—even
though the acts of both defendants’ were the same in all morally
relevant respects. (disparate treatment injustice)

4.

Existing jury adjudication of the issue of negligent breach does not
necessarily show due regard to each of society’s diverse,
irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good. (privileged
ab initio injustice)

As a purely descriptive theory, the Restatement (Third)’s account is dubious given that
the judge never instructs the jury to take the identified factors into consideration. The
parties’ lawyers may raise evidence and arguments pertinent to the Restatement (Third)’s
factors. Yet, nothing in trial court practice necessarily encourages the jury to employ the
Restatement (Third)’s factors in the way that the Reporters hope. The Reporters’ notes
are correct in that the jury reaches its verdict based on indeterminate theoretical guidance;
it is just not necessarily the guidance that the Reporters describe.
In the remainder of this chapter, I briefly address balancing test tort theories to
provide a contrast, especially to highlight how directly they address negligent breach, the
very issue that alternative theories neglect or disavow. Alternative approaches to
negligence law only stand a chance at counterbalancing the now dominant balancing test
approach if the former can provide a compelling theory of what the latter centrally
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addresses, namely, what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. Even
though my project in this dissertation is not to refute the Law and Economics Approach
to negligent breach, I provide a sketch of some of the arguments against it.

Social Welfare Theory
Balancing test theories do not always address accident law in terms of the
traditional elements of the prima facie tort claim. Nevertheless, for ease of comparison to
rights-based theories, I still formulate the relevant part of balancing test theories in terms
of breach of the standard of care. These theories apply efficiency or some form of costbenefit reasoning to determine breach. Some theorists seem to think that it is obvious
why their criterion is the proper one to use64 while others take seriously the need for
justification.65 In the end, these theories inadequately justify their criterion for what
constitutes breach of the standard of care.
The social welfare approach proffered by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell is a
sophisticated account of the Law and Economics Approach.66 Their theory includes,
insofar as it affects the preferences of individuals, the value of anything involved in the
accident and in the administration of assigning accident costs.67 Their theory sums up all
the various preferences that are satisfied by each option of assigning accident costs to
determine which option maximizes the (weighted) preferences of all affected. Kaplow
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and Shavell only exclude in their social welfare theory under the title of “fairness” those
considerations that do not affect preference satisfaction at all.68
In response, social welfare theory is afflicted with the problem of incompleteness.
In fact, social welfare theory fails to answer an issue key to its own formulation. Even
though the theory tries to justify social welfare as opposed to fairness as the criterion to
assign accident costs, the theory does not provide, let alone defend, a particular way to
weight each component of social welfare. 69 Social welfare theory tells us to pursue the
option that gives the highest social welfare once the acts are weighted.
In my view, the only meaningful and justifiable way to weight the various aspects
of social welfare is based on the actual values of the individuals locally affected by the
act at issue. Some version of that may be open to social welfare theory in lieu of
preference-satisfaction as the metric of welfare. If so, then social welfare theory becomes
more like democratic standard theory differing primarily in how it reconciles the differing
and competing values of the relevant individuals.

Strict Liability Separated
The negligence standard of care could be used to assign the costs from all
accidents. However, as various cases arose, judges separately developed, ahistorically
speaking, the standard of strict liability for certain kinds of conduct.70 More accurately,
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judges developed several strict liability rules, for specific kinds of acts that the judges
singled out usually because they involved a high risk of harm.71 One broad category of
strict liability is laid out in the Restatement (Third) as follows:
Abnormally Dangerous Activities
(a) An actor who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
strict liability for physical harm resulting from the activity.
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if:
(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of
physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors;
and
(2) the activity is not one of common usage.72
Examples of abnormally dangerous activities where judges applied strict liability are
blasting and crop dusting.73 Judges have also applied strict liability rules to instances
where an owner’s livestock, wild animal, or abnormally dangerous animal has caused
harm to others.
Strict liability is strict because the agent doing the abnormally dangerous act is
vulnerable to a tort claim even if the agent met or exceeded the reasonable person
standard. So, having caused a foreseeable harm via an abnormally dangerous act is
usually enough to establish liability for accident costs whereas with the negligence
standard of care causation is necessary, but alone not sufficient, to establish liability. 74
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Strict liability could be used to assign the costs of all accidents as long as the
person seeking compensation can somehow prove that another person “caused” the
accident.75 Richard Epstein has espoused such a theory.76 Common law judges did not go
this route choosing instead to use the negligence standard of care in one domain and to
use the strict liability standard in other limited domains. Keeping these domains separate
is entrenched in the common law.
However, common law judges have not provided a deep theoretical justification
for the division between negligence and strict liability. This lack elucidates a further way
that these accident law doctrines are hollow.77 In response to this problem and others,
commentators have developed other theories about how we should assign accident costs.
In the next chapter, I critique these theories.
As a sneak peak, my theory justifies the division between negligence and strict
liability by pointing out that, with abnormally dangerous acts, most, if not virtually all,
individuals do not want to be subject to those risks of harm at all. They want even less to
be subject to negligently performed abnormally dangerous acts because, presumably, a
negligently performed abnormally dangerous act is more dangerous along one or more
dimensions compared to an abnormally dangerous act performed with more care than the
negligence standard of care requires. The implicit “compromise,” if you will, is that
agents may nonetheless perform abnormally dangerous acts if they pay compensatory
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damages for any resulting harm, and they pay punitive damages also if they perform the
abnormally dangerous act negligently (and harm occurs).
This latter point is an interesting departure from existing legal doctrine where
punitive damages are only available if the agent is grossly negligent in performing the
abnormally dangerous act. This asymmetry seems insightful, intuitive, and justified given
the fact that a negligently performed abnormally dangerous act likely involves greater
danger. With the possibility of punitive damages addressing that extra risk of danger, my
theory has a clear advantage over existing legal doctrine for strict liability.

Summary
The Restatement (Second)’s and (Third)’s accounts of the legal doctrine of
negligent breach fail at their purely descriptive projects. Furthermore, both accounts of
negligent breach rely on the process of adjudication to fill their large theoretical holes or
resolve ambiguities. This reliance is worrisome given that neither these nor jury
instructions put a check on the wide discretion that any jury may employ without
sensitivity to the diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good held by
the individuals locally affected by the act at issue. So, examination of the Restatements
elucidates the numerous ways that existing adjudication of negligent breach leaves open
the door to the two kinds of potential injustice to the detriment of the parties to a
negligence suit.
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Chapter Two

Competing Theories of Negligent Breach

The previous chapter shows that two forms of injustice loom for parties to a tort lawsuit.
First and most notoriously, jury adjudication, especially on the issue of negligent breach,
too easily allows like cases to be treated differently. 78 Second, given Liberalism’s
assumption of diverse, competing, and irreconcilable comprehensive conceptions of the
good, the lawsuit may be unjustly decided in a manner (or according to a criterion) that
does not respect these diverse conceptions of the good.
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I also point out, in the last chapter, how these possible injustices persist despite
efforts to provide more determinate content to negligence law. The Restatement
(Second)’s account of negligent breach attempts to flesh out the reasonable person
standard. However, reflection on its ambiguities instead demonstrates the wide
conceptual space in which juries have excessive discretion to render a verdict.
The Restatement (Third) attempts, with its balancing test, to provide more definite
content to the negligence standard of care. However, in doing so, it loses its descriptive
accuracy since the jury never hears the balancing test factors and the jury can interpret
what they do in fact hear in multiple ways that are at odds with the balancing test. Even
taken on its own, due to the measurement, incommensurability, and uncertainty problems
mentioned in the last chapter and its own admitted incompleteness, the Restatement
(Third)’s balancing test leaves open both of the forms of injustice sketched above. These
issues are worrisome given that negligent breach is an essential part of a prima facie tort
claim.

Justification
The purposes of the Restatements that I have been analyzing are predominantly to
state the law,79 not to justify the law. Furthermore, these Restatements do not even restate
any reasons or justifications that judges may have proffered over the centuries. So, it is
worth highlighting that the above considerations do not even attempt to provide a
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justification for the reasonable person standard (in any of its possible forms), the
balancing test, or jury or judicial adjudication in this context.
No self-evident justifications seem available for determining negligent breach
based on the reasonable person standard, the balancing test, or jury or judicial
adjudication. Other plausible ways of assigning accident costs compete with them. New
Zealand’s social tort insurance is a dramatically different way to assign accident costs.80
Those harmed in accidents may apply for compensation from one of several funds paid
for by general or specific taxes.81 So, accident costs are spread among those paying taxes
rather than a specific party to a particular accident. With such divergent systems
available, this dissertation seeks adequate criteria to determine breach of the standard of
care as well as a justification for those criteria. Thus, I create a theory that has the
following sensible goals:
A. Provide more detailed, justifiable criteria to further limit jury
discretion; and
B. Given that individuals hold diverse, irreconcilable, and competing
conceptions of the good, resolve tort disputes according to criteria that
justly arbitrate between those conceptions of the good.
To achieve these goals, I seek a theory of negligent breach that best interprets the relevant
parts of the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
As part of this project, I also analyze, in the next sections, existing theories of tort
law to show that, in their current state, they fail to adequately address the issue of
negligent breach. Of course, proponents of these theories could still add an adequate
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theory of negligent breach. So, I explore some possible revisions or additions on behalf of
these theories. Ultimately, I conclude that one or both of the following critiques apply to
each of these theories:
1.

While the theory may still acquire an adequate account of
negligent breach, most of the theoretical work will be supplied by
that addition rather than the theoretical resources contained so far
in that theory.

2.

Among the options readily available to flesh out the theory, none is
preferable to the theory that I later defend if the ultimate criterion
for success is the best interpretation of the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition.

From one angle, my analysis of the upcoming theories might be a bit unsatisfying
because I am largely pointing out what is missing from these theories. While I entertain
some possible ways to rectify or flesh out these theories, it is impossible for us to
conclusively prove that no compelling option is available. Instead, we can only
demonstrate the lack, entertain some plausible fixes, and point out that much of the
theoretical work, on the issue of negligent breach in these theories, has yet to be done.
Fortunately, I have done that theoretical work for these theories by creating a theory of
negligent breach that is compatible with several general accounts of tort law. For those
that cannot simply or seamlessly incorporate my theory, I point out why my theory is
preferable in the final chapter.

Overarching Theoretical Commitments in the Kantian Tradition
Kantian political theory, as a branch of normative liberal political theory, includes
the writings of Immanuel Kant, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and John Rawls. I take it that one
of the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition is a commitment to
68

treating each individual as a person with certain fundamental interests that must be
respected. I mean the words in the previous sentence to be understood in their most
stripped down, jargon-free senses possible. So, the reader should take each of those
words in a general way apart from any of the particular, more technical concepts that can
and have been developed.
To apply this general statement to specific issues, the concepts attached to these
words need development. Nevertheless, I think that, even at this general level, we can
say, among other things, something significant about what the above commitment
proscribes. Specifically, it proscribes any individual from depriving another individual of
some aspect of that individual’s personhood or fundamental interests in an unjustifiable
way. I am not trying to sneak in the phrase “in an unjustifiable way.” As noted above, due
to the pervasiveness and inevitability of severe, accidental harm, some individuals’
fundamental interests, such as their bodily integrity and lives, will be accidently deprived
or severely burdened as a result of others’ acts. Such is unavoidable due to the fact that
these accidents may occur while others are performing acts that are in a meaningful sense
necessary to their survival. Thus, the qualification “in an unjustifiable way” signals,
among other things, that these proscriptions must be sensitive to some aspects of the role
that another individual may have played in causing the proscribed outcomes.
Nevertheless, even at this level of abstraction, the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition seem to proscribe certain actions. Put from another
direction, it would be impossible, or at least difficult, to justify certain acts as consistent
with the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. For example, one
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person forcing another to be a chattel slave is impossible to reconcile with a commitment
to treating each as a person with certain fundamental interests that must be respected.82
In contrast, the most straightforward (yet perhaps unsophisticated) form of
utilitarianism seems to leave open the possibility that chattel slavery is morally
justified—even if in only exceptional or bizarre situations where enslaving one or a
relatively small number of individuals leads to an overwhelming abundance of utility for
others. Thus, even this general sketch of the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition contains some significant content.
This general sketch could be developed in numerous ways, yet my methodology
is not to derive a theory of negligent breach step by step from first principles. Since my
theory aims to be consistent with many different ways that the Kantian tradition can and
has been developed, I do not deem it as necessary to reinvent the wheel by formulating,
in a unique way, each step of the argument starting from the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition until I reach my theory and its implications.
Instead, my methodology is to partly piggyback off one prominent way that the Kantian
tradition has been developed. Specifically, I employ Rawlsian terminology and concepts
to explicate the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition—even
though these commitments can be explicated in other terms. At least for my purposes, the
differences between general theorists that adhere to the Kantian tradition should not

I have in mind in the background the statement of Abraham Lincoln, “If anything is wrong, slavery is
wrong,” which John Rawls often quoted. SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS
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matter as long as in the end my theory is supported by, or at least consistent with, the best
interpretation of the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
A foundational element in the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition is the concept of the free and equal person. Reasoning about what kind
of society treats persons with equal concern is one method to determine the implications
of these overarching commitments.83 Another way to flesh out these commitments is by
considering what kind of society free and equal persons would choose given limitations
about what may influence (or bias) their choices.84 The outcome of the most persuasive
reasoning from the basis of free and equal persons provides the fundamental structure of
the political society required by morality, based on the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition.
In addressing what treating individuals as free and equal entails, Rawls and other
philosophers use terms such as “life plan” and “conception of the good.” For ease of
exposition, I treat both of these broad notions as roughly synonymous even though they
differ, at least, in focus. At times, I refer to them collectively as one’s “life plan” even
though in some cases aspects of one’s life plan may not be planned in the sense of
consciously or critically adopted. For that reason, “conception of the good” may be better
suited to my meaning. Nevertheless, “life plan” emphasizes better that a life plan is not
monolithic. Rather, it is composed of numerous parts that address various aspects of
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one’s life. A life plan, at least my concept of a life plan, includes one’s routine of daily
acts, inclinations, attitudes, dispositions, counter-factual dispositions, relationships, and
settings in which one lives as well as one’s values, morals, moral principles, religious
beliefs, ideologies, short and long term goals, jobs/careers, life-long projects, and
activities or principles that give one satisfaction on any level (herein also referred to as
“life plan parts”). The collection and integration of these aspects of one’s life are what I
mean by a life plan.
With that clarification in mind, note that Rawls also uses a philosophical tool, the
“original position,” to illustrate how his two principles of justice best capture what it
means to treat individuals as free and equal. Rawls’s argument is intricate and has
extensively been both critiqued and defended. For my purposes, I am sketching only
some of its central features.
Deliberators in Rawls’s original position are under the veil of ignorance, which
hides from them their personal interests and circumstances and most of the features of
their society.85 The deliberators are rational maximizers of their self-interest and, as such,
would choose the kind of society where each could develop their most valued
capacities.86 One of these capacities is the ability to develop, revise, and pursue her own
life plan; this capacity reflects her value of being free.87 The free and equal person does
not want to pursue her life plan regardless of how it affects other people. Instead, she
values her capacity to cooperate with other people based on fair terms of social
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cooperation; this capacity reflects her value of being equal.88 Another part of being equal
means that a free and equal person does not make choices that discriminate against
persons based on morally arbitrary characteristics such as their nationality, heritage,
gender, wealth, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or place in history.89 Putting these
components together, the free and equal person would choose a kind of society where
each individual can pursue each individual’s own life plan according to fair terms of
social cooperation which do not discriminate against persons based on morally arbitrary
characteristics.
Rawls concludes that the deliberators under the veil of ignorance would choose
the following principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society:
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same
scheme of liberties for all;
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity;
They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of
society (the difference principle).90
The first principle has lexical priority over the second principle in that greater social and
economic goods cannot be sought by sacrificing the satisfaction of the first principle.91
Rawls’s two principles of justice together require a political structure that
provides each individual space to pursue her own life plan while making sure other
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individuals are also able to pursue their life plans based on fair terms of social
cooperation.92 In this space, individuals may not have to take into consideration, as a
matter of political justice, how their actions may affect other individuals or society as a
whole.93 For example, an individual may believe what she finds persuasive even if those
beliefs are unpopular or disappoint others. Allowing the individual to believe as she
wants facilitates her forming and affirming her own life plan. The range of permissible
life plans must be expansive enough to allow for meaningful expression of one’s moral
power as a free person.94 In so doing, the political structure provides space for the
diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good in modern societies.
Despite being free to pursue a life plan, an individual may not pursue just any life
plan or conception of the good. An individual may not permissibly pursue being a serial
murderer because that conduct substantially interferes with other individuals’ pursuits of
their life plans. Moreover, an individual may not pursue a permissible life plan by
impermissible means. An individual cannot permissibly secure, as part of her life plan,
home ownership by defrauding a seller of a home.
To establish and enforce the fair terms upon which individuals may pursue their
life plans, the free and equal person would choose a political structure where society or
the government enforces fair social terms that govern individual actions. This choice
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reflects the person’s desire to be equal. 95 To enforce such terms, the government must do
such things as forming laws and institutions, regulating certain transactions between
individuals, and providing public goods. In so doing, the government makes possible
various life plans that individuals may pursue within that structure. In other words, the
individual must comply with the fair terms of social cooperation that govern the
conditions in which she and others can pursue their determinate life plans.96 This political
structure also indicates to individuals what their fair share of resources (including wealth
and social power) is at any given time and allows individuals to estimate what their fair
share is likely to be over their complete lives. Each individual is responsible for creating
her determinate life plan based on that estimate of her fair share.97
Putting these ideas together, the free and equal person would choose a political
structure where she is free to pursue her own life plan within fair terms of social
cooperation that the government creates and enforces for all. In so doing, the political
structure allows diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good to coexist
without any one of them unduly burdening another. Theorists may disagree on the exact
details of these terms, but they acknowledge, as part of the overarching political
commitments of the Kantian tradition, that individuals should be able to pursue their own
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life plans, to some extent, within a legal system that protects the fairness of those
pursuits.98
Up to this point in this section, I have been explicating a philosophical tool in
Rawlsian political theory. The tool is reasoning from what rational individuals would
choose under radical uncertainty (i.e., the veil of ignorance) to ascertain the requirements
of justice. This philosophical tool is not meant to and cannot be used to answer all
political questions. Some political questions can only be adequately answered if the
decision makers have more or complete knowledge about themselves, their societies, and
their places in history. For example, it is implausible for deliberators to determine how
many and what kind of public parks a town should have and where to place them if the
deliberators do not know how many people reside in the town, the demographics of the
population, the town’s geographical characteristics, and so on. Theorists, working within
the theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition, disagree about what decisions
should be made, if any, through the philosophical tools like the original position. Rawls,
in particular, thinks that the original position tool is primarily useful to determine basic
rights or constitutional essentials.
As stated from the outset, I am not relying on or wedded to the Rawlsian
framework to justify my theory—even though I find Rawlsianisms useful to explicate the
general features of the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
How or at what point tort theory or corrective justice should enter into a more general
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political theory is an issue that has garnered some discussion. In this dissertation, I
remain agnostic on this issue for two reasons.
First, one of the main issues at stake is whether interpersonal moral requirements
constitute the basis for tort law principles within the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition. These interpersonal moral requirements exist quite
apart from the political or social requirements of morality. Alternatively, tort law
principles may be properly nestled somewhere within political morality.
In reaction, I am not yet convinced that this issue has a substantial substantive
implication for the issues in this dissertation. It seems quite possible that these alternative
conceptual schemes, by themselves, are two equally correct ways to describe the
underlying ideas. Just like certain phenomena can be mathematically represented in terms
of the mathematics of either quantum mechanics or Newtonian mechanics, neither
conceptual scheme is right or wrong even though each uses different conceptual tools.
So, one reason behind my agnosticism is that I am not convinced that anything related to
this dissertation turns on whether we place tort theory within political theory or outside of
(or prior to) it in some way. One caveat to this issue relates to the next issue, and so I
discuss it below.
The second issue involves substantive implications, yet still, I remain agnostic.
Some commentators think that tort law principles have to be wholly or partly subservient
to distributive justice principles. Others think that these two categories of principles are
largely independent or, at least, the substance of tort law principles is not determined by
distributive justice principles. Some theorists seem to think that this second issue depends
on or can be derived from the first issue where tort law principles correspond to
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interpersonal moral requirements and distributive justice principles correspond to the
political or social requirements of morality. Nevertheless, I suspect that the interrelation
between these two issues is either nil or more complex than has been suggested in the
literature.
Regardless, I remain agnostic because I think some kinds of accidental harm are
properly handled by substantively-independent tort law principles while other kinds of
accidental harm are properly handled by distributive justice principles. While I started
work on this dissertation by addressing these two issues squarely, they became too
unwieldy in conjunction with the issues that I retained. Thus, these issues must be
partitioned off for my future work. So, I am assuming that at least some kinds of
accidental harm pertain only to tort law principles, and the substance of those principles
are not overridden or largely controlled by the substance of distributive justice principles.
If I were to characterize any sort of ideology in this dissertation, I would say it is
anti-dogmatic within the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
Since I think my theory is compatible with many different tort law theories and more
general theories in the Kantian tradition, I do not tie my theory to any particular
formulation of the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
Similarly, I do not tie my theory to placing tort theory in any one fixed relation to
distributive justice or at some specific place in the overarching theoretical commitments
of the Kantian tradition. Put simply, I do not think the substance of my theory is altered
by depending on what (theoretical) point my theory is attached to the Kantian tradition
(for the reasons briefly stated above). If it turns out that the substance of tort law
principles must be largely or wholly subservient to principles of distributive justice, such
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could render my theory a nullity rather than merely forcing my hand to specify one
theoretical point where my theory is properly attached to the Kantian tradition. Since I
suspect that at least some kinds of accident harm should be handled by substantively
independent tort law principles, I assume that is the case in this dissertation.
As I stated earlier, theories of tort law have neglected the justification for their
accounts of breach of the negligence standard of care. To fill that void, I have sketched
above some of the overarching political and moral commitments of the Kantian tradition
to provide a justificatory framework for a theory of breach. The question is which theory
best interprets this justificatory framework. In the next section, I examine existing
theories of tort law that explicitly draw on the overarching theoretical commitments of
the Kantian tradition.

Accident Law Theories within the Kantian Tradition
The theories of tort law in this section seek to capture the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition. The first two theories that I address below are
proffered by Ernest Weinrib and Arthur Ripstein. In parts of their theories that I do not
address, Weinrib and Ripstein extensively and insightfully analyze many of the
components of extant tort law’s doctrine and institutional structure. Nevertheless,
Weinrib and Ripstein barely address what constitutes breach of the negligence standard
of care.99 Surprisingly, this shortcoming has not received much attention either in regard
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to their two theories in particular or more generally among theories of a similar stripe.100
Weinrib and Ripstein skim over what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of
care by endorsing the reasonable person standard and then adding a step or two. They
merely identify one or two moral principles that each thinks constitute or embody the
reasonable person standard and then make brief remarks about the case law.101 Recall that
I associated their theories with the morality-based interpretation of the reasonable person
standard in the previous chapter.
The next two theories that I address below belong to George Fletcher and Stephen
Perry. Fletcher and Perry each base their theories of negligence, to a significant extent, on
social practice. Recall that I associated their theories with the norms-based interpretation
of the reasonable person standard in the previous chapter. Compared to the bare threads
considered above, as we shall see, Fletcher’s theory of negligent breach is complex and
the most developed of all theories surveyed in this section. While Perry only provides us
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with a glimpse of his theory, we shall see that it has the most potential of all of the
theories presented in this chapter. In fact, the theory I advocate in the next chapter
originated from my attempt to develop Perry’s insightful characterization of negligent
breach. While I ended up going a different direction than Perry himself goes, his theory
and to a lesser extent Fletcher’s theory are the closest competitors to my own theory.102
In commenting on these and other tort theories in this genre, John Oberdiek has
recently phrased in terms of primary and remedial obligations the issue regarding how
tort theories have neglected negligent breach. He states that tort theories have only been
concerned with remedial obligations that individuals incur due to the violation of “wholly
unspecified antecedent primary obligations.”103 While that claim is a bit of an
exaggeration, these primary obligations are the details of the negligence standard of care.
In my terms, conduct that fails to meet or exceed one’s primary obligations constitutes
negligent breach. In that light, this section establishes that the four theories mentioned
above insufficiently address the antecedent primary obligations that Oberdiek mentions,
which is another way of saying that these theories neglect negligent breach.
To support his observation, Oberdiek cites Jules Coleman’s much earlier
statement that ‘“while corrective justice presupposes some account of what the relevant
first-order duties are, it does not pretend to provide an account of them.’”104 Despite first
appearances, Oberdiek and Coleman are addressing related but separate topics. Coleman
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speaks of corrective justice in the abstract as a normative domain while Oberdiek points
to existing theories of tort law. Corrective justice and tort law are not identical though
they are related and perhaps have overlapping domains. So, we can imagine, in response
to Oberdiek’s point, that Coleman may well argue that the tort theories that do not
provide an account of the primary social duties are not, for that reason, incomplete as
theories of corrective justice.
Looking at Coleman’s view in another way, perhaps many theories of the primary
social duties are harmonious with corrective justice, but those theories do not fall within
the domain of corrective justice. If that is what Coleman means, he may be right, for what
it is worth. On that view, various principles justify our primary moral obligations in all of
their variety. When an individual violates one or more of those obligations, corrective
justice identifies one’s duties of reparation, if any.
At the same time, most who espouse theories of corrective justice do so because
they are interested in explaining tort law including the outcomes of specific cases. So,
even if Coleman is right that the domain of corrective justice does not include the
antecedent primary obligations, it is surprising that tort theorists do not supplement their
corrective justice theories with an account of primary obligations that pertain to
negligence. Since breach of the standard of care is a primary component of the prima
facie tort claim, a tort law theorist without a theory of negligent breach is playing with
only three-quarters of the deck.
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Weinrib’s Theory of Tort Law
Ernest Weinrib provides what he calls a distinctly Kantian account of tort law by
arguing that tort law’s characteristics reflect the moral dimensions of the Kantian
commitment to liberty.105 Weinrib’s theory emphasizes the bilateral nature of tort law’s
institutional structure to argue that tort law’s purpose is to right the person wronged when
that wrong led to harm.106
Regarding breach of the standard of care, Weinrib endorses what he terms the
“English and Commonwealth” approach to “reasonable care.”107 In contrast to the Law
and Economics Approach, the English and Commonwealth approach ignores “almost
completely” the burden of precaution for reducing risk.108 Instead, this approach focuses
on the risk of harm and the magnitude of the harm that is risked to determine if an actor
was negligent, according to Weinrib.109
Weinrib outlines two parts to the English and Commonwealth approach. First, the
approach determines whether the risk was reasonably foreseeable in the sense that “there
is a threshold degree of risk that a reasonable person ought not to ignore.”110 Only if this
threshold is met does the English and Commonwealth approach address the burden of the
precaution issue, according to Weinrib, although the details of this aspect need not
concern us. Second, if the risk exceeds this threshold, “it is then for the tribunal of fact to
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determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk.”111 In other
words, the trial judge determines whether the risky act was reasonable to take under the
circumstances.
While Weinrib provides some criteria for analyzing the concept of reasonable
care, he does not offer robust criteria. At both steps in the English and Commonwealth
approach, Weinrib leaves some form of the term “reasonable” in the criteria. Weinrib
does not tell us either how much risk meets the initial threshold for it to be unreasonable
to ignore or how to determine that amount of risk. He also does not tell us how a tribunal
of fact should decide whether a risky act that passed the first-stage threshold was
reasonable or not. It would be odd if Weinrib thought that a judge should make such
decisions without further justified criteria for guidance. At least this much is clear: his
theory does not offer determinate answers to specific cases of what constitutes breach of
the negligence standard of care. Instead, it appears that Weinrib, like the Restatements
surveyed above, relies primarily on adjudication that culminates in judicial discretion to
determine what constitutes specific instances of negligent breach.
Given that Weinrib’s insight on morally salient structural features of tort law is
illuminating on numerous other issues in tort law, it is surprising that Weinrib says so
little about how reasonableness should be fleshed out. In Weinrib’s theory, tort law’s
structure and institutional features seem hollow without a determinate answer to, for
example, whether phoning while driving or failing to fully delint one’s clothes dryer at
least yearly constitutes negligent breach. Weinrib sees tort law as grounded in liberty but
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does not provide much guidance about how to determine the bounds of that liberty. In
other words, Weinrib’s liberty-based theory cannot tell us whether I am at liberty to
phone while driving without the potential of paying for others’ accident costs. Back to the
lint example, one of my real-life neighbor’s clothes dryer exploded due to lint, blasting a
sizeable hole through the home’s second story floor and ceiling and its roof. The resulting
fire substantially damaged the adjoining home with which they shared a wall. Even
worse, the homeowners had recently canceled their homeowner’s insurance policy to help
pay their child’s tuition. Weinrib’s liberty-based theory cannot tell us whether my
neighbors were at liberty to forego delinting their dryer to some extent without being
vulnerable to a tort claim for the fire damage to their next-door neighbor’s house.
Of course, Weinrib or an adherent could still flesh out a theory of negligent
breach. I propose some possible fixes below after sketching Ripstein’s theory. However,
most of the theoretical work will be supplied by that addition rather than the theoretical
resources contained so far in Weinrib’s rather thin account of negligent breach. Even
more important, the issue of negligent breach is so centrally important that to instantiate
the best theory, we may want to alter some of the structural features that Weinrib deems
so important. Here is one instance of the methodological differences between myself and
Weinrib. In my view, normative theory trumps existing structure while Weinrib seems to
hang his hat primarily on case law and tort law’s existing institutional and theoretical
structure.
I flag this methodological difference without saying much more or attempting to
argue extensively for my method. Instead, my method seems helpful because Weinrib’s
theory only gets us so far. Weinrib’s theory contains gaps that adjudication must fill in
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order to resolve tort disputes. Since the judge’s discretion fills in these gaps, Weinrib’s
theory leaves open the possibility for both kinds of potential injustice. To mitigate the
potential for injustice, we need further normative criteria that cannot simply be found in
tort law’s existing case law or structure.

Ripstein’s Theory Based on Freedom and Security
Arthur Ripstein advances a theory of responsibility for accident costs within the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.112 He seems to be focusing
exclusively on explaining and justifying tort law as found in its extant institutional
setting.113 For my purposes, I focus only on the part of his theory concerning what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. Ripstein argues that determining
negligence involves “weighing liberty against security” within the construct of the
reasonable person. For Ripstein, the reasonable person “moderates his or her actions in
light of the legitimate claims of others.”114
However, Ripstein does not state how to weigh liberty against security or what
specifically are the legitimate claims of others. He uses phrases such as “appropriate
care”115 to describe the amount of precaution needed and “undue risk” to describe a risk
that inappropriately weighs liberty against security. Yet, he never fleshes out the details
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of these concepts, seeming to leave such decisions to judges and juries without further
guidance.116
While Ripstein’s theory addresses the value of being free, it is unclear whether
Ripstein’s theory even attempts to satisfy the Kantian value of being equal. It cannot
merely be that the same rules apply to all people because all plausible theories of breach
of the standard of care have that quality. Once Ripstein has added the specificity that his
theory lacks, he would have to defend why his theory satisfies the Kantian value of
equality.
At one point, Ripstein states, “specific liberty interests and security interests are
protected, based on a conception of their importance to leading an autonomous life.”117
However, Ripstein does not provide us that conception. Of course, he could yet supply
such as theory, but it is not clear how merely reasoning about the importance of liberty,
security, and autonomy, without further guidance, will provide enough detail to make the
highly specific decisions about whether acts, which Ripstein himself describes as
“activities in contexts,” are reasonable.118 Later, Ripstein does point out that customary
risks will often coincide with appropriate risks and undue risks.119 However, he does not
flesh out the importance of this coincidence or how to determine cases where customary
risks do not coincide with appropriate risks.
As a result, Ripstein’s theory does not go far enough in addressing what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. Ripstein does not provide sufficient
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criteria to determine how the interests of security and liberty are to be justifiably
weighed. Thus, Ripstein’s concepts of liberty, security, and autonomy leave so much
discretion that parties to a lawsuit could receive disparate treatment and one of the
society’s diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good could be
privileged ab initio.

Possible Additions to Weinrib’s and Ripstein’s Theories
On behalf of Weinrib and Ripstein, we could try to flesh out the fundamental
values they point to regarding negligent breach so that the potential injustices may be
mitigated. For example, on Ripstein’s behalf, we could how to trade off the interests of
security and liberty by appealing to moral intuition. Since Ripstein intends his theory to
apply to existing tort adjudication, by “moral intuition” I mean what the dutiful juror or a
well-intentioned judge may draw on to determine what the reasonably prudent person
would have done in the defendant’s circumstances. This kind of appeal to moral intuition
seems to be, at least in part, what Weinrib has in mind when a judge doing the two-step
analysis of the English and Commonwealth Approach. So, I propose this kind of moral
intuition because such is available to, and likely already used by, existing institutional
actors in adjudication.
In response, fleshing out Weinrib’s and Ripstein’s theories with this kind of moral
intuition is unsatisfying because it does not solve the problem of when moral intuitions
conflict within an individual and between individuals. This aspect alone sets the stage for
the potential injustices. Moral intuition is also problematic because it seems to reify the
status quo’s view of risks under the auspices of objective moral truth. Thus, one of the
88

diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good could be privileged ab
initio because it has been “around for a while” or it is the conception of the good held by
many of the society’s elites.
If Weinrib’s and Ripstein’s theories were fleshed out by actual deliberative
procedures, their theories would gain the specificity needed. However, Weinrib’s and
Ripstein’s identification of liberty and/or security does not seem to add much to a theory
that uses actual deliberative procedures. Actual deliberators may be motivated by more
values or evaluative ideas than liberty and/or security such as the value of efficiency or
religious ideas about how one should treat one’s neighbor.
If Weinrib’s and Ripstein’s theories were fleshed out by ideal deliberative
procedures, such is difficult to evaluate without a concrete theory before us. Suppose that
Weinrib or Ripstein use a contractualist deliberative procedure, akin to Rawls’s original
position, where some sort of ideal observer knows the relevant facts and decides what
liberty and/or security would require for each instance of alleged negligent breach.120
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One problem with the ideal observer solution presents immediately. It is not clear
that an ideal observer, in any defensible procedure, would have enough information to
choose among competing negligence-based theories for assigning accident costs. In
general, broad values such as liberty, security, and equality do not obviously lead to any
particular conclusions about the permissibility of concrete risks. An ideal deliberative
procedure seems unable to provide enough detail without a substantial addition of content
to the theory. So, even if Weinrib’s and Ripstein’s theories added an ideal deliberative
procedure, most of the theoretical work on the issue of negligent breach will be supplied
by that addition rather than the theoretical resources contained so far in their theories.
Fortunately, I think Weinrib and Ripstein could wholly adopt my theory of
negligent breach without any major alterations to their theoretical bases or primary
conclusions. My theory tries to interpret best the liberty, security, equality as they figure

One thing is clear. Rawlsian deliberators do not have to reject all negligence-based two-party
theories for the reason Dworkin offers. Dworkin’s line of reasoning considers accident law in a vacuum
without other institutions that assist individuals from falling below the position of the worst-off group
whether due to accident or other causes such as a failed entrepreneurial endeavor. So, it is not obvious that
deliberators need to take extreme loss from accidents into consideration. There are many ways that one
could become devastatingly poor apart from the scenario Dworkin describes. A person could be financially
ruined from (1) a negligent accident where the devastatingly harmed, uninsured individual is a negligent
actor and also one of the harmed; (2) a negligent accident where the devastatingly harmed, uninsured
individual is not negligent, and the negligent party was uninsured and otherwise unable to compensate; and
(3) an accident where the party required to pay compensation (whether determined through negligence or
strict liability) is under-insured and financially ruined from having to compensate the harmed. Furthermore,
disease, natural disasters, failed economic enterprises, failed investments, theft or other crime, lightning,
and so on might cause an individual to be devastatingly poor. Social tort insurance seems to be the only
suitable solution to guarantee that no one would fall below the worst off in society due to accident costs. In
fact, in Dworkin’s later work he employs a hypothetical insurance argument (comparable to the arguments
for social tort insurance in interesting ways) to address situations where individuals would otherwise
become devastatingly poor.
For a debate on this aspect of wealth maximization theory, see Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Guido Calabresi, An Exchange: About Law
and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Why
Efficiency? - A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980).
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into the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. At the same time,
my theory can resolve particular disputes as to negligent breach, the account of which is
in the final chapter.

Fletcher’s Reciprocal Risk Theory
Working within the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition,
George Fletcher provides, prior to this dissertation, the most developed theory of
negligent breach from that tradition. For that reason and because one part of his theory
bears some resemblance to my theory, I address it extensively. With Kantian and
Rawlsian flavors, Fletcher starts by claiming that each person should receive the
maximum amount of accident security compatible with the same amount of accident
security for everyone else.121 In this claim, Fletcher is trying to follow John Rawls’s
emphasis on reciprocity.122 So, I refer to Fletcher’s theory as “reciprocal risk theory.” Put
abstractly, if person X, in a given interaction, imposes more risk on person Y than person
Y is imposing on X (i.e., mutual risk imposition is asymmetrical), then person X owes
compensation to person Y if harm results from that interaction. Monetary compensation
makes up for a person’s loss of security when he is harmed thereby restoring him to an
equal amount of security as everyone else. Fletcher’s theory harmonizes the rationales for
negligence and strict liability. Both are instances where one party imposes more risk than
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the other party imposes. Fletcher thinks that according each individual reciprocal security
(and risk) in this manner treats individuals as free and equal.
Reciprocal risk theory embodies a tension.123 To make this tension more explicit,
I argue that reciprocal risk theory has two conflicting components. The first component
compares the magnitude of the risks of each party’s act to assign accident costs. The
party that imposed the greater amount of risk on the other is liable for any harm that
occurred to the other party.124 I call this “component A.”
Component A is the most obvious from Fletcher’s text. Component A explains
why strict liability is used for excessively risky acts such as crop dusting and blasting.
The magnitude of the risks of these acts virtually always exceeds the risks of the acts of
those harmed. Fletcher also uses component A to determine what constitutes breach of
the negligence standard of care when two people are engaged in the same kind of act.125
He writes, “Negligently created risks are nonreciprocal relative to the risks generated by
the drivers and ballplayers who engage in the same activity in the customary way.”126 All
parties are not negligent when they engage in the same act in the ordinary way, such as
when they are engaged in “ordinary driving.”127 From Fletcher’s text, component A
seems to have no limit to the scope of kinds of activities to which it applies. Thus,
component A can explain pockets of strict liability if one individual is engaged in a
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drastically riskier act as well as negligence where individuals are engaged in the same
act.128
“Component B” of the reciprocal risk theory is hard to disentangle from
Fletcher’s writing because Fletcher sees component A and component B as overlapping
or virtually the same. Since I see component B as distinct and in tension with component
A, I must convincingly extricate it from Fletcher’s writing.
Component B involves Fletcher’s idea of background risks.129 Background risks
are all of the risks that accompany daily social life.130 Since everyone creates background
risks, Fletcher thinks that “all members of the community contribute in roughly equal
shares.”131 Since fairness or reciprocity demands that everyone get the same amount of
security, Fletcher reasons that no one needs to be compensated when an accident results
from background risks.132 Background risks are the risks that individuals must bear
without compensation “as part of group living.”133
Fletcher provides an example, “If we all drive, we must suffer the costs of
ordinary driving.”134 Extrapolating from that example, background risks are acts that all
(or perhaps most) people do in the manner that all (or most) people do them. Component
B is used when two parties to an accident are engaged in different kinds of acts that are
both background risks. Component B does not look at whether one party actually
imposed greater risk on the other. Component B considers them as having the same level
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of risk for the purpose of assigning accident costs even if, in a particular real accident,
one background risk was riskier than the other. So, in Fletcher’s theory, the actual risk of
an act is disregarded when the act is part of the society’s background risks.
I contend that component A of reciprocal risk theory is in tension with component
B. Component A determines breach of the standard of care based on the actual risk
imposed by the acts. In contrast, component B ignores the actual risks of the acts and
instead determines breach based on what role (common or uncommon) that kind of act
plays in the society. Thus, the two components to reciprocal risk theory use different
criteria for breach of the standard of care. As a result, the components of reciprocal risk
theory may determine breach differently for the same case.135
For example, suppose a person engaged in ordinary driving gets into an accident
with a person engaged in ordinary walking. Component A would require the ordinary
driver to compensate the ordinary walker because the former imposed a comparatively
higher risk on the latter. However, component B would not require compensation from
either party because both were engaged in background risks. Thus, the problem with
reciprocal risk theory is that it has two components that determine what constitutes
breach of the negligence standard of care in conflicting ways.
Fletcher may first respond by claiming that component A and component B
actually overlap such that there is no tension between them. The key passage states, “If
uncommon activities are those with few participants, they are likely to be activities
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generating nonreciprocal risks.”136 Fletcher thinks that the domain of uncommon acts
(non-background risks) will be coextensive with acts that are an order of magnitude of
risk different from common risks. Stating the overlap from the other direction, Fletcher
writes,
Similarly, dangerous activities like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting
stand out as distinct, nonreciprocal risks in the community. They represent
threats of harm that exceed the level of risk to which all members of the
community contribute in roughly equal shares.137
So, component A is all that Fletcher seems to advocate. Since all nonreciprocal risks
impose an uncommon amount of risk, they are in that sense non-background risks. If so,
the two components I identify collapse into component A.
In response to Fletcher’s attempt to unify component A and component B, I only
need to show that component A does not handle adequately at least some accidents
involving two background risks. These cases involve two acts that are both common and
one clearly imposes more risk on the other (in the sense important to component A).
Return to the case of the ordinary walker and ordinary driver. Ordinary driving
imposes a greater risk than ordinary walking indicating that component A would
determine that the ordinary driver should compensate the ordinary walker if harmed by
the driver. However, ordinary driving and ordinary walking are both background risks. In
such cases, component B requires that neither party owes the other compensation. To
arrive at that conclusion component A would have to ignore the obvious disparity in the
risks of these ordinary acts. But, ignoring such goes against the motivating idea behind
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component A. So, reciprocal risk theory requires two conflicting determinations of
breach for the same accident.
In a footnote, Fletcher mentions the case of the ordinary walker and driver. He
states that these cases “require further thought.”138 Fletcher thinks that these cases do not
pose a significant problem because they are at the “fringes” of reciprocal risk theory.139
In response, these cases seem hardly at the fringes. The numbers of accidents that
result from people engaging in common acts involving significantly different amounts of
risk are numerous. Even if only some of these common acts with different risks have as
large of a disparity of risk as driving and walking, Fletcher does not tell us why we
should ignore smaller differences.
In reality, common acts have risks that are large (driving), medium (bicycling),
and small (walking). Although cumbersome, even more realistic would be recognizing
that background risks lie on a continuum from most risky to least risky. If Fletcher wants
all individuals to have the same amount of security, we should be concerned about
making these distinctions even if the acts are common or ordinary. If so, then the types of
accidents resulting from two ordinary acts with different amounts of risk are not “fringe”
cases that can be saved for later. Instead, they are going to comprise a significant portion
of accidents. If reciprocal risk theory addresses these cases, it swallows the tension
between component A and component B. If reciprocal risk theory does not address these
cases, then it is unable to completely handle all kinds of accidents.
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Furthermore, there are cases where uncommon acts are not riskier than common
acts. Suppose a person who is juggling gets into an accident with an ordinary bicycler.
While juggling is an uncommon act, it does not seem more harmful to other people than
bicycling or many other common acts. In such a case, we see again the tension in
reciprocal risk theory. Component A would determine no liability based on the similarity
of risks to others between juggling and ordinary bicycling. However, since juggling is
uncommon, it is not a background risk. Component B requires that the juggler
compensate the ordinary bicycler. The way to explain these diverging determinations of
breach is by acknowledging the two components of reciprocal risk theory.
One possible way to resolve this tension is for reciprocal risk theory to assign
each component to distinct kinds of accidents. The tension would not arise because the
two components would never be applied to the same kind of accident. While such a
resolution would eliminate the tension, I see no way to justify assigning component A
exclusively to certain kinds of acts while assigning component B exclusively to different
kinds of acts. Component A has no intrinsic limit to the scope of activities to which it
applies.
Another possible resolution to the tension is to make component B concerned
with actual risk over complete lives rather than about the specific acts that lead to an
accident. The lifelong approach is appealing because Rawls is concerned with how
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individuals fare over their complete lives.140 Recall that Fletcher concludes that each
person is to be guaranteed equal amounts of accident security from Rawlsian premises.141
Fletcher seems to suggest that if Jack walks while Jill bicycles one day, they are
in a reciprocal relationship because another day Jill walks and Jack bicycles.142 Or, even
if Jack does not bicycle, he may do some other act that imposes the same level of risk on
Jill such as playing football.143 By not requiring compensation for all acts that are
background risks, component B focuses on individuals imposing (roughly) the same
amount of risk on each other over complete lives. Under this resolution, both components
of reciprocal risk theory are concerned about actual risk but they differ on the timeframe
in which they measure actual risk.
The first problem with this idea is that we do not have any reason to treat an
accident as one where we should take the lifelong view versus the immediate view. Thus,
the two components would still determine breach differently in some cases. Another
problem with this resolution is that component A and component B are supposed to
justify a legal duty for one person to compensate another person for a single harmful act.
As Stephen Perry points out, the bilateral nature of this legal duty conflicts with the
rationale that motivates Fletcher’s reciprocal risk theory (and the life-long version of
component B).144 If compensation makes up for a loss of accident security, we would
expect all individuals, who engaged in one kind of risky act, to compensate a person
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harmed by that kind of act, or something similar. In contrast, in accident law, only the
one individual whose risky act happened to harm the person is vulnerable to a claim of
compensation.145 Fletcher’s rationale, which seeks to distribute accident security equally,
would be better suited to some kind of social tort insurance where the cost of
compensating for harm is distributed among all individuals who diminish others’ accident
security.146 So, the attempt to save Fletcher from the tension between component A and
component B by taking a lifelong view of risk does not mesh with much of Fletcher’s text
where he is trying to establish an individual’s duty to compensate another individual for
harm.
The final problem stems from the fact that component B does not guarantee that
each individual will be exposed to even roughly the same amount of accident risk over
her complete life. The reason is that not every individual engages in the same variety of
acts to the same extent. So, just because component B allows one person to perform the
same acts (background risks) as others does not mean that each person will be subject to
roughly the same amount of accident risk over a complete life. The problem is that Uday
always walks and may never do an act that counterbalances Jill’s bicycling or Jack’s
football playing. Even if Uday does some comparable act, he may not do it as often as
others do their riskier acts because he spends most of his time inside his house.
Additionally, one person’s background risk act can kill another person cutting off that
person’s chance to impose risks on others to counterbalance the risk to which he was
subjected to while alive.
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Component B merely gives each person the formal or legal freedom to do the
same acts without being assigned others’ accident costs. Component B does not
guarantee that everyone will be subjected to and be able to subject others to roughly the
same amount of accident risk because individual preferences may lead them to
consistently impose different levels of risk on each other. We have no reason to believe
that the differences would cancel out as we add more people into the equation. Thus,
reciprocal risk theory does not seem to equalize actual risks over complete lives. So, this
attempt to reconcile the tension between the two components of reciprocal risk theory
fails.
Since the tension remains, reciprocal risk theory needs to pick between
component A and component B. My guess is that Fletcher would pick component A and
reject component B because component A most explicitly employs reciprocity, the value
that Fletcher thinks animates his theory.
At most, component B provides “legal reciprocity” in that everyone is subject to
the same legal rules. However, any plausible theory of what constitutes breach of the
negligence standard of care will have legal reciprocity as long as breach is based on the
acts performed. To that extent, component B of reciprocal risk theory cannot claim to
embody any unique form of reciprocity compared to any other theory of breach.
Perhaps Fletcher does not think of the reciprocity in component B as legal
reciprocity. Rather, he might think that background risks are reciprocal because the
society accepts these risks as part of the hazards of their way of living. The reciprocity is
that all members think that these risks are acceptable in that society. While this
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interpretation is appealing, I see minimal textual basis in Fletcher’s work that hints in this
direction.
Furthermore, a plausible conception of reciprocity based on an accepted regime of
risk does not seem open to Fletcher because he does not place any requirements on how
the accepted regime of background risks is established. If background risks are just what
individuals do on a consistent basis, then stronger individuals or special interest groups
would be able to unfairly impose their preferred risks as part of the background risks. If
others have no say in what risks others can impose, not only is such a regime of risks not
really “accepted,” but also reciprocity seems nowhere to be found. Since Fletcher does
not place moral constraints on the way that background risks are determined in a society,
interpreting his form of reciprocity as accepted risks is not that plausible.
Even if Fletcher goes this direction with component B, the tension still exists
between component A and component B. The new interpretation of component B rests on
a society’s acceptance of a certain regime of risks. Component A does not appeal to any
sense of acceptance since it only looks at whether individuals actually impose the same
risks on each other. Since a society can think that unequal risk impositions of certain
kinds should be free from liability, the tension between the accepted-risk version of
component B and component A of reciprocal risk theory remains.
No other plausible interpretation of component B seems to be able to employ the
same sense of reciprocity as component A. So, in the end, Fletcher equivocates on
reciprocity in component A and in component B. Since I take Fletcher to be advocating
primarily for the sense of reciprocity imbued in component A, I conclude that Fletcher
would excise component B from his reciprocal risk theory.
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Unfortunately, component A by itself is not an appealing theory of what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. One measurement problem with
such a theory is that we do not have a persuasive way to compare the magnitude of risks
between different acts when those risks are not clearly far apart on the risk spectrum.
Determining whether walking while texting is riskier than playing Frisbee is difficult at
best and impossible at worst.
A bigger problem is that determining breach of the standard of care based on
component A alone introduces uncertainty. Whether one person is acting safely enough
to avoid being vulnerable to a compensation claim depends on what the other person who
happens to be harmed is doing. Such a moving target as a standard of care would make
planning appropriately difficult. Consequently, individuals may excessively restrict their
pursuits or over insure against liability. Thus, component A alone does not seem to be a
good interpretation of what it means to treat a person as free according to the overarching
theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
Component A alone would also favor individuals who prefer acts with low risk.
Individuals with low-risk preferences could shift the costs of some of their accidents to
persons with high-risk preferences. Such an advantage for individuals with low-risk
preferences does not treat persons as equal, according to the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition.
In summary, Fletcher’s theory of reciprocal risk is inadequate either because its
parts conflict or because its foremost part (component A) is not a satisfying interpretation
of the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. Reciprocal risk
theory does not provide us with an adequate theory of negligent breach.
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Perry’s Accepted Pattern of Social Interaction Theory
In critiquing Fletcher’s theory, Stephen Perry briefly suggests his own theory of
what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. He writes that “the
materialization of a risk that is normally incident to an accepted pattern of social
interaction will not give rise to liability.”147 Unfortunately, Perry does not flesh out what
he means by an “accepted pattern of social interaction.” Since Perry words on this
specific topic are few, much of what follows is my attempt to flesh out his theory.
Nevertheless, since my theory was inspired by thinking about Perry’s thoughts and their
relation to Fletcher’s theory, I devote much ink toward teasing out the possible forms that
Perry’s theory could take. In that light, the reader should not take my account as
authoritative, but rather as just one charitable reading of the few sentences that Perry
devotes to the topic. In fact, my critique of my interpretation of Perry’s brief remarks
contains some of the reasons why my theory took its ultimate shape. Hopefully, Perry
will advance a full account of his thoughts on this topic, and only then will a more precise
comparison with my theory be possible.
By the key statement quoted in the last paragraph, I take Perry to mean that if an
individual’s act accidentally harms another individual, the former has not breached the
standard of care as long as the former’s act is part of an accepted pattern of social
interaction. Depending on how Perry fleshes out his theory, this theory may in fact
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accurately describe much of accident law’s doctrine.148 Regardless, Perry seems to
suggest that he is also advancing a normative theory.149 Even so, he does not offer a
justification for his theory. Perry is not relying on Fletcher’s principle of equal accident
security because Perry criticizes that use of a principle of social distributive justice to
establish a right between only two parties to an accident.150 Given that Perry suggests his
theory as a possible amendment to Fletcher’s theory, it is safe to assume that Perry would
justify his theory based on the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian
tradition. I will consider two possible justifications below.
Before then, I identify some possible problems internal to my understanding of
Perry’s theory. Perry’s theory has one of the problems that I identified above while
addressing Fletcher’s theory: an accepted pattern of social interaction may not be
justifiable to determine breach of the standard of care because of the way the pattern
became accepted. For example, if a society accepted an aspect of a pattern of interaction
due to fraud, then the pattern was not legitimately accepted and is not a justifiable basis
for determining breach. Reading Perry charitably, we can assume that he too would
invalidate aspects of a social pattern that were the result of fraud.
Another problem with Perry’s theory is that an accepted pattern of social
interaction could violate constitutional rights. For instance, the accepted pattern of social
interaction could violate the equal protection clause as it applies to race or sex. As
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pictured in the recent movie The Help, the accepted pattern of social interaction
prohibited African American domestic workers from entering the house where they
worked through the front door.151 If an African American domestic worker slipped and
fell while entering the front door of her employment, her violating the accepted social
pattern may exonerate the homeowner/employer from being assigned the costs of the
worker’s harm. Such a legal implication would violate the domestic worker’s
constitutional right to be free from racial discrimination. Similarly, Perry may also
accept, as a friendly amendment, that the accepted pattern must not violate constitutional
rights.
Aside from these amendments, potential problems lurk for Perry’s theory
depending on how he fleshes the theory out. Perry requires the social interaction to be
both accepted in some sense and a pattern in some sense. Both of these attributes pose
difficulties. First, Perry must not require unanimous acceptance. Requiring that everyone
accept the pattern dooms the standard to being impossible to satisfy. If not unanimity,
how many must accept the pattern for it to be legally justified? If only a majority of the
members of the society need to accept the pattern, how does that acceptance justify
assigning accident costs to an individual who does not accept the pattern?
Moving on, another problem concerns the nature of the acceptance of the pattern.
By “accepted” does Perry require a conscious, deliberate avowal of the social interaction?
Such a stringent requirement may be too high to apply in accident cases because often
many individuals in a society do not consciously and deliberately consider whether to
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accept risky acts. At least, Perry must require that many have a pro-attitude toward the
pattern of social interaction. What about those who are indifferent or undecided? What if
50% of the population has a pro-attitude toward one pattern and the other 50% has a proattitude toward a mutually exclusive pattern? Without answering these issues, Perry’s
theory is incomplete.
Potential difficulties also lurk depending on what Perry means by “pattern.” Since
Perry is speaking of what individuals are doing, he seems to mean by “pattern” what
individuals are actually doing with some sort of regularity. One difficulty concerns the
conflict between these two attributes: “accepted” and “pattern.” The actual pattern of
social interaction could not be accepted, or the pattern that most people accept is not
being done. Suppose most individuals believe that drivers should not phone while
driving. Yet, most individuals including those with this belief actually phone while
driving. If harm results from such a scenario, Perry’s theory provides no answer on
whether such constitutes breach of the standard of care.
Another difficulty with Perry’s use of “pattern” concerns acts that are not done
uniformly. For example, suppose 15% of homeowners remove litter from their walkways
daily, 40% do so weekly, 40% bi-weekly, and 5% monthly or less frequently. Is this
complicated arrangement the pattern of social interaction? If so, then no one ever deviates
from the pattern. Suppose someone were to slip and fall on litter on the walkway of a
house whose homeowner removes litter bi-weekly. Since no one deviated from the
(complicated, non-uniform pattern), then the homeowner whose walkway led to the
accident met the extremely low or nonexistent standard of care. Pedestrians would have
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to walk at their own risk. This is a curious outcome given that in this hypothetical
scenario that 55% of the homeowners remove their litter at least weekly.
To avoid this problem, perhaps, Perry could appeal to which frequency for litter
removal is accepted. However, how people actually act is strong evidence of what they
accept. So, how would we determine if one of these frequencies is the accepted pattern of
social interaction when what people are doing reflects no majority consensus?
It is possible that Perry could flesh out his theory in a way that satisfies these
concerns. But, these concerns remain until then. Many of the concerns I have raised
against Perry’s theory need to be answered by the theory that I will defend in the next
chapter. Wrestling with such concerns has shaped the contours of my theory. Even if
Perry can persuasively satisfy these concerns, Perry still lacks a detailed justification for
his theory. Why should the accepted pattern of social interaction determine what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care?
As mentioned earlier, Perry may be committed to a rights-based justification,
based on the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition, for his
accepted pattern theory of assigning accident costs. One possible version of that
justification is suggested by the way Perry formulates his theory. If certain acts are being
done in a pattern, individuals have reason to rely on each other conforming to that
pattern.152 This reason is especially strong for acts where the benefits of the acts depend
largely on everyone conforming to the pattern such as in traffic patterns. Given that
reliance on the pattern is reasonable (perhaps rational) or at least understandable,
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someone (a deviator) who deviates from that pattern wrongs another individual who is
harmed by the deviating act. This assumes that the harmed individual was conforming in
relevant ways to the pattern of social cooperation. While not identical, the harmed’s
reliance interest in the pattern of social interaction is similar to the reliance interest an
individual may acquire in the realm of contract law when one relies on another’s promise
despite the lack of contractual consideration.153 The reliance on the pattern of social
interaction seems even stronger if the pattern is accepted and known by everyone that it is
the accepted pattern.
While the idea of reliance can provide one reason why an accepted pattern of
social interaction is a plausible basis for determining breach of the standard of care, I do
not think the justification runs deep enough into our considered convictions of how
society should be organized to support the entire system of assigning accident costs. The
reliance justification does not seem to be able to combat the reasoning of a deviator who
acts for a different yet laudable reason. Suppose someone deviates from an accepted
pattern of social interaction because doing so produces more utility. The deviator claims
that producing more utility justifies deviation while the harmed claims that her reliance
on the accepted pattern delegitimizes deviation. Without a more robust theory, the
reliance theorist does not seem to have a persuasive response.

One version of this idea is equitable estoppel, which is “a rule that if one person has induced another
to take a certain course of action in reliance upon the representations or promises of the former, the former
person will not be permitted to subsequently deny the truth of the representations, or revoke such promises,
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Another shortcoming of the reliance justification is that it does not explain how
changes to the accepted pattern of social interaction can be effected legitimately. If an
actual pattern of social interaction is no longer accepted, can one no longer rely on that
pattern? If an accepted pattern is no longer being followed even though it is still accepted,
can one no longer rely on that pattern? Must one rely on a new, emerging pattern even
though it is not accepted? Can the government intervene to incentivize one pattern over
another? The reliance justification does not seem to have robust enough theoretical
resources to provide persuasive answers to these questions. The overarching problem in
these questions is that the reliance justification does not provide justifiable mechanisms
for the formation or change of accepted patterns of social interactions.
Another possible version of a justification, from within the overarching
theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition, for Perry’s theory could be arguing that
free and equal individuals in a society would choose the accepted pattern theory as fair
terms of social cooperation. In Perry’s accepted pattern theory, individuals are free to
engage in whatever act they wish. As long as their act is part of the accepted pattern of
social interaction, individuals do not have to bear any accident costs of others that result
from their acts. Individuals are equal, one could argue, in that each individual gets to
participate in the accepted pattern of social interaction. Accident costs are not assigned
based on attributes of the individual but rather based on the individual’s acts. If one
individual deviates from the pattern and harms another, the deviator is assigned the
accident costs of the individual that did not deviate from the accepted pattern. One could
argue that the accepted pattern provides a realm of equality by setting the standard for
assigning accident costs in this way.
109

Perry’s theory plausibly treats individuals as free and equal. However, I do not
think that it is the best interpretation of the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition. The accepted pattern of social interaction could encompass a wide
swath of acts or it could be narrow. Since Perry places no requirements on the breadth of
the accepted pattern, the amount of freedom to act without risking liability may be large
or small depending on what the accepted pattern is. Individuals who see themselves as
free would likely want an alternative arrangement than Perry’s theory in order to protect
their freedom more.
Another shortcoming for Perry’s theory is that it does not explain how those who
do not accept the “accepted pattern” are treated as equals. Let’s call them “dissenters.”
The accepted pattern of social interaction does not seem to value the dissenters’ interests
on an issue to the same extent as it values the interests of those that accept the accepted
pattern of social interaction (“accepters”). Acts that involve the differing interests of the
dissenters are subject to liability if another is harmed whereas the acts that involve the
interests of the acceptors are not subject to liability if another is harmed. If both
dissenters and acceptors were to act according to their respective interests, dissenters
would bear more risk of being assigned others’ accident costs than the acceptors would
bear. On face, dissenters do not seem to be treated as equals. Therefore, Perry’s theory
does not seem to adequately treat persons as equal as required by the overarching
theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. It is true that Perry’s theory treats
everyone as equals in that the same standard of care is applied to everyone in the same
way. However, as I pointed out earlier, every plausible theory of what constitutes breach
of the standard of care has this virtue.
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Summary
As evident from above, the above theories of accident law insufficiently address
what constitutes breach of the standard of care especially when it comes to justification.
They do not provide the theoretical tools to justify determine decisions for all instances of
accidental harm. Like the theories in the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third),
rights-based theories seem content to let the jury determine breach with excessive
discretion that leaves open the possibility of the two kinds of potential injustice. In the
next section, I examine theories that address directly what constitutes breach of the
standard of care and look closely at jury adjudication as a mechanism to make
determinate decisions regarding breach in all possible cases.

Jury Adjudication Theories of Negligence
As demonstrated in the previous section, many rights-based theories inadequately
address what constitutes breach of the standard of care. In contrast, the sole purpose of
my democratic standard theory is to provide a moral justification for the issue that most
other theories barely address, namely, what properly constitutes breach of the negligence
standard of care in accident law. Put roughly:
Democratic standard theory claims that breach of the negligence standard of
care should be determined based on the values of the individuals locally affected
by the kind of act in question.
While I explicate my theory in the next chapter, in this chapter I address theories that
center directly on the standard of care and its relation to social norms or something
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similar. Although I discovered the following theories after creating democratic standard
theory, critiquing these theories has helped me make more precise the contribution that
democratic standard theory offers.
Another interesting aspect of the upcoming theories is that they analyze jury
adjudication as an institutional mechanism for addressing what constitutes breach of the
standard of care. Recall most of the theories that I address earlier seem content to let the
jury make determinate decisions about breach with little theoretical guidance about what
the reasonable person would do. Employing the jury to address breach might be
justifiable. At the same time, in England and elsewhere, only judges make specific
applications of the reasonable person standard in tort cases. The theories considered
above provide virtually no justification for why one or either of these institutional
mechanisms (with or without theoretical guidance) should determine breach of the
standard of care. The upcoming theories address that issue head on.

Wells’s Process Theory of Jury Adjudication in Tort Law
Catharine Wells states that her pragmatic theory of torts is based on the idea that
tort law “enforces community standards of financial responsibility and just
compensation.”154 Wells contends that “[c]orrective justice only justifies the tort system
if the results that the system produces can themselves be defended as just outcomes.”155
She criticizes “rule-based” approaches, which include the tort theories addressed in this
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chapter, because they are unable to determine or justify a uniquely correct outcome.156
Wells’s critique captures the shortcoming that I refer to above when I state a theory is
incomplete. Wells extrapolates that no rule-based theory can achieve that level of
completeness because such theories rely on “increasingly abstract statements of law and
correspondingly abstract accounts of justification” within moral and political theory.157
Given that futility, Wells develops what she calls a “pragmatic” justification for tort law.
Specific outcomes are justified, she believes, if the outcomes result from a justified
process. Wells argues that the jury system, as generally practiced in the United States, has
multiple features that support its ability to ascertain the community standards relevant to
the tort dispute despite the inescapable subjectivity of each juror.158 She concludes that
“jury adjudication is an essential element of reaching a fair resolution of corrective
justice disputes.”159 For Wells, the process of jury adjudication justifies the specific
outcome of a negligence tort dispute.160
Unlike Wells, I am not wedded to the jury system as the best vehicle to ascertain
group values even though I am open to that possibility for the jury system or a modified
version of it. What is interesting is that Wells assumes what I take to be primarily in need
of justification, namely, that community standards should provide the content to the
standard of care. Without explanation, Wells speaks of the “requirement that tort law
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reflect community norms.”161 It is not clear whether for Wells that requirement is moral,
legal, or factual in some sense.
Importantly, that “tort law reflect community norms” is not explicitly a legal
doctrine. No legal doctrine states that a jury must use community norms to reach its
verdict. Nothing forbids a jury from having a religious or an idiosyncratic concept of
what the reasonably prudent person would have done in the defendant’s circumstances.
Instead of being a requirement, it is plausible that, as a descriptive matter, many juries
rely on community norms in reaching a verdict, especially given the reasonable person
jury instructions and the institutional set up of jury adjudication. It is so plausible that, on
my view, the writers of the Restatement (Second) imputed that interpretation into its
account of negligence legal doctrine, as I suggested in the previous chapter. While it is
plausible that juries often apply community standards given the nature of the reasonable
person standard and the lack of more specific guidance, such is not guaranteed especially
given the reportedly haphazard aspects of jury deliberation. Furthermore, the jury’s use of
community norms is dubitable enough that the writers of the Restatement (Third)
substantially downplay that aspect in their rendition of negligence legal doctrine.
Due largely to Wells’s methodology, her theory may not be able to evaluate
whether social norms properly constitute the standard of care. Her methodology holds
that “existing practices are the beginning of a normative inquiry.”162 I take it that this
emphasis on existing practices, rather than theory or first principles, is why Wells refers
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to her theory as “pragmatic.” She claims that her pragmatic theory contains a normative
component with which one may criticize existing practices.163 I am not rejecting that
possibility. At the same time, evaluating whether the standard of care should be based on
community standards or something entirely different seems too far beyond Wells’s
pragmatic normative reach. It is too far because Wells takes enforcing community
standards to be a fundamental requirement of existing tort law practices. Given the
justificatory floor that Wells celebrates,164 her theory does not help much when deciding
between the current United States tort system and alternatives such as social tort
insurance ala New Zealand or the law and economics approach to negligence, especially
in its more revisionary versions.
Put in terms of Wells’s analogy, Wells states that the pragmatic study of bridge
building allows the pragmatic theorist to critically evaluate the various ways of bridge
building as better or worse.165 However, such a theory does not tell us where a bridge
should be built. Similarly, Wells’s theory does not examine in alternative social systems
of assigning accident costs. Thus, the scope of her theory does not allow her to criticize
or justify central components of the negligence system such as the proper source of the
content of the negligence standard of care.
While Wells states that social norms are the currency of the standard of care, upon
further investigation, that claim appears qualified. Wells explicitly disavows normative
foundationalism. However, Wells situates her theory in Humean moral sentiment.166 Felt

163

Id. at 2362.
Id. at 2363.
165
Id. at 2362-63.
166
Id. at 2396-99.
164

115

moral sentiment comprises moral intuitions, according to Wells, and these sentiments are
allegedly synchronous across individuals. The variations among individuals’ moral
reactions are superficial and can be controlled for via dispassion, reason, and
reflection.167 Wells thinks that several of the structural features of jury adjudication filter
out the variations among the moral intuitions of the jurors allowing them to obtain local
objectivity on the issue of whether the defendant breached the standard of care.168
Put differently, Well’s theory, at first, seems to take community standards and
jury adjudication as its fundamental justificatory basis. Later, we learn that community
standards and jury adjudication have a lineage based in human sentiment, which seems
like a normative foundation, a form of naturalism perhaps. In this light, a jury might
produce a wrong verdict if it fails to filter out bias and other distortions of synchronous
moral sentiment. Even if the jury’s verdict accurately reflects synchronous moral
sentiment, its justifiability stems from that basis rather than the process of jury
adjudication. If so, then the process of jury adjudication is an epistemic tool rather than
the justificatory basis that Wells envisages in her theory.
In comparison, democratic standard theory makes no similar claim regarding the
values of a group. The values of the group do not provide the basis because these values
tap into some widely felt underlying moral sentiment. The values of the group provide
the basis of the standard of care in democratic standard theory because those are the
values of the people locally affected by the relevant actions.
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Polemically speaking, Wells’s endorsement of community standards and the
jury’s ability to ascertain them point us toward democratic standard theory. Wells says,
“The requirement that tort law reflect community norms has a certain amount of appeal in
a democratic system.”169 However, she does not extend that thought to a claim that
principles of democracy justify individual tort outcomes. The fact that Wells does not
even explore that possibility is odd especially since she seeks a process-based
justification of tort decisions and democracy is often characterized as a process that
justifies its result. Even though democratic standard theory does not focus on a processbased justification, it leverages the appeal of democracy as a basis for what constitutes
the negligence standard of care.

Feldman’s Virtue Theory of Tort Law
Heidi Li Feldman presents a theory of tort liability that bases the standard of care
on certain virtues, namely, reasonableness, prudence, and due care (a sub-virtue of
benevolence).170 Feldman takes these virtues directly from common pattern jury
instructions. She claims that instead of a Kantian or utilitarian reductionist account of
reasonableness, the virtue ethics tradition shows how reasonableness, prudence, and due
care as applied by a lay jury justify jury verdicts in negligence cases. According to
Feldman, virtue ethics seeks “to identify both what counts as a life of high quality or
worth and the character traits it takes to achieve one.”171 Feldman believes that virtue
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ethics differs in kind from Kantian ethics where moral rightness is based on autonomy
and freedom. For Feldman, Kantian ethics excludes from the domain of morality the role
that “the satisfaction of human needs, wants, and desires” plays in human flourishing,
which is the “ideal central to virtue ethics.”172
To promote human flourishing in general and virtues such as prudence and due
care in particular, we need to identify specific acts that do so. Feldman claims that
humans “naturally have the capacity to see what these traits ask of us.”173 Feldman
explains:
We can take up the perspective of a virtuous person to see how she would conduct
herself in a particular situation. The more naturally certain virtues come to us, the
more easily we can inhabit the perspective they define.174
Feldman describes the jury’s deliberation as jurors performing this process to determine
if the defendant had acted in accordance with reasonableness, prudence, and due care.175
In this way, the jury operationalizes how the abstract virtues apply to the acts in question
in a tort dispute.
While Feldman’s interesting application of virtue ethics is fairly straightforward,
her explanation of how virtue ethics justifies tort law is harder to pin down. At first, her
theory bears a resemblance to Wells’s theory in their mutual reliance on jury adjudication
to produce determinate, morally justified verdicts. While Wells’s finds justification in the
process itself, Feldman seems to rely on the process to discover what the virtues
independently demarcate as ethical behavior. Presumably, even if the jury sincerely goes
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through the process Feldman envisions, the jury can still incorrectly identify what
constitutes ethical behavior according to the relevant virtues. In contrast, for Wells,
proper jury adjudication makes the jury’s verdict a just outcome (even though I try to cast
doubt on this aspect).
The jury’s central role for Wells is that the jury properly situated has access to the
community norms that should govern the resolution of the tort dispute. For Feldman, the
jury’s prominence is more complicated and yet has an interesting similarity. It seems
possible, under Feldman’s theory, that a judge (or any other person) can operationalize
the pertinent virtues to resolve a tort dispute. Given that possibility, why not employ, in
lieu of a jury, a person that substantially embodies reasonableness, prudence, and due
care to resolve all tort disputes? More fundamentally, why should the virtues of
reasonableness, prudence, and due care govern the assignment of accident costs?
Economic efficiency is at least a contender as an alternative criterion and has quite a
large academic and appellate court following.
Feldman has thoughts on the latter issue scattered throughout her article. One
answer she advances is that reasonableness, prudence, and due care are the terms used in
pattern jury instructions for negligence, and she believes that fact is unlikely to change. In
the decade and a half since her article, pattern jury instructions have not deviated from
the use of the terms of reasonableness, prudence, and due care (or similar). Nevertheless,
with the Restatement (Third) and a growing number of appellate case law favoring a
balancing test understanding of negligence,176 pattern jury instructions are not as
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insulated from change as they previously were. Regardless, Feldman motivates her
application of virtue ethics to the standard of care by repeatedly pointing out how it
descriptively fits with extant trial court practices, specifically, negligence pattern jury
instructions and jury adjudication.177 That emphasis gives the reader the impression at
times that Feldman’s theory is largely descriptive or that its normative base rests merely
on tort law’s existing practices.
In other places, Feldman indicates that her theory has normative implications. She
explicates virtue ethics and goes to considerable lengths to differentiate virtue ethics from
Kantian ethics and utilitarian ethics.178 In that account, Feldman paints virtue ethics to be
the superior form of ethics. Yet, she does not mount anything close to a thorough,
systematic defense of virtue ethics. I am not insisting that Feldman drill down to first
principles merely because she appeals to virtue ethics. Instead, her lack of citing or
gesturing toward such a defense is noticeably absent because she critiques the first
principles of the utilitarian and Kantian traditions. So, it comes across as if she is asking
the reader to reject those traditions due to flawed first principles and endorse virtue ethics
on faith.
When Feldman tries to ground the normativity of virtue ethics as applied to
negligence, she seems to go in a different direction. Such is evident after Feldman
introduces her characterization of jury deliberations as jurors performing thought
experiments. Jurors supposedly imagine what a person with reasonableness, prudence,
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and due care would have done in the defendant’s circumstances. Feldman writes, “The
results of the thought experiments juries perform in civil negligence actions are
guideposts to the balance [between security and liberty that] the citizenry endorses.”179
With the introduction of this new facet, one wonders whether having the jury apply
reasonableness, prudence, and due care is actually a mechanism that gets the jury to
ascertain how the citizenry balances the values of security and freedom.
Immediately following the previous quote, Feldman states, “In a political system
that assigns sovereignty to the citizenry, it is the citizens who should decide how
carefully each must act in an effort to avoid personal injury to others.”180 Feldman may
be suggesting here that the normativity resides in the sovereignty of the citizenry. Or, she
may be saying that, even though normativity resides in the virtues properly understood,
the citizenry should play a central role in applying the virtues given the contingent fact
that the legal system she is analyzing places sovereignty in the citizenry. On the former
reading, normativity derives from democracy; on the latter reading, normativity derives
from the virtues. This ambiguity pervades Feldman’s theory with multiple statements
supporting both views.
Feldman most clearly endorses the democratic elements in her theory when she
writes:
Eliminating the negligence standard and the jury’s role in applying it would
sacrifice something of political and social importance: the opportunity for
popular, collective judgments about how each citizen should conduct herself or
himself when the pursuit of her or his own objectives creates the risk of injuring
somebody else.181
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The potential loss of something of political and social importance is not the same
claiming that principles of populist democracy her justify her theory. However, in the
absence of a robust justification of virtue ethics or anything else justificatory in nature,
Feldman’s reliance on democracy seems significant.
In the following statement, Feldman compares jury adjudication to referendum, an
especially democratic process:
We cannot hold a referendum each time somebody is about to act and incidentally
risk injuring others. We need, therefore, another way of forming and expressing
collective judgments about how carefully people should proceed in particular
circumstances. Civil negligence actions, in which juries apply a virtue-based
standard of care, perform this function.182
Feldman implies that the referendum would be better at determining the standard of care,
but due to its impracticality, juries fill that function. Note that Feldman characterizes the
would-be goal of the referendum as a “way of forming and expressing collective
judgments about how carefully people should proceed in particular circumstances.” That
statement is ambiguous. At first, it appears that such a process has nothing to do with the
virtues but, instead, focuses on collective decision-making based on the preferences of
individuals. Alternatively, the collective judgment might be about the true nature of the
virtues as applied in particular circumstances. So, the ambiguity remains.
Perhaps, Feldman envisages her theory as cohesively combining virtue ethics and
some aspect of democracy. At one point, she writes, “Because a virtue-based approach
conceives of the application of the negligence standard as a thought experiment best
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performed by lay people, the virtue-based approach is radically democratic and
populist.”183 Feldman does not unpack this claim or entertain possible conflicts between
virtue ethics and democracy.
To me, any attempt at combining these normative elements threatens Feldman’s
whole project of grounding negligence in virtue ethics. If the jury’s explication of the
virtues of reasonableness, prudence, and due care is normatively binding because it
identifies the way the citizenry balances security and liberty, then what ultimately does
the normative work is the way that the citizenry values and trades-off security and liberty.
In this vein, deliberation about the virtues is only a means to discover the citizenry’s
values. Instead of reasonableness, prudence, and due care having a transcendent meaning
that any human can ascertain if done properly, reasonableness, prudence, and due care are
fully defined by the values of the citizenry. Feldman seems to be aware of this point
when she states, “Jury verdicts in negligence actions give social content to the virtues of
prudence and due care, repeatedly providing concrete conclusions about the sort of
conduct that is consistent or inconsistent with these dispositions.”184 It is odd that
Feldman does not conclude that the “social content” is what is normatively important, not
the shell concept in which the content is expressed. Taken even further, we would have
reason to dispense entirely with the use of the terms reasonableness, prudence, and due
care if some other terms or processes more accurately or more efficiently ascertained the
values of the citizenry regarding the assignment of accident costs in tort disputes. If so,
Feldman’s virtue ethics theory collapses into democratic standard theory.
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Despite the ambiguities in several places, I ultimately think that Feldman sides
with the virtue ethics reading of her theory. While she would be happy if at times her
theory also corresponds with a democratic outcome, she seems unlikely to endorse a
democratic decision that contravenes her virtue-based theory for the following reasons.
First, the article title and the predominant way Feldman characterizes her theory
emphasizes virtue ethics as the theory’s core. Second, she explicitly rejects certain ways
of determining the risk-benefit trade-off. Specifically, she rejects justice and efficiency
separately as sole determiners of negligence. It is plausible that the citizenry could
consistently balance security and benefit according to efficiency rather than
reasonableness, prudence, and due care in specific domains of action or generally. Such a
democratic outcome is anathema to the spirit and much of the text of Feldman’s theory.
Finally, since Feldman is committed to these virtues seemingly for independent reasons,
then she needs to explain how her theory would operate if the general citizenry had
warped senses of these virtues. In that situation, I imagine Feldman would opt for a
mechanism other than the citizenry to operationalize the virtues.
Without using democracy to ground Feldman’s virtue theory, her theory’s lack of
adequate justification resurfaces. Feldman does not provide a defense of virtue ethics in
general or why reasonableness, prudence, and due care should be used to resolve
negligence disputes. She provides no argument why the citizenry should not fill out the
meaning of efficiency (or perhaps justice) to resolve tort disputes. Why not have the
inquiry go through the efficiency as wells as reasonableness, prudence, and due care? The
only obvious answer that Feldman provides is that reasonableness, prudence, and due
care are the concepts identified in extant tort law. If so, then Feldman’s justification rests
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entirely on the status quo law of negligence (primarily the pattern jury instructions) and
some of its institutional practices (e.g., jury adjudication). While her theory provides an
interesting way of understanding these features of accident law, her theory does not
justify the legal doctrine and practices that it explains.

Dagan’s Hierarchy of Values
Before focusing on democratic standard theory, I point out one insight which
supports what I am about to defend. The insight is Hanoch Dagan’s attempt to charitably
read an aspect of Gregory Keating’s theory of risk regulation. Put roughly, Keating
claims, “No amount of inconvenience, for example, can justify inflicting a devastating
injury on someone.”185 From this and other examples, Keating establishes the “existence
of discontinuities of value - the fact that not everything is comparable in value to
undevastated human life.”186 For that reason, unrestricted cost-benefit analysis is an
unjustified way to establish the level of precaution.187 Keating concludes that a society
engaging in an ongoing activity that risks, and thus at some point will with virtual
certainty result in, death and devastating injury on some person is only justified if doing
so realizes some comparable value to some person or class of persons.188
Surprisingly, endeavors that realize “comparable value,” according to Keating, do
not have to be endeavors that prevent or save individuals from devastating injury or
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death. Keating thinks that endeavors such as motoring and producing toy cigarette
lighters are examples of activities of comparable value.189 These and similar endeavors
inflict a “low level of risk of devastating injury” that is an “inescapable price of
activity.”190 Like Fletcher, Keating refers to these endeavors as “background risks,” the
“price of activity in toto” for individuals to have the liberty to pursue their aims, ends,
and aspirations.191 My aim is not to critique Keating’s theory as it pertains to risk
regulation.192 I find the gist of his argument appealing as identifying something
misguided about cost-benefit reasoning whether in risk regulation or accident law.
Setting that aside, Dagan explores whether Keating’s premises commit him to the
claim that tradeoffs between health and productivity are impermissible because life and
health are incommensurably greater values than marginal productivity.193 Dagan rejects
this reading based on Keating’s text. Dagan proposes the Keating’s premises commit him
to endorsing “a social deliberation that identifies and validates the interests and activities
that are, for the given community, intrinsic objects of value and that brings about a
resolution of conflicts between divergent interests and activities according to the
community’s hierarchy of values.”194 Unfortunately, Dagan does not further explicate the
details of what this social deliberation involves, especially in regard to the “community’s
hierarchy of values.” Instead, Dagan proceeds to argue that such a social deliberation
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needs to be limited based on the requirements of political morality. In contrast, I think
Dagan’s description of this social deliberation has more appeal than even Dagan does, at
least as applied to accident law.
I do not think this social deliberation, as I understand it, cleanly follows from
Keating’s text or theory. Rather, Dagan description captures more than Keating’s theory
offers. Dagan’s claim insightfully suggests what is the central appeal of democratic
standard theory. Specifically, what matters in assessing the moral permissibility of
imposing risks is not an extrinsic or universal ordering of risks and benefits. Instead,
evaluating risks should center on a particular society’s internal interests and activities
where differences among individuals are resolved according to that society’s hierarchy of
values. Democratic standard theory expresses this idea, as applied to accident law, in a
streamlined fashion by stating that negligent acts should be determined based on the
values of the individuals locally affected by the kind of act in question. Defending this
theory occupies the next chapter.

127

Chapter Three

Democratic Standard Theory

In prior chapters, several competing theories of negligence, despite their other virtues,
have proven inadequate in providing a determinate, complete, and compelling theory of
breach of the negligence standard of care based on the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition. Each theory provides the judge or jury with
excessive discretion leaving open the potential for disparate treatment and privileged ab
initio injustice. To mitigate this potential, I create democratic standard theory. This
theory’s governing objective is to best interpret what it means to treat individuals as free
and equal when determining breach in the context of a negligence tort dispute at law.
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Remember that I am using “Kantian” to refer to the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian political tradition (broadly construed) within which many
versions of that tradition thrive. So, in creating the most persuasive theory of breach,
based on the Kantian tradition, I am not defending a theory which aims to adhere most
closely with Kant’s own writings or the implications of his writings in particular. Also, I
employ Rawlsian terminology and comparisons due to its prominence among theories
that draw on the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition, not
because I think democratic standard theory relies on the validity of Rawlsianism or its
particulars, as opposed to alternative competing versions of the Kantian tradition.
Rather, democratic standard theory could likely be explicated in the terminology
of any plausible theory based on the overarching Kantian commitments. That does not
mean that democratic standard theory is consistent with all such theories. Instead, some
more general theories and democratic standard theory may conflict even though they both
seek to best interpret the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
Nevertheless, I suspect that democratic standard theory will prove to be supported by, or
at minimum consistent with, the most compelling version of political and moral theory
within the Kantian tradition. At the end of this dissertation, I discuss three core aspects of
democratic standard theory that land it squarely within that tradition.
As a sneak preview, those reasons are summarized as follows:
1.

Democratic standard theory provides a standard of care in
negligence under which the most individuals possible may pursue
their life plans more than under any competing theory of
negligence. This reflects the Kantian value of freedom.

2.

Democratic standard theory suggests that constitutional essentials
set an upward boundary between reckless acts and negligent acts.
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Such amounts to a right against having reckless acts imposed on
oneself. Based on the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition, certain acts are prohibited or allowed due to
reasons that do not center on the consequences of the acts. This
reflects both Kantian values of freedom and equality.
3.

Democratic standard theory treats each individual with a robust
form of equality by weighing each individual’s values equally
while at the same time not letting improper or morally irrelevant
factors substantially influence the standard of care. This reflects
the Kantian value of equal treatment.

An Illustration
Democratic standard theory claims that breach of the negligence standard of care
should be determined based on the values of the individuals locally affected by the kind
of act in question. I parse each aspect of the previous sentence in the pages that follow.
As a teaser, by “values” I have a broad concept in mind that covers virtually all ways that
individuals explicitly or implicitly impute worth or the lack thereof to all aspects of their
lives.
By “individuals locally affected” I mean to refer to those individuals who have
any appreciable degree of chance of being harmed by the kind of act at issue. So, if some
individuals create a risk but are not themselves likely, to any appreciable degree, to be
harmed by that particular risk, those individuals are not part of the relevant group. For
example, if, by disposing of the waste from her leather tanning trade, a person
accidentally poisons a well from which she never drinks, that person is not in the relevant
group for determining negligence in democratic standard theory.
To identify which individuals are in the relevant group for any particular kind of
act, we need look neither far nor wide. The relevant group comprises the same
130

individuals to which an actor, in a particular context, owes a duty of care—to put the
point in terms of tort law doctrine. Put in terms of moral concepts, in any situation, the
relevant group is determined by the scope of an actor’s particular, context-based primary
moral obligation to act with sensitivity to others’ interests at that time and place. Put
differently and simply, the “others” whose interests are at play are the relevant group.
Although not ideal, I refer for ease to the individuals locally affected as a “group”
even though my use of that term is technical (explained below). For now, keep in mind
that my use of “group” does not implicitly or necessarily involve any commonality
normally associated with groups, such as nationality, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation,
religion, religious beliefs, political affiliation, etc.
To illustrate democratic standard theory, suppose that, when a parent hosts others’
kids for play time, the relevant group’s values support the following standard:
Group One: After warning children and preventing dangerous situations from
arising, a hosting parent must continually monitor children during play time with
friends and must respond promptly and appropriately to any injuries.
This standard reflects a group’s values concerning the protection of children, play time,
pain, injury, medical care, and the worth of adult time and skills. If a parent fails to
continually monitor the children and another’s child breaks her arm while climbing a tree,
the hosting parent has breached the negligence standard of care and is vulnerable to a
negligence claim for the child’s accident costs.
As one may have guessed, another group’s values regarding adult supervision of
play time may differ and instead dictate a different standard, such as:
Group Two: After warning children and preventing dangerous situations from
arising, a parent must be within “shouting” distance of children during play time
and must respond promptly and appropriately to any injuries.
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Group Two’s standard requires less direct monitoring than Group One’s standard.
Suppose that in Group Two another parent’s child falls while climbing a tree. Prior to the
fall, the hosting parent forbade such conduct, and after the fall, the hosting parent heard
the commotion and responded appropriately. The Group Two parent did not breach the
negligence standard of care and is not vulnerable to a negligence claim for the other
child’s accident costs—even though the parent would have breached the standard of care
for the same acts if he were in Group One.
This illustration is inspired by the case, Lubitz v. Wells, 113 A.2d 147, 19 Conn.
Supp. 322, (1955), where a child injures another child by swinging the father’s golf club,
which the father left in his own backyard. I characterize my example in terms of parental
monitoring of children instead of the reasonableness of where a parent leaves one’s golf
clubs or similar items as the Lubitz court primarily framed the issue.195 In my mind, the
more fundamental issue in Lubitz is parental monitoring. The parent arguably failed to
adequately monitor at the beginning of the play time in the sense of either failing to
forbid use of the golf club or failing to inspect the play area for possible dangers.
Regardless, democratic standard theory could frame the issue in terms of parental storage
(or lack thereof) of such items, if all things considered, that is the best way to handle the
kind of act at issue. Below, I address further the delicate yet familiar task of framing such
issues in negligence cases.

Lubitz v. Wells, 113 A.2d 147, 19 Conn. Supp. 322, 323 (1955) (reasoning that “[i]t would hardly be
good sense to hold that this golf club is so obviously and intrinsically dangerous that it is negligence to
leave it lying on the ground in the yard”). At the same time, note that it seems like the plaintiff argued that
the father could have met the standard of care if he had cautioned his son against the use of the golf club.
Id. at 322-23.
195
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As evident from the parental monitoring example, democratic standard theory is
democratic in a unique yet powerful sense. The people’s values determine legal
outcomes. More specifically, the people’s values determine what constitutes breach of the
negligence standard of care in accident law.
The members of a group need not share the same values or weight any of the
values in the same ways. That supposition would almost wish away the philosophical
problem at issue. Instead, the point of democratic standard theory is to determine breach
of the standard of care given the diverse, irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of
the good in modern societies. In this way, the theory follows and extends the project of
political liberalism.196 By attending to the larger framework, in particular, democratic
standard theory strives to mitigate the potential for privileged ab initio injustice.
To that end, when members of a pluralistic group have different values, as is often
the case, each person’s values are treated with equal weight vis-à-vis each other, like a
one-person-one-vote system. Majority rule, according to democratic standard theory,
should resolve the problem that diverse, often conflicting values pose. Even though the
majority’s values support a single standard of care for a particular kind of act, such does
not mean that the values of each member of that majority are identical. Different values
may provide overlapping support for a single standard of care for a particular kind of
act.197 Except in situations where a person’s constitutional essentials would be violated,
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JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 3-4 (1993) (stating that the primary inquiry of political
liberalism is “how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”).
197
Compare to Rawls’s idea of overlapping consensus. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A
RESTATEMENT 32-38 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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the standard of care is whatever standard is supported by the values of the most
individuals of the relevant group as long as it has at least a simple majority (that is, over
50%). Later, I address (rare) situations where constitutional essentials trump, for
democratic reasons, the standard of care that the actual majority’s values support.

Values (Broadly Construed) a.k.a. “Life Plan Parts”
To reiterate, democratic standard theory claims that breach of the negligence
standard of care should be determined based on the values of the individuals locally
affected by the kind of act in question. By “values,” I mean a vast expanse of ideas that
pertain to individuals’ lives, including how much importance or worth individuals attach
to specific kinds of acts, longer term endeavors, things, relationships, work, risks and
virtually all aspects of their daily lives as well as moral concepts (courage, prudence,
benevolence, etc.), duties, rules, principles, and beliefs. Not all values are relevant, but
most values potentially are. Relevant values pertain to the acts alone or in context with
other acts that potentially lead to accidental harm.
“Values,” in my broad sense, are an enormous part of a “life plan” or
“comprehensive conception of the good.” I treat both of these concepts as roughly
synonymous and refer to them collectively as one’s “life plan” even though some aspects
of one’s life plan may not be that, well, planned, that is, consciously or critically adopted.
A life plan is not monolithic but is composed of numerous parts (“life plan parts”)
that address various aspects of one’s life. A life plan includes the following or subparts of
the following: one’s routine of daily acts, inclinations, attitudes, dispositions, counterfactual dispositions, relationships, and settings in which one lives as well as one’s values
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(as narrowly construed), morals, moral principles, religious beliefs, ideologies, short and
long term goals, jobs/careers, life-long projects, and activities or principles that give one
satisfaction on any level. The collection and integration of these things or aspects of them
in one’s life are what I mean by a life plan. As should be evident, numerous aspects of
one’s life plan fit within my concept of values.
Some life plan parts are unconsciously or uncritically included in one’s life plan
through socialization, genetic endowments, genetic predispositions, chance, trauma,
accidents, etc. Let me refer to these aspects as “proto-life plan parts” to indicate that such
play a part in one’s life plan, but proto-life plan parts may not be that consciously or
critically endorsed. Their existence does not undermine democratic standard theory as
long as, for most individuals, a sufficient number of one’s life plan parts are full-fledged
life plan parts. Consequently, I do not further address them. Relatedly, even values that
one has consciously or critically adopted have usually been shaped by strong exogenous
influences from one’s society. Nevertheless, what matters is that the values are now his or
hers (i.e., a particular individual’s values a.k.a. life plan parts).
One’s life plan parts may adjust in light of exogenous events, development of
one’s personality or knowledge, and so on. For example, as part of an individual’s life
plan, she will have attitudes about labor and leisure. How much she actually labors at any
given time likely depends on how much she likes that labor, how much remuneration is
involved, and how much income she wants or needs at that time. If remuneration
increases, she may labor more. So, the way labor figures in this person’s life plan
depends on her values as they interact with other factors, including exogenous factors
such as changes in wages.
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Part of forming and pursuing one’s life plan involves assessing what risks one has
exposed oneself to either by one’s own acts or by proximity to others’ acts or the
products of their acts. Each available type of job involves a certain bundle of benefits and
risks as a package deal. Also, living in one kind of home rather than another and in one
town/city rather than another involves benefits and risks as a package. The same is true of
other aspects of one’s life plan such as one’s leisure activities and one’s modes of
transportation. Thus, forming and pursuing one’s life plan in a social context involves
pursuit of benefits even though such pursuits involve certain inherent risks and risks due
to one’s proximity to others’ pursuits of their life plans.

The Object of Values
To implement the democratic standard theory, we need to know how to identify
which values within each person’s life plan are relevant to determining the negligence
standard of care for any particular kind of act. Let’s begin by clarifying what exactly is
the object of the values to which democratic standard theory points. Metaphorically,
setting breach according to individual’s values can be likened roughly to a voting system
where each individual’s values count as one “vote” for each kind of act in the standard of
care. Using this rough analogy, in this section, I am identifying what type of propositions
or “laws,” if you will, individuals are “voting” on. For ease of use, I refer to the objects of
values that individuals are voting on as “propositions,” although I stress I am not
implying that these “propositions” either have or do not have the standard features of law
such as “being legally authoritative over multiple transactions or occurrences.” Statutes,
ballot initiatives, referenda, and case law precedent generally can have that sort of
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authority. For my purposes, consider my term “proposition” with regard to the negligence
standard of care as only a single-use proposition. The single-use, specifically, is to
adjudicate the issue of breach in a single, specific accident that already occurred.
There are two types of propositions that, though loosely formulated, should
convey the issue at stake in this subsection. They are interrelated (and, in many instances,
are merely two sides of the same coin), and cannot, perhaps, be cleanly or completely
separated. With the first type, the propositions focus on the acts themselves and the
manners/contexts in which these acts may be performed. These are (usually) productive
acts that individuals do or want to do. For example:
Type One: One may take one’s dog outside of one’s own securely
enclosed property only if the dog has a proper restraint (e.g., a leash or
muzzle), regardless of how well supervised or trained the dog is.
With the second type, the propositions pertain to what risks individuals may impose on
others’ person or property. For example,
Type Two: One may impose a risk of dog attack or property damage by
taking one’s dog outside of one’s own securely enclosed property without
any physical restraint as long as the dog is well supervised and trained.
These two propositions provide different levels of safety against dog attack. However, set
that detail aside in order to focus on each type of proposition. A Type One proposition
focuses on the (productive) tasks that individuals may perform. A Type Two proposition
focuses on what risks individuals may impose on others.
In democratic standard theory, Type One propositions are the focus. Put
differently, the type of propositions to be decided democratically pertain to what tasks
individuals are permitted to perform, not what risks individuals are permitted to impose
on others, without being vulnerable to a negligence claim. Each of these types can be
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reformulated in the terms of the other. In many instances, values that a person has may
support the same substance of either type of proposition. Nevertheless, the point here is
not merely semantic or one of emphasis.
The implication of this distinction is that democratic standard theory is not
primarily or directly trying to capture each person’s values as they relate to imposing risk
on others (that is, Type Two propositions). Democratic standard theory’s calculus
disregards any individual’s stand-alone values that support gratuitously imposing risk on
others. Remember my sense of values is broad such that one’s values could include a
preference, desire, or inclination to impose a risk of harm on others. Such values,
standing alone, have no positive moral worth, and, thus, society should not facilitate or
protect them. Stand-alone values to impose risk on others resemble more closely, in a
moral sense, values to commit core criminal offenses. Both sorts of values include
implicitly or explicitly a substantial disregard for another’s bodily integrity or property.
To clarify, I use the phrase “values to [DO AN ACTION]” in the previous
paragraph for shorthand as follows: A person’s values, in my sense, have as their object
the action in question. Or, the values tend, other things being equal, to bring about the
action in question at least partly for its own sake, not merely as a side-effect.
In contrast, Type One propositions do not aim at causing risk even though, as it
turns out, Type One propositions usually involve risks to others’ bodily integrity or
property due to brute facts about the nature of the universe and society. The values that
support Type One propositions are the bread and butter of any person’s life plan. As
essential life plan parts, Type One propositions and the supporting values are morally
worthy of social consideration and, in numerous cases, protection. Thus, in democratic
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standard theory, only Type One propositions are what individuals are “voting” on with
their values.

Nature of the Values in Democratic Standard Theory
Democratic standard theory uses values in place of directly appealing to extant
legal doctrine’s concept of the reasonably prudent person. The rationale behind this step
is that the concept of the reasonably prudent person and its cognates are almost entirely
dependent, if the theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition are properly
understood, on the actual values of the individuals involved. To explicate this point, let’s
examine statements that have, or can be reworded to have, the same form as the
following:
Current Legal Concept of Reasonableness: Act A in manner X and
context Z is unreasonable if that act is not what a reasonably prudent
person would have done.
Many think that the concept of the “reasonably prudent person” (hereafter referred to
simply as “reasonableness”) is a piece (or combination of more basic pieces) of the moral
fabric of the universe. For example, recall that “reasonableness” was a core piece of
Feldman’s virtue-based theory.
I suspect that this way of slicing and dicing the moral fabric is false—at least in
the sense of reasonableness related to breach of the negligence standard of care. The
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition do not designate a specific,
correct amount of (negligent) risk that is morally permissible to impose on others in any
particular context—unless (and here is my most significant insight) the premises
necessarily incorporate the values of the individuals affected. Since individuals’ values
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can change, reasonableness is not a moral concept with universal content over time even
with respect to the same persons. Furthermore, since acts in different locations affect
different individuals who likely have a different mix of pertinent values, reasonableness
is not a moral concept with universal content across all persons. A kind of act, such as
phoning while driving or the other examples I have provided, may be unreasonable in one
city while reasonable in a different city, and each of these moral claims are equally
justified due to the different underlying values regarding transportation, time, etc. held by
the individuals in each city.
Democratic standard theory treats individuals’ use of reasonableness, its cognates,
and related concepts as mere expressions or repositories of facts about a person’s values
including their likes, dispositions, experiences, preferences, beliefs, and other
idiosyncrasies. Rewording the above Current Legal Concept of Reasonableness to clarify
how democratic standard theory understands the concept of reasonableness would be as
follows:
A Person’s Use of Reasonableness: Act A in manner X and context Z is
unreasonable, to a particular person, if that person’s values do not favor its
characteristics, purposes, or likely results.
“What a reasonably prudent person would have done” according to one person is
reformulated to a proposition about “what a particular person values.” I include
“characteristics” and “purposes” in addition to “likely results” because in many instances
individuals care not merely about an act’s results but also with how those results are
brought about or the purposes of the acts.
For example, individuals may tolerate the risks of the transport, storage, and use
of radioactive material to develop medical treatments for cancer. At the same time, the
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same individuals may not tolerate the same risks of the same quantity and kind of
materials to develop alternative energy technology. The former is “worth it” to hopefully
extend lives whereas the latter only reduces oil consumption, an individual may explain.
So, the characteristics or purposes of an act matter in addition to the possible results.
Perhaps, we could collapse these concepts into an umbrella concept of “results.” Yet,
keeping them separate emphasizes important features of an act that are often left out in
other kinds of risk assessments such as in policy analysis by technocrats.
At the group level, I contend that the concept of reasonableness should read as
follows:
Group Concept of Reasonableness: Act A in manner X and context Z is
unreasonable if the values of the majority of locally affected individuals
do not favor its characteristics or likely results.
Not surprisingly, I phrase the Group Concept of Reasonableness as a version of
democratic standard theory. In doing so, I am trying to make it clear that, based on the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition, there is no other relevant
concept of reasonableness that pertains to breach of the negligence standard of care aside
from that elucidated in democratic standard theory.
Democratic standard theory is only interested in the usage of the concept of
reasonableness (including the “reasonably prudent person”) to the extent that it contains
information concerning individuals’ values—regardless of any other meaning or
significance for it in other domains. So, democratic standard theory understands a
person’s statement about, or even a jury’s verdict that hinges on, an act’s reasonableness
according to the format in the above Personal Concept of Reasonableness. The hope is
that a person in the relevant group, a jury’s deliberation after an adversarial trial, or some
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other epistemic process can also provide evidence as to the values of the relevant group
thereby elucidating what is unreasonable (i.e., what constitutes breach) in a particular
context.
Note that democratic standard theory does not judge whether or not the values
(including moral beliefs) of any individual are correct in a universal or even a culturally
relativistic sense. The theory instead determines breach of the standard of care based on
facts. While a person’s values (in my sense) contain, among other things, moral concepts
and principles, the fact that the person has those particular values and moral beliefs is a
fact about the world or, more specifically, a fact about that person in the world. Thus, in
setting breach of the standard of care according to individuals’ values, democratic
standard theory relies on facts rather than on the truth or correctness of any individual’s
values (including moral beliefs).
In defending democratic standard theory, it is unnecessary to specify what is the
precise nature of these underlying values, that is, whether they are mere facts or, in some
sense, moral facts in virtue of their pertaining to acts that involve other individuals. All
that matters is that the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition
require that we do not rely on, utilize, or even give any weight to any possible truth or
correctness of individuals’ underlying values for the purpose of justifying the negligence
standard of care. This conclusion is unique and important because, traditionally, the
reasonable person standard, and rights-based theories of tort in general, have been
primarily portrayed as relying on a moral basis that is largely independent of the actual
values of those individuals locally affected by the kind of act at issue.
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In summary, for the concept(s) of “reasonably prudent person,” “reasonable,”
“reasonableness,” or their cognates in the context of accident law,198 I contend that the
overarching theoretical commitments within the Kantian tradition do not specify, in any
universal sense, which acts are reasonable and which are unreasonable as these concepts
pertain to breach of the negligence standard of care. Instead, based on the overarching
theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition, any concept or theory that sets the
standard of care must necessarily include information about the life plans of the
individuals affected. As a result, no standard of care is universally morally correct or
superior for all groups. The morally superior standard for any given kind of act (like the
parental monitoring of child play time in the above example) is whatever standard is
supported by the values of the most members of the group of locally affected individuals.

Why Groups?
Recall that democratic standard theory points to the values of those individuals
locally affected by a kind of act to determine if a particular act in time and place breached
the negligence standard of care. First, note that implicit in that formulation is that the
negligence standard of care for the same kind of act can be different if the values of
individuals change or when the affected individuals are in separate groups. For this
reason, democratic standard theory pertains to “modular groups” rather than fixed groups.
“Modular” simply indicates that the relevant group may not be static at each application
of democratic standard theory.

198
I save for my future work my thoughts on what “reasonable” properly means in criminal law or in
other issues I have not explicitly identified.
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I avoid using the phrase “the group’s values” because I do not mean to
anthropomorphize the group. I also do not want to introduce or even imply any wacky
sense of collective identity or an amalgamation of individuals” values into one set of
values that the group holds. Ideally, I would rather not use the term “group” at all because
it too easily suggests a collection of individuals with more commonalities than I mean to
suggest. Yet, continually using phrases such as “locally affected individuals” or more
precisely a “collection of individuals who are affected by a kind of act (or series of
related kinds of acts) in a single, relatively specific context” are cumbersome. (I specify
more precisely below what I mean by a “kind of act.”) So, when I use the term “group”
for ease, the one and only characteristic I am referring to is the collection of individuals
(at a specific time and place) locally affected by the kind of act in question. Individuals in
the group (or for short, but also not ideal, “group members”) need not reside or work in
the same area or be a member of the same town, city, nation, etc. Moreover, the group
does not necessarily or implicitly have any other commonality normally associated with
groups such as nationality, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, religion, religious beliefs,
political affiliation, etc. Due to the atypical use of a group, any tyranny of the majority
concern based on the claim that democratic standard theory could unfairly disadvantage a
suspect class or something similar is misplaced. I mean the term “suspect class” to refer
to the extensive jurisprudence regarding the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. In that jurisprudence, the courts have labored to define particular “groups,”
often termed “suspect classes,” for which this constitutional protection is provided. I am
simply pointing out that these suspect classes and the accompanying jurisprudence are
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orthogonal to most of the issues in this dissertation, especially my use of majoritarianism.
Later, I respond to concerns that involve other possible senses of tyranny of the majority.
Despite my hesitancy in using the term “group,” I do not mean to suggest that
such a collection of locally affected individuals have next to nothing in common. To be
locally affected by an act, there is a good chance that most or all of the group members
will have been in the same area where the act occurred and many may, as it turns out,
reside, shop, and/or work in the same area. Yet, to be clear, I am not building or implying
any such requirement in my technical definition of the term “group.”
With all of those points in mind, let me illustrate how group members have
characteristics in common that are not what we normally think of as group-defining
characteristics. Suppose only one road connects two commercial areas, and an
automobile collision occurs on this road. The relevant group may be those drivers that on
occasion or regularly travel between those two commercial areas even though these
“group members” live and work in a variety of places that are far apart and share no other
single morally relevant characteristic.
The reader may think that the success of democratic standard theory primarily
hinges on its ability to identify the relevant group for any accident at issue. I do not think
so—for three reasons. First, the relevant group for any particular matter will likely turn
out (and justifiably so) to be one of the existing political divisions in which the harm
occurred. Practical matters would weigh heavily, even in a moral sense, at least for
democratic standard theory to guide actual tort disputes given existing political
institutions. In other words, using existing political divisions may be practically
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necessary and “good enough for government work” to operationalize the thrust of
democratic standard theory.
Second, if I may lay my cards on the table and explicate my hand later, the
relevant group is going to be largely or entirely dependent on the scope of the actor’s
specific primary moral obligation(s) to act in a particular context with sensitivity to
others’ relevant interests. That scope involves moral concepts of the duty of care,
outcome-responsibility, and various other senses of foreseeability. Put more simply, the
relevant group depends on those individuals to whom the actor owes a duty of care when
performing the act at issue. Therefore, democratic standard theory does not need an
independent argument for its concept of group apart from it being compatible with one or
more compelling theories of the duty of care in tort.
The inextricable importance of the duty of care to a negligence tort claim has
received much attention lately especially in the work of John Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky.199 As I note in the Introduction, democratic standard theory’s concept of breach
works in concert with theories of other moral components of a negligence claim
including duty of care, causation, outcome-responsibility (and the concepts included
therein), compensable damages, harm, risk, and so on. Any theory of breach must
necessarily do so. In that light, democratic standard theory’s use of “group” (or better a
“collection of locally affected individuals”) may stand or fall alongside others’ theories of
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John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733
(1998); see also Stephen Perry, The Role of Duty of Care in a Rights-Based Theory of Tort Law, in THE
GOALS OF PRIVATE LAW 79 (Andrew Robertson & Tang Hang Wu eds., 2009).
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the other components of negligence, most especially the duty of care and outcome
responsibility.
Finally, I see my most important and novel claim in this dissertation as being that
negligence properly turns almost entirely on the values of individuals. If we lived in a
world where individuals had identical relevant values, that unanimity would render moot
the issue of identifying a relevant group. Once the reader is nearly convinced that
negligence properly turns almost entirely on individuals’ values, the remaining step, in
order to entirely convince the reader, is largely transformed into a task of avoiding or
minimizing the tyranny of the majority concern. That concern is how can we justify
holding an individual to a standard of care, which that individual’s own values do not
support, just because a majority of individuals’ values happen to support that standard.
Identifying the relevant group is not a moot issue, by any means. Rather, once I overcome
the tyranny of the majority concern, identifying the relevant group looks more like a task
of minimizing the number of individuals held to a standard that their own values do not
support. In such a task, we aspire to minimize such occurrences and, at the same time, are
content with almost any level of success we achieve. So, shortly I turn my attention to
motivating the democracy thread and to minimize worries about majoritarian tyranny.

Corrective Justice or Distributive Justice?
One concern that may arise both from my argument above and my forthcoming
argument regarding democracy is that democratic standard theory uses something akin to
a distributive justice mechanism to address an issue within corrective justice. As I noted
in Chapter Two, Stephen Perry levels a similar criticism against George Fletcher’s use of
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equal distribution of security in the reciprocal risk theory. In contrast, the concern has no
purchase in democratic standard theory because of its focus on the issue of negligent
breach of the standard of care. Put in the terms of Jules Coleman and John Oberdiek
discussed in Chapter Two, democratic standard theory provides the basis for a domain of
primary moral obligations. Corrective justice involves a potential secondary obligation
when certain primary obligations are violated. So, corrective justice operates on a wide
swath of primary obligations regardless of the nature of those obligations or the kind of
justification underlying them.
For example, in a simple case of theft of one’s money, let’s assume that the
correct theory of distributive justice establishes that the victim is entitled to that money at
the time of the theft. The victim’s claim for compensation from the thief is the epitome of
a bilateral claim appropriate for corrective justice—hearkening even back to Aristotle’s
thought. Yet, the victim’s primary claim to the money is justified through distributive
justice.
Similarly, even if the justification I provide in democratic standard theory
amounts to a distributive-like theory, such does not count against it as a theory of what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care. Since democratic standard theory is
an account of primary obligations that often give rise to bilateral claims in corrective
justice, the underlying justification does not have to be wholly or even partly bilateral in
nature. As an advantage illuminated by this point, since democratic standard theory
operates at the level of primary obligations, the theory is likely compatible with most
plausible rights-based theories of corrective justice.
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The Two Potential Injustices
As addressed in Chapter Two, one prominent problem with Ripstein’s and
Weinrib’s theories (and Fletcher’s theory to a far lesser extent) is that each theory, like
existing accident law, provides the judge or jury excessive discretion in determining
negligent breach. These theories do not address or defend whether a judge or jury is
capable or justified in determining breach. They merely rely on, without explanation,
status quo adjudication to apply their broad moral concepts, likely by means of the
reasonable person standard, to the detail-rich factual scenarios relevant to determining
breach. The resulting discretion leaves open the potential for disparate treatment and
privileged ab initio injustice.
To mitigate these kinds of injustice, democratic standard theory provides specific
criteria that to determine what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care for
any accident. Specifically, the first step requires us to identify the relevant group for the
accident at issue. I address that issue later because, as it turns out (as telegraphed above),
identifying the relevant group is easily resolved by appeal to any cogent theory of the
duty of care in tort. Since such a theory is external to democratic standard theory, we
need not search for any new justification from within democratic standard theory.
The second step is to identify what the relevant group’s values are regarding the
acts that led to the accident. As I suggest below, the values need not be individually
identified and weighted as if we need to specify an equation. Cumulative ways to
measure the values of one or more individuals are likely informative enough for resolving
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disputes over accident costs. To determine the group’s values regarding an act, all
reliable sources are potentially useful. As candidates for such sources, one can imagine
surveys, rigorous observation of actual behavior, focus groups, expert opinions, opinions
expressed in media, (proposed, defeated, or passed) legislation, prior jury adjudication (or
mechanisms like it), and many other reservoirs of relevant data.
An objector may be concerned that the locally affected individuals’ values contain
holes or may be indeterminate regarding specific kinds of acts. I use “holes” to
collectively refer to all possible types of ways in which the values of the relevant
individuals may not provide a conclusive answer to that group’s standard of care for
particular kinds of acts. Those ways include:
•
•
•

Existing values do not cover the kind(s) of relevant act(s) at issue
in the accident;
Existing values equally support two or more competing standards
of care for one kind of act; and
Existing values equally support two competing standards of care
for one kind of act so closely that it is difficult to discern if one has
a slight majority (e.g., 51%).

The third point is epistemic, yet I include it here because it may be practically
indistinguishable from the second point and may land us in the same situation, at least
practically speaking, as the other points.
As evidence for the objection, one might point to the numerous tough cases that
have been litigated and continue to be fodder for tort law courses. By “tough cases,” I do
not mean the same thing as Ronald Dworkin famously refers to as “hard cases.”200 At the
same time, the allusion and the resulting homage are intended. One way to compare these
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concepts is that hard cases involve life plan insensitive issues and tough cases involve life
plan sensitive issues. Despite the intended analogy, the disanalogy is that toughness of
tough cases is only superficial as I argue in the next paragraph. To clarify further, by
“tough cases” I mean those lawsuits in tort (or analogous non-litigated scenarios) where it
seems that unbiased, fully informed individuals may disagree (and do in fact disagree)
based on plausible reasons about whether or not the underlying act(s) (in context)
constituted negligence.
As a result, anyone who has experienced such a discussion in or out of a tort law
class may end up exasperated at these specific, seemingly irresolvable tough cases. Such
experiences demonstrate the reality of the jury’s excessive discretion and the resulting
genesis of the two kinds of potential injustice. In reaction, one may wonder whether the
legal concept of a reasonably prudent person is merely a convenient farce as adherents to
critical legal theory contend. Or, perhaps, one may suppose that the concept was created
due to some other more benign sociological explanation that points to coincidental
historical forces or practical necessities.
Getting to the rub, if tough cases exist, democratic standard theory would not
provide a complete and determinate standard of care. Thus, under that possibility, it
would be unable to resolve all possible accidents. If so, then democratic standard theory,
like other Kantian theories would be implicitly relying on a political mechanism (such as
(but not necessarily) jury adjudication) to fill these holes. The two kinds of potential
injustice would remain to the extent that holes remain.
In response, observe that, even if a group’s values contained holes, as the objector
suggests, democratic standard theory has a distinct advantage over alternative Kantian
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theories if the political mechanism, utilized to fill the holes, approximates how the
relevant locally affected individuals would do so. By means of example only, if jury
adjudication contained a representative sample of the relevant individuals, perhaps it
would resolve any holes or indeterminacies in their existing values. At least, using
something like judge or jury adjudication is a relatively straightforward mechanism to
apply democratic standard theory. It is more straightforward than Weinrib’s and
Ripstein’s vague appeals to broad values. Fletcher’s reciprocal risk theory must assume
that jury members are good risk estimators to bridge the connection from his theory to
jury adjudication. Perry’s accepted patterns theory is the only other theory, among those
surveyed herein, that has a direct connection between its criteria and jury adjudication.
Presumably, if jury members are drawn from the areas where the accident occurred, they
would be familiar with the relevant accepted patterns of social interaction or can readily
become so through the evidence presented in the lawsuit.
I do not see any way to prove conclusively that no such holes or indeterminacies
exist in a particular group’s values (let alone for all groups). Let me motivate why I do
not think that holes occur in the real world. Values in my sense are not only a broad
category, but each of the numerous parts of my concepts of “values” are themselves
broad in that they apply to an extensive range of acts. Adages such as “look before you
leap” and “safety is no accident” apply in some sense to all acts. I hazard to guess that
every or virtually every act that has been contemplated or performed either has been
evaluated within the group in question. For any others, extending existing group values
through modest inferences could provide determinate guidance to an individual. If an
individual is in doubt, I imagine that many groups’ values would demand that the
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individual not perform the act at issue without further inquiry. Alternatively, the
individual might be able to proceed if she acts with an abundance of caution.
If a new act or piece of technology is invented such that it is not clear how
existing values would treat it, democratic standard theory has a clear answer. The new act
is a breach of the standard of care until the group’s values clearly ratify it. In the
meantime, an individual who imposes that risk on another does so at the peril of being
vulnerable to a negligence claim.
My sense is that tough cases are intractable only if one is searching for a
universally correct answer to whether an act is negligent. I am not denying that unbiased,
fully informed individuals plausibly disagree about such issues. Yet, what are intractable
are the life plans or comprehensive conceptions of the good of those who disagree about
such issues. That intractability is not an objection to democratic standard theory. As
stated previously, that intractability is one of the major starting premises of liberalism in
general. It is because such individuals fundamentally disagree about various important
issues that a society needs mechanisms, like majoritarian rule, to reconcile their
intractable conflicting values. Similarly, Rawlsianism uses the original position and
(later) the idea of overlapping consensus to illuminate commonalities among intractable
conflicting comprehensive conceptions of the good. Thus, the existence of tough cases in
tort case law is explainable due to intractable conflicting comprehensive conceptions of
the good, not necessarily due to holes in a group’s values.
Those seemingly tough cases are only intractable insofar as they analyzed out of
the context of the time and place in which the underlying acts took place. Specifically,
the context that is left out is the group of locally affected individuals and their actual
153

values. Within that context, majority rule identifies negligence in spite of the intractable
values.
Based on the above, I am putting significant weight on the role of majority rule in
resolving conflicting life plans or comprehensive conceptions of the good pertaining to
breach of the negligence standard of care. So, defending democracy in that context and
resolving any tyranny of the majority concerns are the tasks to which I now must turn.

Why Democracy?
1. Public Goods
Since individuals in a society are subject to each other’s risky acts, determining
which kinds of acts constitute breach of the standard of care is a political issue. This issue
is one of a cluster of political issues that arguably should be made democratically.
Thomas Christiano terms this cluster, the “collective properties of the society.”201 I use
the more common term, “public good,” instead of his term given that the underlying
concepts seem to be, at least approximately, the same. I draw the parallel between legally
redressable negligence and public goods because the concept of a public good illustrates
significant features of the issues involved in breach. Yet, importantly, I am not relying on
Christiano’s positive argument for democracy.
Christiano states that a public good is where “in order to change one person’s
welfare with regard to this [public good] one must change all or almost all of the other
members’ welfare with regard to it.” As an example of a public good, consider the public
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road system along with the laws pertaining to automobile driving. To allow one private
citizen to legally exceed the speed limit on the highways, all others involved would be
worse off because they would bear a greater risk of this person causing an auto collision.

Christiano identifies four characteristics of public goods:
1. Nonexclusivity – “It is not possible to affect one person’s life without
affecting the lives of the others.”202
2. Publicity – The public good must be a public object that affects others’
wellbeing, not just something that others have nosy preferences about.
3. Inevitability – The public good must be inevitably shared; we cannot choose
otherwise.
4. Alterability – Individuals or groups must be able to alter the [public good].203
To illustrate a public good, clean air is nonexclusive in that one cannot decrease or
increase the amount of air pollution in a city without affecting the lives of others. As for
publicity, a particular individual’s preferences on the amount of air pollution include how
it affects that person. Humans, as well as the rest of the Earth, inevitably must share any
air pollution by virtue of their sharing the air.
Observe that not all public goods are tangible like clean air and, say, public parks.
One of the prototypical public goods, national security, is not tangible or not primarily
tangible. National security is often based in part on tangible items such as military
personnel and weapons. At the same time, treaties, trade relations, international law,
political maneuvering, monetary support to other nations, humanitarian relief, historical
political ties, shared values, immigration laws, international goodwill, and so on are
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intangible yet often vital components of a nation’s national security. Among these
intangible components, some are legal or have law-like aspects.
Another public good, referred to as “authorship,” is essentially the regime of
copyright law that allows any person to protect her creation. So, here we find a public
good that is intangible in its entirety.
Analogously, public safety, both generally and in the limited scope of the
availability of redressing in tort one’s harm from negligent acts, is also an intangible
public good. Public safety, in the form of legally redressable negligence, has the same
four Christiano characteristics as other public goods. Regarding nonexclusivity, if one
kind of act is legally redressable negligence, anyone who might perform that kind of act
is affected. As for publicity, everyone has interests, not mere nosy preferences, whether
the kinds of acts they perform make them vulnerable to negligence claims.
As for inevitability, given our other commitments to rule of law, a legal power to
redress negligence for a kind of act is a power that all or no individuals have. In other
words, we qua individuals inevitably share the powers and liabilities made available at
law.204
Regarding alterability, legally redressable negligence can change which kinds of
risks it covers. While accidental risk itself is ineliminable from social life, we do not have
to adopt any new activity or technology that involves unappealing risks. No person,
group, or entity has forced humans to utilize machine-powered transportation. We do not
have to continue to act in ways that produce risks that we do not want to bear. One
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individual may not be able to convince the rest of society to give up cars or mobile
phones due to the risks. Nevertheless, individuals can alter the details of the lives to
change many of risks that they are exposed to or they impose on others. Collectively,
individuals in a society can alter which risks constitute legally redressable negligence.
The attributes of public goods demonstrate why a political or social decision is
appropriate. At the same time, freedom of the press, for example, is a public good in the
sense I have been developing. Yet, that fact alone does not mean that the contours of that
public good (or freedom/right) should be based on the values of the majority of
individuals affected. So, some public issues are the proper domain of the values of
individuals involved while other issues should be determined based on other classes of
reasons. I develop this distinction in the next section.
First, note that a government does not have to be democratic itself to utilize the
democratic standard of care. An authoritarian government, or a non-democratic part of a
democratic government, can also determine breach of the negligence standard of care
based on the values of those affected. In fact, any legal mechanism that utilizes juries or
bases negligence on reasonableness or similar concepts will likely, if not necessarily,
incorporate individuals’ values. To the extent they are successful, these are partly
democratic processes in my broad sense of instantiating the “will of the people” into legal
outcomes.
Even utilitarian theories have a democratic element to them in that the benefits
and burdens that are balanced reflect, to some extent, the values of the individuals in the
society even though each person is not given an equal “vote” even in theory. Market
mechanisms that determine costs of harms reflect various individuals’ values since the
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individuals’ values determine in part the market prices. Social welfare comes close to my
concept of values even though the weighing mechanisms of social welfare-based
approaches to negligence may improperly skew the values that they use as inputs.
Perhaps, all plausible theories of breach of the negligence standard of care will be
democratic to some extent. However, democratic standard theory still deserves its name
because it is the most democratic among the alternatives. I now return to refining the
distinction between political issues where the values of the individuals involved should
determine the outcome and those where such values should not do so.

2. Life Plan Sensitivity
Ronald Dworkin identifies two kinds of political questions, one of which is better
answered by majoritarian rule within a constitutional democracy. Dworkin states that
“preference-sensitive” political decisions are decisions where the “character and
distribution of people’s preferences in part determine which decision is the right one.”205
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Dworkin’s example is a question about whether a town should use designated
funds to build a baseball stadium or an ice hockey rink, given that the town can only
build one facility.206 Assuming that decision ought to depend on which facility would be
used more, he argues that “a majoritarian political process seems the best way to discover
the answer.”207 Based on that example, Dworkin is thinking of democracy as an epistemic
tool.208 Dworkin suggests, without elaboration, that majority decision-making is more
likely to be “right” about preference-sensitive issues than any other decision-making
process.209 In contrast, “preference-insensitive” political decisions are where “facts about
the mix of preferences or opinions are substantively irrelevant.”210 Dworkin does not
think we have any good reason to believe that the majority decision-making, as an
epistemic tool, is going to be right about preference-insensitive issues.211 Dworkin
reasons, by example, that the fact that the majority of citizens approve of the death
penalty is not, by itself, a justification for capital punishment.212 Since Dworkin focuses

Dworkin is not claiming that a communal form of democracy cannot use voting. Rather, the actions
aggregated cannot be merely individual actions with no sense of doing something as a group.
In the average person’s day, many acts involve often unspoken coordination where many individuals are
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on preference-insensitive issues, he does not develop further his concept of preferencesensitive issues in this text.
One interesting aspect of Dworkin’s discussion of preference-sensitive issues is
that he assumes the sports facility question should be based, in part, on which facility
would be the “most used.”213 That is just another way of saying the decision properly
depends on the preferences of the majority of potential users of both facilities. So,
Dworkin seems to think that the “right” decision depends on, at least in part (and
Dworkin does not reveal any other part), the aggregated preferences where the majority
(of the pertinent group) rules. Put differently, there is no universal, morally required
answer to this political issue. While Dworkin explicitly praises majoritarian decisionmaking as an epistemic tool for preference-sensitive issues, he also seems to endorse that
majoritarian decision-making because what morally matters for the issue is what the
majority prefers, all other things being equal. In other words, this issue has no morally
required decision apart from the decision derived from some meaningful input from the
individuals affected by the decision.
For preference-sensitive issues, capturing the “majority’s will” does not merely
provide epistemic access to the proper decision, but also the “majority’s will” is the only
proper decision. So, even if none of the standard democratic procedures were feasible to
make the sports facility decision, it seems that Dworkin would still be committed to the
claim that there is no “right” answer to which facility should be built apart from the
majority’s preferences (however discovered).
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In using “preferences” without elaboration, Dworkin is riding roughshod over
several philosophical issues regarding what preferences are, how they relate to an
individual’s second-order preferences or more objective interests, and so forth. He does so
perhaps because he focuses on preference-insensitive issues. Even though I am interested
in exploring the category of preference-sensitive issues, I am not going to speculate on
what Dworkin himself means by “preferences.” Instead, I think his distinction can be
reformulated in broader terms that tie the distinction directly to the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition.
Dworkin seems to think certain issues should be preference-sensitive because doing
so advances the life plans of as many relevant individuals as possible. Suppose the hockey
rink would be used more than the baseball stadium, and no other facility would be used
more than those two. Since the town can only build one facility, it should build the hockey
rink because doing so will further the life plans of as many of the potential users of either
facility as possible. None of the potential users have a moral right to the town building any
one of the facilities over the other. So, building only the hockey rink does not violate any
right of those individuals whose life plans would be furthered more by the baseball stadium.
Instead, the differences between the life plans of the potential users are properly resolved
by the town building the facility that furthers the life plans of as many individuals as
possible. The same reasoning would lead to building the baseball stadium in another
similarly situated town where the baseball stadium would further the life plans of the most
individuals as possible. No single answer regarding the sports facility issue is morally
required for both towns, based on the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian
tradition. Instead, the morally required answer is the one that would further the life plans
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of as many of the relevant individuals as possible. Speaking of these issues in terms of life
plans instead of preferences does not detract from the appeal of Dworkin’s distinction. If
anything, its appeal shines brighter because the revision is formulated in broader, more apt
terms and does not depend on any particular understanding of what constitutes a
“preference.” So, after I address some objections to the sports facility example, I will refer
to these issues as “life plan sensitive issues.”
An objector may ask for further explanation: Is there something unfair about not
relying on the majority’s will?214 I take it that this question is not aimed at Dworkin’s
epistemic point because nothing appears problematic if one has a superior, alternative
epistemic mechanism to discover the majority’s will. Rather, the objection is to my
reading of Dworkin where I claim that the majority’s will is the right answer, that is, the
answer that justice requires. So, the objection is: If the town deviates from the majority’s
will, are the individuals in the majority treated unfairly?
My short response is yes, if we are understanding fairness as justice, so to speak.
To explain, given that fairness (i.e., justice) involves treating individuals as both free and
equal, then deviating from the majority’s will fails to treat the majority as free in the
sense that it does not advance their life plans despite the ready opportunity to do so. Put
differently, it fails to do something akin to a Pareto optimal improvement, given the
strictures of Dworkin’s example (explained below). It is this aspect of fairness/justice that
I am analogizing from the sports facility issue to the issue of breach of the negligence
standard of care.
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Even so, the objector is likely more concerned about whether so deviating fails to
treat the majority as equals, given that instantiating the majority’s will advantages them
and does not equally advantage the minority. To clarify, I do not intend the sports facility
example to illustrate or argue primarily for the equality aspect of democratic standard
theory which it, like fairness as justice (a.k.a. justice as fairness), draws from the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. Assessing any possible
unequal treatment of the majority, beyond whether their constitutional essentials are
violated, depends on how the stadium issue is decided if it were not decided based on
majority rule. So, such an assessment would involve comparing majoritarianism’s sense
of equality with alternative senses of equality such as the toss of a fair coin, a lottery, or
utilitarianism’s method of according equal weight to each unit of each person’s utility. In
that comparison, we would seek after which sense of equal treatment is the best
interpretation given the immediate context (e.g., political issues like the sports facility
issue) and how it accords with all other relevant aspects of the town’s political
institutions. Such a comparative task would involve comparison of democratic standard
theory with consequentialist theories of negligent breach against the backdrop of the
extensive, relevant literature that spans multiple disciplines. My plan is to address those
issues in future papers, with which I will pave my path to tenure.
To gesture in that direction, my sense is that majoritarianism, as applied strictly
only to issues like the sports facility example and negligent breach gives life to a sense of
equality that plays a major role in the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition. That sense of equality is that each person’s actual life plan, given equal
weight and force (in particular senses of those terms), should directly shape the fine
163

details of political equality. I realize that the previous sentence is vague. Yet, its
explication must wait (briefly) for Dr. Gregory Jay Hall, Esquire, to vigorously pursue
that research agenda.
I settle for now with establishing in this dissertation, among other points, the
following three claims related to this objection:
1.

Majoritarianism, in the strict confines of the political issues
explored herein, treats as equals, in a meaningful sense, individuals
both in the majority and minority by according equal weight to
each person’s values.

2.

Strictly in only these kind of issues, majoritarianism does not treat,
as unequals, individuals either in the majority or the minority in the
sense of that it does not violate their constitutional essentials.

3.

Majoritarianism accords the best sense of treating individuals as
free in that it provides a legal mechanism under which as many
individuals as possible may pursue their life plan parts.

Ultimately, in this dissertation, I aim to establish, as well, that democratic standard theory
provides the best interpretation of what it means to treat individuals as free and equal, as
to the issue of negligent breach, based on the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition. If fruitful, then my post-dissertation comparison of democratic standard
theory to consequentialist theories of negligent breach is justified.
Having largely postponed the equal treatment sense of the above objection, let’s
continue the first strand of the above objection. The objector may press me by supposing
that a town has an entrenched majority that favors using public money only for sports
facilities. Each time the issue is on the table, the 51% majority who favor sports always
prevails over the 49% who favor putting the money into museums or towards public
education. It does not seem that over time more individuals’ life plans are furthered when
the sports fans always win each majoritarian vote and the 49% get nothing each time and
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overall. In contrast, fairness, perhaps in both the sense of freedom and equality, would
demand some kind of compromise, the objector would proffer, to ensure that the large
minority gets at least something they prefer.
I am sympathetic, if not in agreement, with the thrust of this objection. Due to
particular details in Dworkin’s example, this form of the objection is misplaced, despite
any initial appearance otherwise. I have not yet emphasized these details. Recall that the
town has enough funds for only one sports stadium. This condition does not make the
example unrealistic as some small towns cannot afford any sports facilities while other
small towns can only afford one stadium, at least during a rather lengthy timeframe. So,
we are not dealing here with multiple decisions about multiple possible stadiums for a
population with conflicting values regarding sports and other “goods.” In other words,
Dworkin’s stipulation shapes the scenario so that it is not exactly like issues addressed by
distributive justice, at least the Rawlsian stripe.
Similarly, Dworkin also stipulates that the town has already designated funds for
building a sports stadium. So, we can, in fact, we must, for the example to have any
significance, presume that any considerations of distributive justice have already been
met with regard to funding museums, education, and so on. While the objector may rejoin
that the earlier distributive questions are where the beef is, I do not deny those
distributive questions’ importance.
Interestingly, note that the above stipulations, along with Dworkin’s other
stipulation that the townspeople only (or primarily) want either a hockey or baseball
facility, make this particular example much more like a bilateral issue rather than a
distributive issue. In fact, it is this stipulated bilateral nature of Dworkin’s example that
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opens up the possibility for any insight from it to be applicable to the arena of negligence
law in tort—where I am also stipulating, for the purposes of this dissertation, that at least
some accidents are matters of bilateral justice rather than distributive justice. As for my
terminology, I am calling the moral arena “bilateral justice” instead of the usual term
“corrective justice” merely to highlight that, even though nothing about the sports facility
issue involves correcting a wrong, both it and the issue of breach have interesting
bilateral features that make the moral considerations at play analogous.
By no means, do I think that the sports facility issue and the issue of breach of the
negligence standard of care are identical. As an autobiographical aside, my reflections on
these concepts in Dworkin’s work stimulated my already burgeoning interest in any
possible role that majoritarianism may properly play in political institutions based on the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. Back then, I was
ruminating on accident costs more broadly in that I was wrestling with both ex ante and
ex post political decisions regarding the assignment of accident costs.
My earlier broad inquiry highlights a disanalogy between the sports facility issue
and assigning accident costs via accident law. Specifically, the sports facility issue is
decided prior to the town incurring the expense of the stadium. While it is plausible that a
town can only afford one sports facility, it is implausible to assume that the town must
build one of these expensive sports facilities. Even though the town designated funds for
one facility, the town could always reallocate the funds or refund those monies in light of
the lack of unanimity on which facility to build. To put it bluntly, at the time of the
decision, the town is not yet stuck with the sports facility’s expense.
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In contrast, at the time of an accident, at least someone will inevitably be stuck
with the accident costs, even if later a court renders a verdict that assigns those costs
differently among the two parties. The question is whether that disanalogy makes the
sports facility example inapplicable to negligence law in tort. I don’t think so. At the
same time, it is not useful to conjure up bizarre modifications to the example to tighten
up the analogy. Bizarre modifications would, by themselves, call into question whether
the example so rendered is helpful. Furthermore, to the extent that our reasoning depends
in part or in whole on the process of reflective equilibrium to harness our considered
convictions, bizarre modifications risk putting our reasoning outside of the context where
our considered convictions were established and have significance, if any. So, I will
avoid the bizarre to avoid the gambit that commentators in law, philosophy, and their
intersection unknowingly trip on.
Consider the following realistic modification. Suppose a town has an existing
baseball facility. While state of the art when built, the baseball facility, like that sport in
general, has deteriorated drastically over recent years. Virtually no one in the town wants
to watch or play baseball anymore. At the same time, the town does not want to lose its
enormous investment in the facility, and, for a relatively modest amount, it can convert
the baseball stadium into a hockey rink or a football stadium (but not both). This
modification still is not perfect for the town could still let the baseball stadium lie fallow.
Nevertheless, supposing a modicum of surplus funds and a modest cost for the
renovation, I think we can bridge the gap between the sports facility example and
negligent breach in tort.

167

Let’s assume that 51% of the townspeople want the renovation to produce a
hockey rink, 49% want a football stadium, and 90% do not want the baseball stadium to
lie fallow. The reasoning from above still holds with the modified, more analogous
example. Deviating from the majority’s will fails to treat the majority as free in the sense
that it does not advance their life plans despite the ready opportunity to do so. Given that
the hockey rink advances more individuals life plans vis-à-vis the football stadium, of the
two, building the rink better advances the social goal to treat individuals as free.
Analogously, regarding a trip and fall accident, suppose a 50% majority of
individuals in the relevant group prefer homeowners to inspect and remove litter from the
walkways of their property every other day while a 40% minority prefer inspection and
removal twice daily. As for the remaining 10%, they want it to occur less than every
other day with most preferring once per week. When a pedestrian trips on litter on one of
these walkways, suppose all evidence supports the claim that the pertinent house owner
only inspected and removed litter once per week. Enforcing the negligence standard of
care at the majority’s every-other-day schedule still furthers the preferences of the
individuals in the minority to some extent. We can liken the 90% supermajority that does
not want the dilapidated baseball stadium to lie fallow to the 90% supermajority (that is,
the majority and the minority together) who do not want house walkways inspected and
litter removed any less frequently than every other day. Plus, in the sports facility
example, assuming many in the minority also enjoy hockey, they will have their life plans
furthered to some lesser extent by the hockey rink. While not perfect, the bridge between
the sports facility issues and negligence in tort should hold enough weight to justify
further exploring parallels such as these as we examine the proper role of
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majoritarianism, if any, in political institutions that aspire to enact the overarching
theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
Another objector may contend that, even if some issues are life plan sensitive,
those may be limited to issues where the stakes are relatively low such as:
•

which sports stadium to build;

•

where to build a city park;

•

how much, if any, tax revenue should support the arts (and which
arts); and

•

to what extent public school curriculum should include the arts.

Additionally, the objector may reason that issues involving devastating injury, death, and
substantial property damage are life plan insensitive due to those drastic consequences.
Thus, due to the severe harm at stake, the issues of accident law may be more similar to
Dworkin’s death penalty example rather than the sports facility example.
As a preliminary response, note that substantial injury can and does result from
sports, especially hockey. In 1968, before professional hockey players universally used
helmets, Bill Masterton died directly from a hockey injury to the head when an opponent
knocked him flat on his back causing Masterton’s head to hit the ice. Surprisingly (or
perhaps not), Masterton is the only player that has died directly from an injury suffered
while playing professional hockey in the National Hockey League. Yet, hockey players
are not the only ones risking their lives. In 2002, at a professional hockey match, a
thirteen-year-old hockey spectator died after she was struck in the head by a hockey puck
even though the puck had already ricocheted off another fan (who suffered only minor
injuries). Numerous other injuries regularly result from hockey, and more severe injuries
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result from hockey compared to baseball.215 So, the political issue about whether or not to
encourage hockey (by building a hockey rink) involves a substantial political choice to
risk bodily injury. Furthermore, the political choice to build a baseball stadium versus a
hockey rink is a choice for one level of risk instead of a higher level of risk. Thus, if
political issues regarding sports are morally different from political issues regarding other
kinds of acts which yearly result in deaths and devastating injury, as the objector in the
previous paragraph suggests, the difference is not that one involves risk of death and
devastating injury and the other does not.
I freely admit that the preceding argument only gets us so far, for the objector
could retort that the scale of harm at issue in sports is dramatically smaller than in other
areas of social life. The number and extent of bodily injuries resulting from sports (even
hockey) seem like a mere footnote compared to the legions of deaths and devastating
injuries that occur each year due to other accidents. The bodily injury and death resulting
from driving automobiles, walking in a city, and performing various household acts that
lead to slip and falls, fire-related injuries, and poisonings far outnumber and are far more
pervasive and ever-present than sports injuries. Due to the differences in scale along
multiple dimensions, the objector may continue, political issues pertaining to accidents as
a whole may not be life plan sensitive like the sports facility issue.
In reaction, when such devastating injury and death is at issue, nothing is a more
proper basis to determine how much risk and what kind of risk individuals should be
exposed to other than the values of the individuals who are themselves exposed to those
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very risks. If anything, it seems rather odd to have any other factor determine risk
exposure. Would we not be disturbed by a social reality where we are exposed to severe
accidental harm and death, and we, as a group, do not have any or very little input into
the determination of what acts make us vulnerable to negligence claims? I cannot see
how this minimal point is anything other than almost a truism. In that light, breach of the
negligence standard of care is a life plan sensitive issue regardless of whether the reader
agrees that majoritarianism is the best way to resolve conflicting values among the
individuals affected.
Consider a non-judicial but related legal practice that suggests that negligent
breach is a life plan sensitive issue. When courts get high-profile negligence cases
“wrong,” legislatures sometimes step in to alter that particular precedent. At times, courts
even invite the legislature to change a negligence rule if so wanted.216 Consequentialist
theories may be able to justify these practices as legislatures engaging in efficiencydriven policy analysis or cost-benefit reasoning, given that legislatures are supposedly
better at such analysis when compared to courts. However, when it comes theories
motivated by the concept of the reasonably prudent person, there is a disconnect between
courts and juries determining this moral concept and the practice of legislature override.
Presumably, legislatures are motivated by many other forces than mere consideration of
what the reasonably prudent person would do. So, there is little basis for reasonablenessmotivated theories to conclude that the legislature override of the courts and juries’
decisions is more likely, on average, to accurately decide the issue. Reasonableness-
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motivated theories should at least express concern over this type of legislature override
or, even better, provide the theoretical resources to justify or reject that involvement.
Instead, reasonableness-motivated theories do not adequately address the issue.
Perhaps, the above considerations suggest why any plausible theory of breach of
the negligence standard of care will have a democratic component. Recall that my sense
of democracy in this dissertation is, put roughly, a political mechanism where the
people’s values determine legal outcomes. Consequentialist theories such as the
balancing approach of the Restatement (Third) or the social welfare approach implicitly
have a democratic component in this sense. The social welfare approach
straightforwardly uses individuals’ values as components of social welfare. In the
balancing approach, risks of possible injuries and the burdens of precautions are
ultimately based on individuals’ values. A risk of an injury has significance in part due to
how individuals value the pain and limitations involved. The burden of a precaution is
measured based on how individuals weigh its characteristics and the effort and expense
involved. Any aspect of these concepts that involves the market ultimately relies on
individuals’ values because, in large part, market prices depend on how individuals value
what it takes to supply goods and services and on how individuals value or demand those
same goods and services. Given these consequentialist theories substantially utilize
individuals’ values, a.k.a. life plan parts, they implicitly recognize that negligent breach
is properly a life plan sensitive issue.
From that perspective, one of the most significant differences between
consequentialist theories and democratic standard theory is not whether or not negligence
should be based on the values of the individuals involved but rather how competing
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values should be reconciled. To reiterate, one mechanism to reconcile competing values
is restricted majority rule (democratic standard theory). Another is maximizing weighted
social welfare where the values of the individuals involved are inputs into a
consequentialist weighing of each component of social welfare. Another is to balance
risks of possible injuries against the burdens of precaution where the inputs for each of
these concepts necessarily include the individuals’ values. While consequentialist
theories are not usually phrased exactly in these terms, this sensitivity to individuals’ life
plan parts is an important commonality between democratic standard theory and these
competing consequentialist theories of negligent breach.
The differences between democratic standard theory, social welfare theory, and a
balancing test theory akin to the Restatement (Third) can be separated into two parts.
First, theories differ on the extent to which individuals’ life plan parts play a role, with
some theories allowing a greater role for other factors. Second, theories differ in how
each individual’s own life plan parts are weighted vis-à-vis others’ life plan parts. So, in
addition to how to weight values, one of the fundamental questions is not whether breach
of the negligence standard of care is a life plan-sensitive issue. Rather, the question is
how sensitive should breach be to individuals’ life plans, with democratic standard theory
taking a stand at the “almost entirely sensitive” end of the spectrum.
I keep these observations brief because, as mentioned earlier, defending
democratic standard theory against competing consequentialist theories is a future
project. In this dissertation, I am defending the claim that breach is a life plan sensitive
issue and that democratic standard theory best captures that aspect when compared to
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other non-consequentialist theories, based on the overarching theoretical commitments of
the Kantian tradition.

Negligence Breach as a Life Plan Sensitive Issue
Drawing on Dworkin’s distinction, I contend that what constitutes breach of the
negligence standard of care is a life plan sensitive issue. By making the negligence
standard of care almost entirely based on what best allows individuals to advance their
life plans, democratic standard theory reveals its basis in the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition.
Within those overarching Kantian commitments, political institutions should be
committed to establishing a political framework in which individuals may further their
life plans. To do so, they should create mechanisms that are sensitive to individuals’ life
plan parts, that is, the political mechanisms allow space for individuals to act in
accordance with their life plan parts (i.e., their values) under terms that aspire to also treat
individuals as equals. The intersection of allowing individuals to pursue their life plans,
within constraints of equal treatment, create the fine details of a particular society that
pursues the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.
To make this more concrete, let’s highlight how Rawlsianism, another theory
based on the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition, calls for
political institutions that are sensitive to individuals’ life plan parts, specifically
individuals’ values regarding labor and leisure, within the constraints of equal treatment.
During the following discussion, keep in mind that democratic standard theory treats
negligence as a life plan sensitive issue for similar reasons. Specifically, within the
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requirements of equal treatment, political institutions aspire to allow individuals to pursue
their life plan parts as much as possible.
In Rawlsianism, political institutions must be substantially sensitive to
individuals’ values regarding labor and leisure based on Rawls’s requirement for
protection of the basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity.217 On this topic, Rawls
remarks, “There is no reason at all for the forced or central direction of labor.”218 This
means that political institutions may not properly require that individuals work a certain
amount or in certain ways. Political institutions may perhaps use education or incentives
to shape individuals’ values regarding labor and leisure, but such may not reach the level
of coercion.
At the same time, Rawls’s principles of justice do not require that political
institutions advance, without limit, individuals’ values regarding labor and leisure. The
difference principle allows economic markets in labor and goods and services, among
other institutions, to give moderated yet fair effect to individuals’ values regarding labor,
leisure, and their other life plan parts. The moderation results from the difference
principle’s requirement that the overall distribution of wealth must benefit the least well
off as much as possible.
Simultaneously, given the lexical priority of the basic liberties and fair equality of
opportunity, justice does not allow political institutions to make the worst off better off
by coercing anyone to labor more than the individual chooses or to labor in a particular
job that the individual does not want to do. This arrangement is fair in that individuals
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may live according to their individual values regarding labor and leisure as long as the
institutions as a whole benefit the least well off as much as possible. And, of course, all
individuals have their basic liberties protected and fair equality of opportunity. In these
ways, Rawlsian institutions are sensitive to and protect space for individuals’ values
regarding labor and leisure.
Similarly, to advance individuals’ life plans, what constitutes breach of the
negligence standard of care should be sensitive to and protect space for individuals’
values. One sub-conclusion to my thesis is that a theory based on the overarching
theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition cannot provide determinate and
complete answers to what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care without
incorporating individuals’ actual values. This sub-conclusion is noteworthy and a unique
contribution to tort theory. Recall that Weinrib’s and Ripstein’s theories failed to even
remotely provide close to the level of specification needed for determinate and complete
answers to what constitutes negligent breach. What is missing from these theories is
sufficient inclusion of individuals’ values. Their appeals to freedom and equality ring
hollow without including what is actually important to the actual individuals involved.

Tyranny of the Majority?
Rule by the majority often evokes, as if by reflex, the criticism that the minority is
victimized by a tyranny. Majority rule is infamous due to historical instances where
majorities burdened and abused those that were less numerous or less powerful. Majority
rule is not always a necessary evil that must be tolerated for lack of a better alternative. I
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argue that majority rule is not merely instrumentally useful but is the morally required
mechanism to determine breach of the negligence standard of care.
Recall that, under democratic standard theory, breach of the standard of care is
determined by the values of the individuals locally affected by the kind of act in question.
The values of each member of the relevant group count equally. When the values of
group members conflict, majority rules. Let’s define a person with a “minority view” as a
person whose values regarding a specific kind of act do not reflect the standard of care
supported by the majority’s values. If an individuals’ act leads to accidental harm, that
individual, even if holding a minority view, may be vulnerable to a negligence claim
based on the standard of care supported by the values of the majority in that group. If the
relevant group were different, whether or not that individual is vulnerable to a negligence
claim for the same act may be different. Even so, that disparate result does not treat the
individual with the minority view unfairly. I develop this point in the next sections.

1. Not a Suspect Class
It is important to note that the individual with a minority view is not a member of
a suspect class or group. I am resisting the urge to use terms “minority member” or just
plain “minority” because those terms too easily connote historically disadvantaged ethnic
and religious groups, which are extensively covered in jurisprudence related to the equal
protection clause. In the realm of negligent risk, the individual with a minority view is
not necessarily in that “minority” due to an immutable characteristic. The individual with
a minority view merely has values that favor certain kind of act and its risk that most
others do not value. While some ethnicities or other subgroups that share immutable
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characteristics may also share many of the same values, members of an ethnic group, for
example, might change their values and individuals without the ethnic characteristics can
also have or can adopt the same values as the ethnic group.
Moreover, in democratic standard theory, an individual may have a minority view
for one kind of act while at the same time have the majority view for many or most other
kinds of acts. For example, one may think that the benefits from most engine-based forms
of transportation are not worth the death, injury, and property damage that they
statistically cause. At the same time, the same person may endorse the existing
technologies that increase factory production and make constructing buildings easier. So,
the same person can have a minority view on some issues (e.g., transportation) while also
having the majority view on other issues (e.g., production).
For most kinds of acts, the disadvantages of not sharing the majority view are not
likely falling on the same individuals. Rather, the disadvantages are likely spread, to
some extent, among the group members. As a result, the lack of a persistent,
disadvantaged minority subgroup due to immutable characteristics already lessens any
tyranny of the majority concern regarding democratic standard theory.
While some individuals or subgroups may be extremely risk averse, these
individuals are the rare exception. Perhaps, the ideal solution for these individuals or
subgroups is for them to voluntarily separate themselves like the recluse Howard Hughes
from those that engage in the risks of modern life similar to how the Amish separate
themselves to maintain the lifestyle they wish. Democratic standard theory would support
group separations in such situations but would maintain that a person with a minority
view, who remains (at least through proximity) part of a group whose individuals have
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drastically different values, is not treated unfairly if held to the majority’s standard of
care in a negligence tort dispute.
2. Basic Liberties Protected
Kantian theorists often endorse majoritarian rule as instrumentally good for
various reasons. Yet, they emphasize that majority rule should be constrained or vetoed if
or when it leads to objectively unjust decisions. Democratic standard theory incorporates
constitutional democracy in that basic liberties limit the domain of majority rule
regarding what constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care.
Let’s take a step back for a moment to distinguish democracy from pure
majoritarianism. Some theorists think that democracy is unrestrained majoritarianism and
construe inalienable rights as at odds with democracy.219 Along with other theorists, I
find this pure majoritarian view of democracy as wrongheaded because it does not
capture the underlying ideas that make democracy appealing, namely, treating each
individual with equal respect and concern.220 I am not adding to this debate which is
extensively discussed in the literature. Rather, I am sketching these positions in broad
strokes to clarify another aspect of how I am using the concept of democracy.
Under the view of democracy as restrained majoritarianism, basic rights such as
freedom of thought, speech, movement, and assembly and equal voting rights are
necessary preconditions of a democracy based on majority rule.221 Other basic rights such
as those protecting a person’s bodily integrity, private property, private sexual decisions
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and marriage choices and criminal rights such as the right to legal counsel and the right
against self-incrimination are justified aspects of a democracy because these rights
provide each individual a part and a stake in the collective, to use Dworkin’s terms, as
well as a degree of independence from it.222
In the arena of risk imposition, when a basic liberty trumps the majority’s
standard of care for a particular accident, democracy has not been thwarted. Since
democratic standard theory’s fundamental goal is to treat each individual with equal
respect and concern, limiting a particular standard of care to protect basic rights further
realizes the theory’s justification rather than undermining it.
When basic liberties trump the majoritarian standard of care, properly adjusting
the standard of care depends on the details. If the trump results from one party’s
immutable characteristic, the proper adjustment may simply involve applying the
majoritarian standard that applies to those without that immutable characteristic. In my
example from above, the homeowner would not be able to use the black domestic
servant’s violation of a social norm by entering the front door to claim contributory
negligence or negate an otherwise valid negligence claim. With these adjustments, the
standard of care reflects the majority’s values regarding risk sans any element that
violates an individual’s constitutional essentials.
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The Recklessness Boundary Protects Constitutional Essentials
Basic liberties are also protected by negative legal consequences that attach to
acts of recklessness with or without the requirement that harm resulted. Basic liberties, in
fact, set the boundary between recklessness and negligence. So far, I have discussed risk
primarily as if resulting accidental harm is only vulnerable to a legal claim for
compensation if such is supported by values of individuals locally affected by the
underlying acts. Some readers may be concerned about how democratic standard theory
handles the numerous acts that involve excessively high risk due to the nature of the acts
or the manner/context in which they are performed. There is likely an upward boundary
where the probability of harm is so high or the severity of the harm is so dire that moral
theory may universally prohibit the act. Commentators and legal doctrine often refer to
this category of risk as “recklessness.”
Reckless acts involve less risk than acts where one intends harm or knows that
harm is virtually likely to occur. At the same time, recklessness involves more risk than
mere carelessness or negligence that most people encounter daily as illustrated in the
examples in this dissertation. While my formulation of recklessness is intentionally
rough, it suffices for my present purposes. Here, I am excluding ultra-hazardous acts that
are both excessively risky and also have substantial social value. The common law deals
with those acts under the legal doctrine of strict liability in tort. I address democratic
standard theory’s implication for strict liability elsewhere. Instead, in this subsection, I
am addressing excessively risky acts that have little or no social value—especially when
compared to the excessive risk. Usually, reckless acts bring, at most, value to only the
actor.
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While this dissertation’s primary purpose is to draw the line between nonnegligence and negligence, democratic standard theory also contains the theoretical
resources to draw and justify the boundary between negligence and recklessness. The
boundary between recklessness and negligence need not be set by the actual values of
those individuals locally affected by the kind of act in question. Instead, but still
consistent with democratic standard theory, reckless acts could be those acts that have the
following characteristics:
1. Excessive riskiness either in its probability of occurring or the dire
extent of the probable harm; and
2. Virtually no or very few fully informed individuals would have a life
plan that included one’s own ongoing exposure to the risk in that act.
If an act meets those characteristics, we need not further consider whether the act meets
the democratic standard of care. Alternatively, if for some bizarre reason the values of an
actual group support a proposition for a reckless act, these individuals’ values may be
permissibly overridden because those individuals must not be fully informed or must
have some other gross misunderstanding about the issues involved.
Another way to identify the boundary between recklessness and negligence is an
extension of the argument for Rawlsian constitutional essentials. I suspect that this
justification and the previous one are identical in substance though phrased differently.
My previous answer is a version of the reasoning underlying why Rawlsian deliberators
behind the veil of ignorance adopt and give lexical priority to the constitutional
essentials. This second justification appeals directly to and fleshes out the rationale for
constitutional essentials. I keep these two justifications separate because explicating their
connection would take us too far afield.
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Getting back on the track of the second justification, individuals not only have
interests in the government or other persons never intentionally depriving them of
constitutional essentials, but they also have interests, generally speaking, in others never
acting in ways that recklessly threaten their constitutional essentials. For example, a
person who tosses construction debris from a tall building without regard to potential
passers-by creates a danger so severe that it improperly restricts their basic liberty of free
movement. Free movement may also be improperly restricted by driving at a highly
excessive speed or in an excessively dangerous manner.
Intentional and knowing infringements on individuals’ constitutional essentials
are often criminalized or remediable in law in various ways. Similarly, reckless acts are
usually criminalized or remediable in law through compensatory or punitive damages
when harm results. Doing so provides various kinds or levels of legal protection to a
person’s right to bodily integrity and other constitutional essentials. Explicit criminal
prohibition of many reckless acts is appropriate because reckless acts are not a necessary
part of social life. [Even ultra-hazardous acts that contribute to a substantial social good
could be eliminated without major disruption to social life even if eliminating ultrahazardous acts required some dramatic changes.] Furthermore, recklessness does not
have the same mitigating feature that negligence does. Specifically, imposing that level or
kind of excessive risk is not generally due to small or momentary lapses in judgment or
awareness like many of the acts that we generally think fall within the domain of
negligence.
I do not think these conclusions are controversial. Yet, a full defense of basing
recklessness in constitutional essentials requires further attention in my future work. Let
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it suffice that I am assuming that articulating a moral theory of recklessness and its
boundary with negligence is a moral inquiry related to, but distinct from, articulating a
theory of how to justify the distinction between negligent acts and non-negligent acts.
This latter inquiry is this dissertation’s focus.

3. The Risk in Social Cooperation
Based on the above analysis, constitutional essentials trump majoritarian values
when they support recklessness or when they support an outcome that would directly
violate one of the constitutional essentials. In what follows, I explore why constitutional
essentials or other significant rights do not continue to shape the contours of the
negligence standard of care. Some reckless acts have possible cataclysmic consequences
far beyond the realm of negligence. I am thinking of acts that involve enormous harm
such as a truck driver driving intoxicated while transporting radioactive waste or a
motorist “playing chicken” with an unsuspecting train engineer by driving on train tracks
straight at a speeding commuter train full of passengers (to see who will brake first).
Usually, when I speak of recklessness, I am not referring to these cataclysmic kinds.
Aside from these extreme examples, harms of similar magnitude could result
either from acts of recklessness or acts of negligence. For example, death by house fire
may result from one negligently leaving the stove on as well as from one recklessly
smoking in bed when exhausted. So, treating negligence and recklessness differently
cannot be due to the severity of the harms risked, even if on average reckless acts risk
more severe harms compared to negligent acts. So, the rationale, if any, must be derived
elsewhere.
184

Well, there are several morally relevant differences. One difference puts the
overall issue starkly. As mentioned above but put more simply here, recklessness is not a
necessary part of social life. In contrast, the category of acts to which negligence pertains
is a necessary part of social life. That is not the same as the claim, “negligence is a
necessary part of social life” although that too may be true given human frailties. The
point is that, for social life to be possible, individuals need to be able to act in ways that
simultaneously impose risks of harm to themselves and others, risks of harm on a scale
from (above) 0 up to 100, where 100 is a number I stipulate to represent the boundary
where recklessness begins.
All aspects essential to social life and many that are non-essential can be
accomplished with acts where the risk magnitudes are from 0 to 100 (termed hereafter a
“0-to-100 risk”). Where along that scale non-negligence ends and negligence begins
cannot be specified by appeals to constitutional essentials. A right to be free from a “0-to100 risk” would entail a Hohfeldian disability preventing others from performing an act
that is essential for social life or has risk comparable to those acts that are essential for
social life. In this trade-off, each expansion of the space to pursue one’s life plan
necessarily involves a corollary restriction, in the form of increased risk, in the space for
others to pursue their life plans. In this sense, acts with 0-to-100 risk magnitudes are
essential to social life whereas reckless acts (with risk magnitudes greater than 100) are
not.
The theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition do not point toward a
specific level of risk (anywhere from 0 to 100) for any kind of act that is universally
morally acceptable. I am not the only one to have found the theoretical commitments of
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the Kantian tradition to have this attribute.223 My critiques of the theories in Chapter Two
also support this point. Thus, we cannot use the theoretical commitments of the Kantian
tradition to establish a specific level of risk at which point an actor is vulnerable to a
negligence claim and, below that level, one is not vulnerable to such. Furthermore, even
the idea that something other than individuals’ own values should determine the risks that
individuals must bear seems inconsistent with a variety of arguments against paternalism.
We can reasonably conclude that there is no objectively morally correct amount
of risk that would function like a right to constrain the majoritarian outcome of what
constitutes breach of the negligence standard of care—aside from the exceptions
canvassed above. In that sense, the majoritarian standard of care cannot be objectively
wrong or unjust in most cases. Instead, the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition support the majoritarian standard of care because it furthers the life
plans of the most individuals possible.
To test the appeal of democratic standard theory, let’s illustrate a tragic choice
that democratic standard theory is willing to swallow. In 1995, the United States
Congress repealed the statute requiring a nationwide speed limit of 55 miles per hour
(mph) on interstate roads.224 Afterwards, some states raised the speed limits on several
rural and non-rural interstate roads with some speed limits reaching 75 mph.225 One study
concludes that, between 1995 and 2005, 12,545 (about 1,255 per year) more fatalities
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resulted from the increased speed limits than would have occurred had the speed limits
remained 55 mph.226 The same study estimates that 36,583 (about 3,658 per year) more
injuries in fatal crashes resulted from the same speed limit increase.227 Putting those
statistics together, the increase in speed limits led to 49,128 more deaths or injuries. I
assume these statistics are accurate for this illustration.
Here I add an element of fiction to apply these facts to democratic standard
theory. Suppose that the values of 51% of the potentially affected drivers and passengers
supported the increased speeds that resulted after the 1995 speed limit repeal. The values
of 49% of the group opposed the repeal. Also, these respective percentages remained
constant for the 10 years covered by the study. Let’s further assume that, of the total dead
or injured, 51% (25,055 people) were among the majority whose values supported the
increased speed limits while 49% held the minority view.
In this scenario, democratic standard theory would deem that those individuals
who drove faster yet below the higher speed limits did not breach the negligence standard
of care. As such, any of those faster drivers who were involved in accidents, as a result of
driving at speeds within the limits, are not vulnerable to negligence-based compensation
claims for these accidents. Consequently, the faster drivers did not violate any rights of
the 49,128 dead or injured. Even though 49,128 more individuals died or were injured,
they (or their estates) are not properly entitled to any compensation from the other parties
to the accidents. Based on these stipulated facts, the dead and injured alone bear their
own accident costs and the consequences.
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In terms of this example, we can phrase the objections against democratic
standard theory addressed above more starkly as follows:
A. Were those individuals, who held the majority view and were among
the 49,128 dead or injured, treated unfairly when the values of 51%
majority (which included them) determined that driving within the
higher speed limits did not breach the negligence standard of care?
B. Regarding those dead or injured who held the minority view, were
they treated unfairly by a tyrannical 51% majority who valued the
higher speed limits?
Let’s address each question in turn.
Even though the dead and injured faired horribly, as it turned out, the legal regime
under which they were killed or injured reflected their own values. The relevant values
are the ways a person weights the pros and cons of traveling faster including their
assessment of how that faster travel furthers their other life plan parts. As for the pros,
those traveling at the faster permitted speeds obtain the advantages of traveling faster
without being vulnerable to compensation claims from any resulting accidents. As for the
cons, each person on the road, including the 51% majority themselves, face a greater
chance of accidental injury including devastating injury or death.
The death or injury of 25,055 individuals (the 51% majority) made them
substantially worse off than they would have been had they lived or escaped injury and
also obtained the advantages from faster driving. Nevertheless, the increased risk from
the increased speed reflected the all-things-considered result of their own values. Thus,
letting the standard of care reflect the values of the individuals involved creates a legal
regime that facilitates these individuals’ pursuits of their own life plans despite the risks
involved. While a heavy price to pay, political institutions committed to facilitating
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individuals’ life plans will always create legal regimes that allow a greater amount of
death and injury than otherwise available simply due to the fact that an alternative legal
regime with greater safety is always an option. That is the grim reality of self-rule. As a
side note, the same is true of any standard of care as greater safety is always an option
even if that greater safety is unreasonable, inefficient, or leads to less overall social
utility.
If the reader finds this grim reality unsettling, consider the issue from a different
angle. How slow would one be willing to travel to reduce the risk of death from that kind
of act? 10 mph? 5 mph? Perhaps, the cautious would prefer to completely dispense with
motorized or horse-drawn transportation. On average, people walk about 3 mph. Is even
that too dangerous? At some point, I hazard to guess that even the extremely cautious are
willing to expose themselves to extremely minimal risk of death to travel where they are
going. Take that amount of risk, whatever it is. To that amount of risk, even the
extremely cautious cannot plausibly object. Regardless, any objection would be a mere
complaint about the precarious nature of the human condition rather than an objection to
a theory of the negligence standard of care.
Interestingly, according to democratic standard theory, even the extremely
cautious person’s values validate the amount of risk that reflects those values. Not giving
effect to those values is bizarre paternalism. Thus, determining what constitutes negligent
breach, at least as it pertains to those in the majority, enjoys a straightforward
justification because the negligence standard of care is based on the values of that
majority. So, legal outcomes reflect the “will” of that majority. The more difficult
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question for democratic standard theory is whether the dead or injured who held the
minority view were treated unfairly.
Prior to any accident, the person with the minority view is not as well off as if her
view were the majority view. Even so, the person with the minority view still benefits
from the overall system of social cooperation. The main benefits are as follows:
1. Her basic rights are protected.
2. Distributive justice allows her to obtain her fair share of the benefits of
social cooperation, which she may use to advance her life plan.
3. In determining the negligence standard of care, she had an equal
“vote” in that her values received equal weight.
4. Given the democratic standard of care, she has a degree of choice as to
which risks she will likely be exposed to and how much risk she will
likely bear.
Part of the price for these benefits from social cooperation is her being subject to some
level of risk of accidental harm. In other words, one downside to social cooperation
governed through democracy is that, while each person’s values are (ideally) factored
into life plan sensitive issues, one is subject to the resolution of the issue whether or not
one’s values “win.” Since the individuals among the 49% were entitled to the benefits of
social cooperation listed above, they were treated fairly even though their values did not
“win” in determining the standard of care on the speed limit issue.
It is true that the 24,073 dead or injured individuals who held the minority view
“lost” in two ways. First, they died or were injured from the increase in non-negligent
risk that did not reflect their values. Second, they were not entitled to compensation from
other parties to the accidents since the greater speed reflected the majority’s values. At
the same time, that would be true of some individuals no matter where the standard of
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care is set. Under alternative theories of breach, an individual could be killed or severely
injured from another’s act that the individual herself did not value even if by some other
measure that act was efficient or “reasonable.”
Danger is inherent in social life. So, the issue is not whether individuals should be
injured without the possibility of compensation as a result of risk that they themselves do
not value. Rather, since such injuries are a fact of social life, what kinds of reasons
provide the right basis for determining these political issues where some individuals will
die or suffer devastating injury. It is not a question of whether some will be harmed
(without compensation) from risks that they do not value; it is what reasons justify a legal
regime where such things happen.
In the context of the law of risk regulation, Gregory Keating explores what kinds
of reasons justify the risk of death and devastating injury. In my view, he rightly
identifies (at a general level) that the reasons have to involve something comparable to
death and devastating injury. Regarding the idea of comparability, Keating writes:
Harms are comparable when their impact on the lives of those they affect is
similarly grave - when they impair ordinary activities, or important activities, or
the pursuit of rational life plans, in similarly severe ways. Harms are comparable
when they strike at the preconditions of rational agency in similarly severe (or
similarly mild) ways. Harms are comparable when they disrupt the lives of those
they affect in similarly urgent (or similarly insignificant) ways. Burdens and
benefits are comparable when they improve or impair lives in similarly important
or modest ways. When burdens and benefits are comparable, they may, other
things equal, be traded-off against one another. When they are not comparable, it
is unfair – unjust – to trade them off against one another.228
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I agree with the gist of what Keating sketches though the real action is the greater detail
of the criteria that can determine which harms and benefits are comparable.
Unfortunately, Keating does not explicitly provide adequate detail on this issue. We can
characterize the speed limit case above in terms of arguably comparable harms and
benefits: the freedom of traveling quickly versus diminished accident security from the
faster travel. Keating’s theoretical tools do not provide detailed enough theoretical
resources to determine whether the freedom to drive somewhere between 55 and 75 mph
is comparable to the death or injury of 49,128 individuals. Perhaps, his focus on risk
regulation explains this lack of detail.
Even though Keating suggests and hints that his theory can be extended to
negligence tort law, that extension is by no means straightforward.229 Keating continually
claims that harms and benefits need to be comparable but provides little guidance on how
to determine that issue. At the end of his article, Keating provides some guidance when
he suggests that, in a society where background justice obtains, “the shutting down of
major productive activities” would be “a grave injury comparable to a significant risk of
devastating harm.”230 He sees these major productive activities as morally special
because they “arose out of a fair background situation, through procedurally fair
transactions, and flourish in an economic system governed by principles of justice.”231 To
me, Keating obscures or perhaps leaves out a major piece of what might be a persuasive
moral justification.
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What Keating obscures is that the moral importance of these major productive
activities must also be based on individuals’ values. The values of the individuals
involved are what should decisively lead to the actual specifics of these major activities
in light of the characteristics and possible results of those activities. Specifically, what
needs to do most of the normative lifting here are the individuals’ values about labor,
leisure, the satisfaction of their daily wants and needs from those major activities, and so
on—as individuals interact with each other and with political institutions of justice. As
written, individuals’ values at best play an obscure, unmentioned role in the fair
transactions and economic system that Keating highlights.
Without including individuals’ values centrally in the argument, Keating’s
argument appears to overly reify the status quo: he does not acknowledge that these
major activities do and should change according to the values of the individuals involved.
More importantly, if the major activities do not reflect the values of most of the
individuals involved, then these activities are not comparable to the risks they engender
even if the risks resulted from fair transactions and within Keating’s ideal economic
system. In that scenario, Keating’s argument collapses without any way to revive it.
Dagan’s reformulation of Keating’s point (which, in my view, is actually an
excessively charitable improvement over and above Keating’s argument) is an attempt to
save it from being a naïve avowal of the status quo. To reiterate Dagan’s insight, he
writes about the social process regarding risk as:
a social deliberation that identifies and validates the interests and activities
that are, for the given community, intrinsic objects of value and that brings
about a resolution of conflicts between divergent interests and activities
according to the community’s hierarchy of values.
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In my view, which I also think reflects Dagan’s meaning here, a group’s hierarchy of
values is not a ranking based on objective principles or criteria. Rather, the hierarchy is
what that group of individuals do in fact value relative to other things that that particular
group values. Put differently, the interests and kinds of acts at issue are not intrinsically
valuable tout court; they are intrinsically valuable “for that given community,” to use
Dagan’s words.
With this needed insight, we can respond to Keating’s repeated inquiry of whether
the harms are comparable or outweigh the benefits. Democratic standard theory informs
us that Keating’s questions are not exactly the right questions. Instead, the right questions
are roughly as follows:
•

Are the harms and benefits comparable according to a certain group
of individuals?

•

Do the benefits outweigh the harms according to a certain group of
individuals?

The values of the individuals locally affected make certain benefits comparable to risk of
death or devastating injury because those individuals do in fact value those benefits and
their accompanying risk of death or devastating injury as comparable. Applied to the
above speed limit example, driving faster and its accompanying benefits are comparable
to (and outweigh) the death or injury of 49,128 individuals because the values of locally
affected support deem that driving between 55 to 75 mph and its benefits as comparable
to the particulars of the sizeable and virtually certain risk of death and injury. Assuming
no misinformation, foul play, or epistemic problems, these individuals’ values deem, put
simply, driving between 55 to 75 mph as comparable to the death or injury of 49,128
individuals.
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If the values of the individuals in the relevant group were identical, democratic
standard theory would set the stakes of each kind of act in line with the life plans of
everyone. Given conflicting values regarding risk, majority rule determines which acts
are comparable with their inherent risks. By allowing as many individuals as possible to
determine what kinds of acts are comparable with what risks, individuals may pursue
their life plans where the stakes of negligent risk reflect those life plans of as many
individuals as possible.

Identifying the Relevant Modular Group
To reiterate, democratic standard theory contends that the values of the group of
locally affected individuals should determine what constitutes breach of the negligence
standard of care for any given kind of act. In the last section, I argued for why values
should almost entirely determine the contours of negligence. That is what I mean by the
standard of care being democratic. If individuals had identical values, the argument for
democratic standard theory would already be mostly complete. However, for nations that
have diverse populations, individuals’ values inevitably conflict. Despite its infamous
reputation elsewhere, in the realm of risk majoritarianism best reconciles the competing
values without violating any individuals’ basic rights or anything of similar magnitude.
While based on majoritarianism, the democratic standard of care is not a tyranny simply
because no one has a right to perform any particular kind of act, which has a risk
magnitude between 0 to 100 on my stipulated scale, without being vulnerable to a
negligence claim if harm results. Instead, based on the overarching theoretical
commitments of the Kantian tradition, majoritarianism in this limited context best fulfills
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the goal to provide a legal regime that allows the most individuals to live according to
their life plans.
In this light, identifying the relevant group of locally affected individuals is not a
problem, the solution of which will make or break democratic standard theory. Rather,
identifying the relevant group is more like a practical problem where the closer we get to
the locally affected individuals the greater the advantages we reap. We aspire for
identifying the relevant group as best we can, and yet we are content to settle for the
rough approximations often necessary due to the large populations in modern nations.
In that vein, democratic standard theory could justifiably rely on national
boundaries to specify the relevant group. Similarly, political subdivisions within a nation
such as states or cities could also delineate the relevant group. These avenues are
especially appealing for nations or their subdivisions with relatively small populations,
substantial internal migration or travel, or other elements that unify the values of the
individuals in the nation regarding the standard of care. As a practical matter, a national
negligence standard of care should be the rebuttable default for the relevant group.
While existing political divisions are in a sense morally arbitrary, such do center
the relevant group on a specific geographical location, which accords with the fact that
proximity between the actors (or their agents or products) is necessary for accidents to
occur. Using existing national boundaries or other political subdivisions to delineate the
relevant group has obvious practical advantages. In reality, for democratic standard
theory to be operationalized in real world tort cases, existing political divisions might be
the only practical option for delineating the relevant group. Fortunately, existing political
divisions may roughly approximate the locally affected individuals for the purposes of
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democratic standard theory, especially if the nation or its subdivisions have effective
democratic mechanisms.
As should be clear from the preceding paragraph, by no means do I intend to rule
out the use of existing political divisions to delineate the relevant group even though I
further explore the issue. I formulate democratic standard theory with the intentionally
flexible concept of “group” to handle cases both involving actors or acts that transverse
existing political divisions and those kinds of acts that are nuanced within these divisions.
Whatever I may achieve in refining the relevant group better than existing political
divisions adds appeal to democratic standard theory.
To illustrate the needed flexibility, consider the multiple spheres of driving in
relation to existing political divisions. In a state like Pennsylvania, one has three mediumto-large metropolitan regions separated by vast stretches of rural regions. Mixed in with
intrastate and interstate drivers, the Amish share the roads with their horses and buggies.
So, within the political division of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, we find
everything from horse and buggy to the average drivers of the country and suburbs to the
overly aggressive automobile driver of the city. In some local spheres, the relevant group
needs to include the Amish with their horse and buggies. In the cities, perhaps only
pedestrians and overly aggressive drivers are the relevant group. In other spheres, such as
the roads that individuals regularly use to transverse the nation, the relevant group is
likely the nation. With national transportation methods such as automobile, airplane, and
train, transnational travel is also possible suggesting that, at times, the relevant group may
extend beyond national borders.
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For example, 800,000 Canadians visit Minnesota each year.232 Some have pointed
out that Minnesotans have more similar political attitudes to Canada than to the “deep
south” of the United States.233 Perhaps with some kinds of acts, the negligence standard
of care needs to reflect the commonalities of Canada and Minnesota rather than including
Minnesota with other parts of the United States in a national standard of care just because
they share a national government.
Since a theory of negligence is ideally able to handle accidents between actors
across existing political divisions, it is worthwhile to explore how flexible the relevant
group may be. In other words, while I would settle for this dissertation having established
that the relevant group pertains to the nation or existing political subdivisions, I think one
of the advantages of democratic standard theory is its ability to identify relevant groups
that do not match existing political divisions. Furthermore, elucidating how democratic
standard theory understands the relevant group further displays appealing aspects of the
theory.

The Duty of Care Identifies the Relevant Group
The primary issue for which I create democratic standard theory is to assign
accident costs from accidents that have already occurred. Although democratic standard
theory has relevance to issues regarding how to justify future risk impositions or new
technologies, I must save these issues for future projects.

Sam Brodey, The 11th Province? Considering the State of Minnesota’s Special Relationship with
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Given that focus of democratic standard theory, the relevant group is a group that
existed at the time of the accident. In that sense, the relevant group is frozen in time. As a
theoretical matter, we need not worry about if the relevant group or their values have
changed since the accident occurred. We are solely interested in what the relevant group
and the values of its individuals were at the time of the accident. As a practical matter, a
substantial amount of time may have passed before these inquiries are made as when a
lawsuit is filed only at the tail end of a long statute of limitations. If so, we would want to
make sure we are properly assessing these matters as they were at the time of the accident
rather than any changes that may have occurred afterwards.
Furthermore, when applying democratic standard theory, we are determining what
standard of care existed at the time when the relevant acts were performed. We are not
creating a standard of care, in light of an accident, and then applying that to the past
event. The rationale is that, due to considerations pertaining to responsibility for acts and
the rule of law, the actor must have been able to ascertain and conform to the standard of
care to which she is adjudged negligent or non-negligent. Fortunately, this feature also
leads us to the method for determining the relevant group of individuals locally affected.
Identifying the relevant group is not as difficult as it may initially seem. Recall
that, following Coleman, the negligence standard of care is comprised of primary moral
obligations regarding the permissibility of acts that risk harm to others. The relevant
group is going to be largely or entirely dependent on the scope of the actor’s primary
moral obligation to act with sensitivity to others’ interests. More specifically, in any
situation, the actor’s particular, context-based primary moral obligation to act with
sensitivity to others’ interests at that time and place determines the relevant group based
199

on the “others” whose interests are at play. This includes the moral concepts of the duty
of care, outcome-responsibility, and various other senses of foreseeability. Put
differently, the relevant group depends on those individuals to whom the actor owes a
duty of care when performing the act at issue. Therefore, democratic standard theory does
not need an independent argument for its concept of group apart from a compelling
theory of the duty of care in tort.
In that light, democratic standard theory’s concept of the group may stand or fall
alongside others’ theories of the other components of negligence, most especially the
duty of care and outcome responsibility. The inextricable importance of the duty of care
to a negligence tort claim has received much attention lately especially in the work of
John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky.234 It is not worthwhile for me to regurgitate the
arguments for other components of a tort claim. Rather, let me illustrate the plausibility
of delineating the relevant group based on the actor’s duty of care. This approach should
also be useful because democratic standard theory is designed to be practical for the
current structure of tort law (even though the theory’s implications reach beyond that
domain as I have mentioned). In the upcoming illustration of how democratic standard
theory would operate in a specific tort lawsuit, I focus on harm to bodily integrity for
ease of exposition. Nevertheless, the same points are adaptable to any of the other typical
harms in accident law like damaged physical property and, more recently, emotional
distress.
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Finally, the following example pertains to hunting. I do not think individuals
values regarding the moral permissibility of hunting are relevant to the issue of what
constitutes negligent breach when someone is hunting. The moral permissibility of
hunting may be a life plan insensitive issue. Regardless, since the below example is
meant to be generalizable to most other instances of potential negligent breach, I assume
that the moral permissibility of hunting is a separate matter.
Suppose that, on July 26, 2016, in the great state of Georgia, Gomer was hunting
with his rifle’s safety disengaged. Gomer tripped on a tree root and the rifle discharged a
bullet injuring Barney who was taking pictures while stopped along a scenic Georgia
country road. In his complaint in a Georgia state court, Barney alleges that (a) Gomer had
a duty of care toward Barney; (b) Gomer breached that duty when he negligently hunted
with his rifle’s safety disengaged; (c) Gomer’s negligence actually and proximately
caused him to trip and the bullet from Gomer’s rifle to shatter Barney’s left femur; (d)
Barney’s injury resulted in medical costs, lost wages, pain and suffering, and lifelong
limited functioning of his left leg; and (e) all other necessary allegations for a negligence
tort claim.
In Gomer’s initial responsive pleadings, Gomer alleges his hunting with his rifle’s
safety disengaged was not negligent. For that reason, Gomer denies any and all liability
for Barney’s injury and other resulting harms.
In addressing the question of Gomer’s negligence in the context of this tort
lawsuit, we are already dealing with a decision-making process that determines
negligence on a case-by-case basis. At this stage, we need not concern ourselves with
whether determining negligence in this case does or should have any implication beyond
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resolving the dispute between Gomer and Barney. As it stands, existing tort law in the
United States does not generally give precedential weight to negligence trials especially
when no appellate court review follows.
As pointed out earlier, United States tort law generally states, in its traditional
form, that for Defendant to have been negligent, Defendant must have had a duty to
Plaintiff and must have breached that duty by her conduct that fell below the standard of
care that a reasonably prudent person would have met. To operationalize democratic
standard theory to determine if Gomer was negligent, we must first identify the relevant
group of locally affected individuals. To do so, let’s adopt a real-time perspective of
Gomer’s acts just prior to the alleged negligent act.
At 4:00 AM, on the day in question, Gomer begins actively hunting elk in the
wilderness of Georgia. By about 5:15 AM, Gomer is stalking an elk that he had just seen.
He has his rifle’s safety disengaged so that he can aim and fire at a moment’s notice.
Let’s pause the scenario and take a step back. Tort law provides a mechanism for
remediating, among other things, accidental harm. Tort law is also thought to guide
behavior so that individuals are not vulnerable to negligence claims or, even better, so no
one is negligently harmed in the first place. In my view, a better way to conceive of this
guidance function is that tort law provides a legal institution that piggybacks on and
provides legal backing to already existing moral requirements. In that sense, the
negligence standard of care is comprised of primary moral obligations regarding the
permissibility of acts that risk harm to others. Let’s return to the hunting example to
follow the implications of this point.
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While hunting, the primary moral issue is:
Hunting Primary Moral Obligation Question – Does Gomer violate a
primary moral obligation as he stalks with his rifle’s safety disengaged a
recently-observed elk?
To address this issue, we first ask:
Hunting Duty Question – To which persons, if anyone, does Gomer owe
a primary obligation to not injure while he is hunting?
I contend that the answer to the Hunting Duty Question provides the basis, if not the
entirety, of the answer to who constitutes the relevant group of locally affected
individuals in democratic standard theory’s formulation of negligence. Thus, the values
that are relevant to breach are the values of the individuals to whom Gomer owes the duty
of care to not negligently harm.
The importance of the concept of a duty of care in tort law is one of recent interest
among scholars with some proposing that the concept of duty is unneeded while others
contend that the duty of care is essential to a tort claim. Obviously, I side with the latter
group. Let me continue with the reasoning in the hunting example to motivate the
plausibility of deriving the relevant group from the duty of care, that is, the scope of the
primary moral obligation at issue.
The most obvious individuals to whom Gomer may owe that obligation is to any
individuals who are in fact in the vicinity where Gomer is hunting. Such could be other
hunters, hunters’ companions, park rangers, passers-by, hikers, and any individuals who
live in or at the borders of the wilderness. Perhaps Gomer may owe an obligation, in
some sense, to himself as well given that he too is in the ambit of risk.
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Barney, as it turns out, is a passer-by and, thus, falls within the relevant group.
Those nearby-in-fact individuals are the ones that are risked injury from any of Gomer’s
acts. So, if Gomer owes an obligation to use the gun’s safety mechanism, he owes it to at
least those nearby-in-fact individuals, that is, anyone within gunshot range of the entire
area in which Gomer hunts. Applying this point to democratic standard theory, due to the
risk involved in Gomer’s act, at least the values of those nearby-in-fact matter. By
implication, those nearby-in-fact are in the group of locally affected individuals with
regard to Gomer’s act of hunting with the safety disengaged.
Before we investigate whether the scope of Gomer’s moral obligation (and thus
the scope of the locally affected group) expands beyond nearby-in-fact individuals, let’s
inquire whether anyone is clearly not part of the relevant group. What about individuals
who are in fact on the other side of the Earth while Gomer is hunting? Initially, it seems
Gomer does not owe any obligation to hunt in any particular way (e.g., with or without
the safety engaged) to individuals who are so far away that his act could in no way risk
them harm, except in bizarre scenarios so unlikely that their moral relevance is nil.
An example of such a bizarre scenario is as follows. Gomer trips, his gun
discharges, and the bullet hits an arsenal of nuclear weapons, which were unknown to
Gomer. Those weapons destroy all human life in Asia. While possible in the sense of
logically possible, such bizarre and infinitesimally unlikely possibilities have no moral
significance to the issues at stake in this dissertation. So, from here on out, I ignore them.
Back to reality, while Gomer hunts, nearby-in-fact individuals are definitely in the
relevant group, and those individuals who in fact are on the other side of the globe are
definitely not in the relevant group. Since we can identify individuals some of which are
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clearly included in the scope of Gomer’s moral obligation and some of which are clearly
excluded, it is plausible that the scope of Gomer’s moral obligation, if any, is limited
(i.e., the scope does not necessarily include all persons). Similarly, by implication,
democratic standard theory’s concept of a group of locally affected individuals is not
hopelessly vague or something of that problematic nature.
The proposition at issue could be as specific as: “Hunters may actively hunt with
their rifle’s safety disengaged once they have spotted their prey.” Alternatively, the
proposition could be as general as: “Hunters may actively hunt within a safety range of
40.” Safety range 40 includes, among other things, actively hunting with one’s rifle’s
safety disengaged in several scenarios.
As an aside, determining how to phrase the proposition is obviously not an exact
science. Nevertheless, such a task is not one to which lawyers are strangers. Formulating
an issue in any lawsuit involves some artistic license, abuse of which can be curtailed
through argumentation in adversarial litigation. Guidance in how to formulate the
proposition can be found in how those clearly in the relevant group conceptualize the acts
at issue. For example, the following could be values of the relevant group that pertain to
Gomer’s act:
1. A right to carry a gun is a right not to have your gun’s safety engaged.
2. A gun with a safety engaged is no gun at all.
3. A person in pursuit of his prey is on a Godly mission.
4. Better to burn the forest down than for a hunter to not kill his prey.
5. When it is hunting season, it is war time. Civilians, stay away!
6. Most hunter safety courses offered in Georgia do not mention any
need to have a gun’s safety engaged while one is actively hunting.
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These are merely my fanciful creations. Nevertheless, I am suggesting the sorts of things
that would be used to formulate the proposition.
Suppose that the relevant group for the accident between Gomer and Barney were
limited to those nearby-in-fact individuals. Democratic standard theory would determine
the Hunting Question based only on the values of those individuals. Suppose that the
values of the relevant individuals unanimously supported the proposition, “Hunters may
actively hunt with their rifle’s safety disengaged once they have spotted their prey.” In
such a scenario, Gomer’s act was not negligent. That conclusion has intuitive appeal. If
the values of those who are in fact risked harm support that kind of risk, then Gomer and
others should be able to impose that risk without being vulnerable to a negligence claim.
Since unanimous, I cannot see how Barney could plausibly claim that Gomer’s act was
negligent, even if Barney wants to change his view ex post or just wants compensation in
light of his harm. Such would be equivalent to claiming, “Even though everyone, myself
included, holds that hunting with the rifle’s safety disengaged is a worthwhile kind of act,
Gomer behaved improperly (negligently) because he hunted with his rifle’s safety
disengaged.” That is hardly a defensible claim.
Again, we see the difficulty ultimately resting on whether we are equally
persuaded when individuals’ values are not unanimous, which is admittedly the standard
scenario. Put differently, since unanimity is never guaranteed and usually unlikely, then
democratic standard theory may stand or fall based on whether majority rule is justified.
While defending majoritarianism is the more important claim, I am not claiming that
identifying the relevant group is moot. Instead, the persuasiveness of majority rule may
depend, in part, on having a cogent sense of the relevant group. The more we are able to
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exclude from the relevant group individuals whose interests are not actually at stake, the
more clearly we see who are the individuals affected by the act at issue. Being able to
reliably identify those individuals who are affected may ease any concern that the
minority view is being out “voted” simply because extraneous individuals of the other
view were included in the relevant group due to a wishy-washy concept of the relevant
group.
Let’s return to this idea that the relevant group may include more than those
nearby-in-fact but less than everyone in the world. The twin issues to deal with are
Specificity and Foreknowledge.
The Specificity Issue is related to what I addressed earlier about how to formulate
the relevant proposition. I now take up some of the finer difficulties that I glided over
above because they primarily get ugly in the issue of identifying the scope of the relevant
group and its brother, the scope of the duty of care. In particular, the more specifically we
describe the act or even the kind of act at issue, the smaller the reference class of acts is
and the fewer the individuals in the relevant group seems to be. For instance, suppose we
specify Gomer’s act as “hunting, at 4:53 AM on July 26, 2016, with his rifle’s safety
disengaged and tripping on the tree stump at 31.1799° N, 83.7888° W.”235 If so, then
Barney may have been the only other person who was in fact within gunshot range of
Gomer’s highly-specific act. Also, the notion of appealing to the locally affected
individuals becomes a silly contest between the group of two, Gomer and Barney, with
no one to break a possible tie.
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These are GPS coordinates for the quaint area of Moultrie, Georgia.
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A related problem arises as well because such a specifically described event
presents a mismatch between it and values. While values themselves contain a high
degree of specificity, they are unlikely to have any information nuanced enough to
address that specific tree root at 31.1799° N, 83.7888° W or even tripping in particular
while hunting or while carrying a gun. Thus, specificity is needed but only up to a point.
The other twin issue here pertains to the limitations of human foreknowledge and
even knowledge in general. If they are to be useful as guidance, moral obligations must
be able to apply to situations where the actor does not know all possibly relevant
information. At best, an actor has limited knowledge, and, for other pertinent
information, she will estimate probabilities of other facts or what could occur based on
present information and any pertinent past experience. Any meaningful sense of
responsibility, whether moral, legal, or causal, needs to take into consideration these
limits on foreknowledge.
To deal with these twin issues, we need to abstract to some extent from the
particulars of Gomer and Barney’s accident. Fortunately, a layperson’s understanding of
their moral obligations and duty of care can guide us through these issues. Here I am also
assuming that individuals have a minimum threshold of the capacity to foresee and avoid
harm. In his theory of outcome responsibility, Stephen Perry describes this threshold as
“the degree of capacity regularly exercised by ordinary or average people who strike us
as possessing meaningful agency.”236
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Return with me to Gomer. I trace his possible thoughts, not in the sense that he
likely had these thoughts or that he could have them in this form. Rather, I trace what his
thoughts could be if he were sufficiently attentive to such matters as opposed to focused
on other things or distracted by the lovely song of the morning birds, for example. In
other words, these are the issues that Gomer should have been aware of and attended to
given that he is a competent moral agent. Once again, Gomer may not articulate these
ideas in these specific ways or even through words. He may respond to instinct, emotion,
habit, an unarticulated sense of duty, or memories as well as any general or specific
word-like thoughts.
Suppose that Gomer keeps his rifle’s safety engaged while traveling to the
hunting site. As he begins to actively hunt, he loads a bullet in his rifle and considers
disengaging the safety. But, he has heard that many other hunters have hunted all day for
the last two days without seeing any prey. So, he thinks that disengaging the safety is not
“worth it” until he sees prey or recent evidence that prey was near.
At the moment of the thought in the last sentence, we already have enough to set
the scope of Gomer’s duty of care and the corresponding relevant group of affected
individuals. Implicit in Gomer’s thought (or instinct, emotion, habit, etc.) is that the
added danger from disengaging the safety on a loaded rifle would persist throughout the
day exposing himself and others to danger from any number of possible mishaps.
While Gomer himself has never had a rifle misfire, he has heard of such events
happening over the years. Last fall, Andy, who is one of Gomer’s friends had his rifle’s
safety disengaged when a previously unknown flock of birds took flight as Andy was
wiping sweat from his forehead. The birds startled Andy such that he immediately
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grabbed his rifle with his now sweaty, slippery hand. His grip slipped such that his finger
hit the trigger and the gun fired. The sudden, unexpected discharge startled him even
further and he instinctively put his hands protectively over his face. Gunpowder from his
hands got into his eyes such that he suffered partial eyesight loss for several months.
While Gomer has limited knowledge about what will happen that day, he has a
general sense of possible dangers that may result from a disengage safety mechanism.
Even though no one else aside from Gomer’s friend was injured from the accidental
discharge, Andy was denied a hunting license the next year, and none of Andy and
Gomer’s hunting buddies are willing to go hunting with Andy since the accident
occurred. That thought spurred Gomer to wonder how many of those buddies were
hunting that day as well.
So, while Gomer is not specifically thinking about the possibility of his tripping,
he has a sense that disengaging the safety, at that moment, was not the best thing to do.
From the few thoughts I have sketched, we see imbedded in them the outlines of the
scope of the group to whom an actor owes any possible moral obligation. Other hunters
are clearly within that scope as indicated by the ostracism from Andy’s former hunting
buddies, some of whom may be hunting in the vicinity of Gomer on the day in question.
By implication, anyone nearby-in-fact is also included.
Given that Gomer cannot plausibly know who among his hunting buddies, or
other hunters in general, are nearby-in-fact, the scope of his moral obligation includes
anyone who might be in that area whether hunting or not. We again must not get carried
away with bizarre and infinitesimally unlikely possibilities here. While it is logically
possible, that the Dalai Lama, for example, is meandering about where Gomer is hunting,
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nothing about the Dalai Lama suggests he has or will ever intend to go to Georgia let
alone the wilderness in southern Georgia where Gomer is hunting. So, there must be
some appreciable likelihood that such persons would be within gunshot range of the area
where Gomer is hunting. Individuals who live in Georgia, especially southern Georgia,
and perhaps surrounding states are candidates for being within gunshot range of Gomer’s
hunting. We have reason to doubt whether anyone outside this region has an appreciable
likelihood of being within gunshot range on the day in question, aside from perhaps
hunters, vacationers, and nature enthusiasts who have traveled to Georgia at that time.
In this scenario, who specifically is in the group of possible nearby-in-fact
individuals may not and need not necessarily play a role in Gomer’s practical reasoning.
In other situations, such considerations would be auspicious. In others, morally
obligatory. Regardless, another helpful avenue for piecing together the scope of Gomer’s
moral obligation is to investigate what Gomer, or someone similarly situated, would
anticipate as those to whom he is accountable. In other words, if Gomer were to consider
the possibility of his rifle accidentally discharging, which resulted in an injury, to whom
would he anticipate that he would be accountable for that accident. The ultimate question
is would such a person anticipate that he is accountable to anyone beyond Georgia or
perhaps to anyone beyond Georgia and the states that border Georgia. My sense is no.
Gomer is likely to anticipate being accountable to those nearby-in-fact especially
any person who is injured and that person’s companions. He may have to defend his acts
to those involved in the sport of hunting in Georgia to keep any licenses or avoid
ostracism. He will anticipate some legal consequences if another suffers more than trivial
harm and Gomer neither wants to compensate the person nor thinks he should have to do
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so. Of course, regardless of whether he was attending to these matters, Gomer would
have any appropriate moral obligation and would likely have to account, in some sense,
to some or all of these individuals after any accident. Again, we can elicit the scope of
Gomer’s obligation by attending to these matters from his perspective prior to the
accident.
Let’s return to the issue of whom Gomer, or someone similarly situated, would
not deem himself accountable to. Put simply, he is not accountable to anyone who could
not even possibly have been, to an appreciable degree, within gunshot range of Gomer’s
hunting area, including any hunting area that he could have possibly reached, to any
appreciable degree. The “could have” in the previous sentences contains a number of
aspects worth sketching. First, included are the people who would have been in gunshot
range had the accident not occurred in at the specific place and time that it did occur. For
instance, if Gomer would have likely reached within gunshot range of a large swath of
people had the accident occurred later or at the very end of his likely hunting period,
those individuals’ values would be also included. Second, suppose that Gomer could have
been hunting the day before or the day after or even any day plus or minus two weeks (or,
e.g., any day in the month-long elk hunting season). We should include those individuals
who had an appreciable chance of being in Gomer’s hunting area such as anyone with an
appreciable chance of hunting in that area on any day where there was an appreciable
chance of Gomer hunting as well.
Similarly, if there was an appreciable chance of Gomer hunting instead in
Northern Georgia or Southern Alabama on any day in elk hunting season, then included
would be everybody for whom there was an appreciable chance of their being in any of
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those areas on any of those days. On the other side of this coin, excluded is almost
everyone in Oregon, Maine, Arizona, etc. as well as virtually all of the rest of the world
because there is no appreciable chance of, say, 99.999% of them (e.g., the over 7 billion
individuals in China and India) being in any of these areas on any day during elk hunting
season in 2016 (or even plus or minus a few years).
Another sense of “could have” excludes individuals that coincidentally were in
fact within range, or could have been, due to bizarre, infinitesimally unlikely scenarios
that virtually no individual, similarly situated as the defendant, could have anticipated.
For example, in the sense of logically possible, due to an unprecedented, never to be
repeated event, numerous Army Rangers could have been performing a top secret, live
ammo training session within gunshot range of the area where Gomer was hunting on the
same day as the accident at issue. The standard of care applicable to Gomer and Barney’s
accident does not change just because there was an unappreciable chance that,
unbeknownst to Gomer (and, as stipulated, unrealistically discoverable), a legion of
Rangers could have been milling about that area without the safety engaged on their
guns.
Look at these “could have’s” from the other direction. Group together everyone
who could not have had any chance (in any plausible sense), to any appreciable degree,
of being within in gunshot range of Gomer’s hunting. How could individuals in this
group plausibly claim that Gomer had any meaningful duty to avoid accidentally shooting
them while hunting? Any such duty is an exercise in fantasy or sheer nonsense. I also
hazard to say that virtually no individual, aside from perhaps some philosophers and
others with quirky, extreme views, actually believes such duties exist.
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Based on the above considerations, we have what we need to specify the scope of
Gomer’s moral obligation. His obligation, framed from Gomer’s real-time perspective
prior to his disengaging his rifle’s safety, extends to all individuals who had or could
have had a chance, to any appreciable degree, of being within gunshot range of any area
in which he did hunt or could have hunted in that season or any season give or take, say,
one or two in either direction.
Due to the same considerations, the scope of the relevant group is, well, the same.
So, the pertinent standard of care, according to democratic standard theory, is whatever
standard is supported by the values of the majority of the individuals in that group, to wit,
those who had or could have had a chance, to any appreciable degree, of being within
gunshot range when Gomer was or could have been hunting. To generalize, democratic
standard theory determines breach according to the values of individuals who had or
could have had any chance, to an appreciable degree, of being harmed by the kind of act
at issue (which includes what was and what could have been the particulars of the act).
Determining which individuals had or could have had a chance, to any
appreciable degree, of being harmed involves epistemic approximation. Some kinds of
acts in some contexts will be more straightforward than others. For Gomer and Barney’s
accident, the relevant group seems limited to those individuals with even minimal ability
to travel into or near the pertinent wilderness and those who reside in southern Georgia
and nearby parts of other states. Based on my anecdotal evidence of that region, my sense
is that the values of a clear majority of individuals in that group would support a
particular standard of care regarding Gomer’s kind of act. While we would need to
include, based on my discussion above, some likely negligible amount of visitors from
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outside the aforementioned region, my sense is that not enough outsiders, on average,
with drastically different views visit that region such that we would have sufficient
reason to conclude that the clear, regional majority would be outnumbered.
I realize that my claims in the last paragraph are speculative, in a way, and better
evidence would be needed to substantiate them. I do not pretend to know what that
standard would be in southern Georgia for Gomer’s kind of act, and the actual answer to
that issue is irrelevant for my purposes. Nevertheless, what seems to be missing from that
inquiry is empirical information about a discrete area. Such seems well within the reach
of social scientists, if not some laypeople with substantial knowledge about that region. I
address issues related that epistemic claim in various ways below.
Since a legal inquiry into the relevant group always takes place after the accident
at issue, such an inquiry could take on other forms than what I specified above. For
example, connections between the defendant and the actual harmed may provide a
rebuttable, initial outline of the relevant group. Next, who was nearly harmed by the act?
By “nearly harmed,” I mean were there any specific, actual individuals close to the
accident in time and place. If the accident had happened a little earlier or later or a small
distance in any direction, would different individuals have been harmed? Here, we are
looking for connections between the defendant and those nearly harmed for more
plausible information to sketch out the relevant group for the kind of act at issue.
Next, is the act in question the kind of act that is regularly repeated in that
location or the surrounding area? At this step, we are making an abstraction, possibly
even greater than those above, when we move from a specific act to a kind of act. This
abstraction requires caution, as also discussed above, since any single act could also be
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described so generally that acts with substantially different, relevant features might be
improperly included. Finally, adopting the ex ante perspectives of the actors or similarly
situated individuals, as illustrated in Gomer and Barney’s case, would provide additional
data as to the relevant group.

Structural Points in the Argument
Let me clarify what the structure of my argument is not. My argument is not
based on an ex ante notion of fairness. I am not claiming, like some utilitarian theories
do, that before the accident each potentially harmed individual was in a state of equality
vis-à-vis one another because they each had a chance at winning or losing in terms of
benefiting or getting injured from the permitted risk. While at times I encourage an ex
ante perspective, that is not because I claim that that ex ante state is important morally
speaking in the way just stated.
Rather, what is important for democratic standard theory is that the standard of
care reflect the values of most individuals possible. That inquiry would not change even
if, under bizarre circumstances, we knew ex ante that 99% of the relevant group would be
accidentally injured as a result of a kind of act that meets that group’s standard of care
and each injury would far outweigh any of the benefits that each may receive from the
permitted act. A party to an accident is treated as an equal when she is vulnerable to a
negligence claim that resulted from an act that was not supported by the values of the
most locally affected individuals—even if her values and the values of many others, but
still less than a majority, do support the act. She is treated as an equal, among other
reasons, because her values are given equal weight in the calculus that determines what
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the standard of care is for that kind of act. Ex ante or ex post conceptions of equality or
fairness are irrelevant to that calculus.

Possible Epistemic Procedures
1. Insiders Have Pertinent Information
Democratic standard theory’s concept of democracy does not require standard
institutional markers such as voting, equal participation, or elected officials, although
such procedures or intermediaries may play a role in discovering what a group’s standard
already is. In contrast, the theory advocates we use (or discover and then use) the best
available procedures to determine the standard of care that the values of the group
require. Without intending to suggest that I endorse any particular procedure, I want to
make it plausible that such an endeavor is realistic at least to an extent that is “good
enough for government work.”
Determining a group’s standard of care for the wide variety of acts that can lead
to accidents is no simple matter. Fortunately, we do not need to create a compendium of
each standard for each of the various kinds of acts for each group. Nevertheless, I need to
show that the democratic standard of care is possible to construct at least to resolve
numerous disputes over accident costs. Even though the standard of care is based on a
group’s values, we may not need to isolate each value of each individual, determine its
weight, count the number of people that weight that value each particular way, and then
calculate the totals of the group. Such a labor-intensive process would likely be more
expensive than the total accident costs in many disputes over accident costs. Instead,
aggregative techniques may sufficiently approximate the values at issue and identify the
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group’s standard of care. One way to look for such techniques is to consider who has
access to the information sought.
Individuals have conscious or unconscious access to their own values and
standards. Simultaneously, most members (“insiders”) of a group generally have access
to the information needed to act in ways that generate positive or neutral responses from
others and avoid negative responses. Often an insider’s values are the same as or are in
harmony with the values of the group. That harmony is common because the insider often
acquires his values from the group via his parents and other group members. Even when
an insider acts contrary to the group’s values, often she does not act ignorantly. When an
insider is not sure whether an act will elicit a negative response, the insider can often seek
indirectly or directly more information from those with relevant experience or from those
potentially affected by the act at issue. Generally, insiders are regularly engaged in
seeking and sharing such information not only privately but also publicly in the news,
political activities, social organizations, and the media’s numerous vehicles.
While individuals usually act according to their own values to achieve their aims,
in general, they consciously or subconsciously restrict or modify their acts to avoid
negative reactions from others. The lack of constant, socially destabilizing conflict
among most members of a group suggests that group members can and often do conform
to a substantial extent their behavior to acts that the group’s values permit. One way this
phenomenon is manifested is by sufficient conformity to criminal prohibitions to avoid
societal breakdown. Another manifestation is when an individual displays good manners,
avoids rudeness, or at least refrains from eliciting too strong of a negative reaction from
others such that others seek to frustrate the individual’s aims. The manifestation that I
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want to focus on is how insiders act to minimize the chance of accidental harm and to
avoid fault for any harm that might occur from their acts. To accomplish this accident and
fault avoidance, insiders have conscious or subconscious access to information of a
certain kind and are regularly adding, refining, and updating that information.
This accident related information pertaining to our group values can be most
salient when we encounter others with different values. Many who have traveled or lived
abroad have experienced shock when a parent asks, as if it were no matter of concern, a
ten-year-old son to climb, without any safety device, a forty-foot tree to cut down
coconuts for newly arrived and previously unknown visitors. Similarly, parents may
regularly leave only an eight-year-old daughter to care for her four younger siblings
while the parents are working in fields far away. Such acts contravene Western values
about exposing children to danger such that a Westerner who acted similarly would be
blameworthy, according to Western values, especially if a child was harmed as a result.
We may be curious how we acquired our risk-related values and why we may feel
as confident about the propriety of our values as others feel about their conflicting values.
Here, I am merely highlighting that these values exist within groups and that insiders
have access to their group’s values, including those values that determine whether the
risks involved in an act are acceptable. It is these values that the democratic standard
theory uses as the basis of the standard of care. So, insiders have access to the
information that the democratic standard theory seeks. The question remains how a social
institution can gain access to that same information to determine what constitutes breach
of the negligence standard of care.
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One option for the social institution is to ask (in an effective way) an insider to
reveal the group’s standard of care. By an “effective way,” I mean to signal that we need
to indicate of all of the problems that researchers have uncovered while trying to figure
out what a person believes. These problems are many and complex. For example, how a
question is framed to an individual can influence his answer to the point of leading him to
display opposite or conflicting beliefs.237 Individuals with different levels or kinds of job
training can advocate seemingly incongruent opinions about the acceptability of a risk
because the individuals are focusing on different aspects of the risk.238 Such individuals,
even with different training, may agree more on the underlying values than is first
apparent. The minutia can matter in ascertaining a person’s beliefs, and so every minute
detail of the method of using one or more insiders to determine a group’s standard of care
should be scrutinized. The problems of extracting information from insiders are real but
not necessarily unsurpassable barriers. To be clear, I am not naively thinking that such
problems will be easily or even entirely solved, even though I do not attempt to defend
that claim in this dissertation.

2. Jury Adjudication is Worth Further Social Scientific Experimentation
As one may have guessed, I have jury adjudication in mind above. To reiterate, I
am not advocating that democratic standard theory requires jury adjudication or any
particular institution, mechanism, or procedure. Nevertheless, consider how the jury
adjudication, as presently practiced in the United States, might be an effective mechanism
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to discover exactly what democratic standard theory requires to determine breach of the
standard of care. That would be good news since jury adjudication is likely here to stay in
the United States, and democratic standard theory would fill a sizeable gap in the
justification of jury adjudication. Of course, I advocate rigorous experimentation to test
jury adjudication’s effectiveness against alternative viable mechanisms. This
experimentation is necessary especially in light of the work that has shown that jury
deliberations can be random, bizarre, and inconsistent. Further experimentation could
also offer ways to adjust jury adjudication to better instantiate the requirements of
democratic standard theory.
The first aspect to consider is that the jury is not directly tasked with the objective
that the democratic standard theory requires. Recall that the judge instructs the jury to
determine whether the defendant acted as a reasonably careful or prudent person (or
something similar) in the pertinent circumstances.239 The concepts of acting reasonably
careful ostensibly point the jury to determine a different kind of question from what
conduct is supported by the values of the majority of group members. The former asks for
a moral evaluation while the latter asks for facts about a number of individuals that hold
certain beliefs or dispositions. So, the judge directs the jury to answer an ostensibly moral
question and, in doing so, the jurors likely believe that they are providing an answer that
contains moral truth, that is, an answer that is connected to the moral fabric of the
universe. Note that democratic standard theory need not be revisionary as to the best
wording for negligence jury instructions. Democratic standard theory does not mandate
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that a jury be asked what is the standard of care supported by the values of the most
individuals as possible or anything even remotely similar. Further social scientific
experiments could possibly reveal that asking a jury, in the context of adjudication as
presently structured, about whether the defendant’s conduct was what a reasonably
prudent person would have done in a similar situation yields the best possible
approximation of what democratic standard theory requires. Or, experimentation could
reveal that providing slightly different jury instructions from what are predominantly
used along with providing certain expert testimony or statistical data as evidence would
yield the best possible approximation of what democratic standard theory requires
When twelve-person jury agrees that an act is not what a reasonably prudent
person would have done in a similar situation, their verdict at least reveals some
commonality among their values, assuming that significant breakdown of the intended
process did not occur during jury deliberation. In the unique context of a jury trial, that
verdict may also reveal commonalities among the values of a larger group to which the
jury members belong.
Let’s sketch aspects of jury adjudication in the United States that seem to
encourage the jury toward a verdict which incorporates their understanding of the view
held by as many of the locally affected individuals as possible.240 The twelve jury
members have been randomly chosen to hear argument and render a verdict about a
dispute that often rests in part on the conduct of the defendant. Assuming good
conditions, jury members are not biased and do not otherwise know the litigants in the
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lawsuit, even though they often reside in the same general area as the litigants or where
the accident occurred. Jury members travel to a government building for their service.
Their jury service is framed as a person’s civic duty. Jurors hear argument in a courtroom
that is structured and decorated in ways that symbolize law, government, power, etc.
Court officials conduct and facilitate the process.
While jurors deliberate together, I want to be careful not to idealize the substance
or process of those deliberations. Yet, it is still a group process where unanimity is
usually required of them. The jury must present its verdict in the courtroom to court
officials, the litigants, the lawyers, and perhaps an audience. Along with others, these
aspects of jury adjudication make its verdict likely to reveal more than some
commonality among their own values. These aspects seem to encourage the jurors to
reach as a group a verdict that may roughly approximate the standard of care that is
supported by the values of the group’s majority.
At the same time, the “jury is still out” on jury adjudication. Jason Solomon
explores the arguments for and against jury adjudication.241 He points out valid concerns
about a jury’s ability to be unbiased, jury adjudication’s ability to provide consistent
outcomes in like cases, a layperson’s ability to assess social norms, and so on.242 While
much of the research he cites about a person’s ability to assess social norms is not
specific to jury adjudication, the research and Solomon’s critique suggest that jury
adjudication needs further assessment and likely some modification.243
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In What Sense of the Overarching Theoretical Commitments of the Kantian Tradition?
In this subsection, I am not explicating or advancing my claim that democratic
standard theory protects, and thus furthers, individuals’ life plans and also succeeds in its
other objectives within accident law. The prior sections sought those goals. Now, I am
elucidating why I categorize democratic standard theory within the overarching
theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. I will also distinguish this Kantian
aspect of democratic standard theory from aspects that belong in the consequentialist
category.
Democratic standard theory adheres to the overarching theoretical commitments
of the Kantian tradition in at least three meaningful respects. First, forming and
advancing each individual’s life plan is one of the fundamental objectives of the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. Democratic standard
theory provides a standard of care under which more individuals may pursue their life
plans more than under any competing theory of negligence.
Second, democratic standard theory suggests that constitutional essentials set an
upward boundary between reckless acts and negligent acts.244 Individuals have
fundamental interests, generally speaking, in others never acting in ways that are reckless
for the same reasons that individuals have accident security interests. (Recall from above
that I define “accident security” as each individual’s interest in being free from accidental
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harm to their body and property.) Reckless acts are not, in a moral sense, a necessary part
of social life, even if due to human frailty such may be ineliminable.
Consequently, democratic standard theory does not tolerate any level of risk,
however high, even if the values of those locally affected support such. Instead,
democratic standard theory understands a reckless act as similar to a violation of a
fundamental right or a constitutional essential which have lexical priority over the legal
importance of the values of the individuals in the group affected by the reckless acts. As
such, the boundary between recklessness and negligence marks the point where no
further increase in the legal permissibility to impose risk on another is ever justified. Like
the well-worn fundamental rights found in the overarching political commitments of the
Kantian tradition, democratic standard theory respects an upward boundary to the amount
of risk imposable on others.
Finally, the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition demand
meaningful equality, perhaps even the most robust sense of equality possible in any given
context—subject to its being in harmony with the other political institutions based on the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. Democratic standard
theory treats each individual with a more robust form of equality, compared to competing
theories, by factoring each individuals’ values equally into the standard of care while at
the same time not letting morally irrelevant factors substantially influence the negligence
standard of care.

A Kantian Pursuit of a Life Plan and its Parts
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As stated earlier, establishing and maintaining a political institutional framework
where each individual may advance a life plan is one of the fundamental aspects of the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition. As Rawls puts it, one of an
individual’s two fundamental capacities is the ability to develop, revise, and pursue her
own life plan; this capacity reflects her value of being free.245 Rawls’s two principles of
justice aim to provide a legal regime under which individuals may advance etc. their life
plans by, among other things, protecting basic liberties and ensuring fair equality of
opportunity. Since liberty is in a straitjacket without wealth/resources, Rawls’s difference
principle seeks to regulate the economic aspects of society’s basic structure so that, over
complete lives, either everyone shares equally all wealth, power, resources, etc. or that
inequality redounds to the greatest possible benefit to the least well off individuals in
society.
For this dissertation’s purposes, all is well and good, insofar as those principles
go, until someone is accidentally harmed. Initially, the harmed person’s pursuit of her life
plan is hampered in either one or more of the following ways:
1. Bodily injury and pain directly limit or prevent an individual from doing
what he would otherwise do, possibly including acts that meaningfully
contribute to his life plan. Such physical injury can be devastating and
permanently life-altering;
2. Expenses and lost wages due to bodily injury diminish his wealth, which
he could otherwise use to further his life plan;
3. Property damage inhibits his use of that property to further his life plan;
4. Expenses to replace damaged property diminish his wealth, which he
could otherwise use for furthering his life plan; or
5. Death.
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Democratic standard theory protects individuals in that it entitles a harmed individual to
pursue a negligence claim. Compensation from a successful negligence claim assists the
harmed to pursue his life plan by mitigating the setbacks from the harm.
We need not be naïve by assuming that compensation is a complete fix. Again,
bodily injury, especially, can be devastating and permanently life-altering. Nevertheless,
compensation can help to restore the harmed’s ability to pursue his life plan (e.g., through
medical care or assistive devices). Especially in, but not limited to, situations where
restoration of an ability is not entirely possible, compensation allows the harmed to
pursue other endeavors that hopefully substitute for what the individual previously did.
So, compensation to the harmed hopes to ameliorate, albeit often imperfectly, setbacks to
one’s pursuit of one’s life plan.
Of course, any theory of negligence that provides for compensation (and all
plausible theories do so) will, in that way, at least partially ameliorate setbacks to
individuals’ pursuits of their live plans. However, not all theories justify compensation
for that specific reason whereas democratic standard theory does so. It is true that any
other theory would laud compensation for this or similar reasons. Nevertheless,
democratic standard theory maintains the focus on tort law’s ability to provide a
framework under which individuals may pursue their life plans. In other words, providing
a framework for pursuing individuals’ life plans is a central and organizing aspect of
democratic standard theory in addition to its primary justificatory base. This centrality
lands democratic standard theory in the overarching theoretical commitments of the
Kantian tradition.
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Furthermore, democratic standard theory provides an additional mechanism that
protects and allows individuals to further their life plans over and above other theories.
By crafting the standard of care in line with the values of the most individuals possible,
those individuals may pursue their life plans without being vulnerable to negligence
claims if harms result. In other words, since the negligence standard of care corresponds
with most individuals’ life plan parts, as long as individuals adhere to their life plans,
they will not be vulnerable to negligence claims for anyone else’s harm. Other theories
neither have this mechanism to the same extent nor can obtain it without mirroring
democratic standard theory.
Also, democratic standard theory incentivizes others from engaging in the kinds
of acts that do not sufficiently advance the life plans of most other individuals by
providing a legal regime that, in effect, “penalizes” individuals who engage in those acts
by making them vulnerable to a negligence claim for compensatory damages. In this way,
democratic standard theory helps to protect individuals from risks due to the kinds of acts
that do not sufficiently advance most individuals’ life plans. This also advances
individuals’ life plan indirectly because, as mentioned above, many individuals not only
prefer not to be accidentally harmed, but they also prefer not to be harmed from particular
sources of risk, even if they will tolerate risk of harm from different sources of risk.
Recall my example above about an individual tolerating risks from the use of radioactive
material to develop cancer treatments but not to develop alternative energy technology.
Consequently, democratic standard theory, more than any competing theory of
negligence, provides a standard of care under which the most individuals possible may
pursue their life plans. That central justificatory basis is advanced at multiple levels to
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advance that objective rather than as some ancillary benefit tangentially connected to its
primary justification. This central thread weaves democratic standard theory into the
overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition.

The Recklessness Boundary Protecting Constitutional Essentials
So far, I have discussed risk primarily as if resulting accidental harm is only
vulnerable to a legal claim for compensation if such is supported by values of
individuals’ locally affected by the underlying acts. Some readers may be concerned
about how democratic standard theory handles the numerous acts that involve excessively
high risk due to the nature of the acts or the manner/context in which acts are performed.
There is likely an upward boundary where the probability of harm is so high or the
severity of the harm is so dire that moral theory may universally prohibit the act, even
though the actor does not at all intend to harm anyone. Commentators and legal doctrine
often refer to this category of risk as “recklessness.” Reckless acts involve less risk than
acts where one intends harm or knows that harm is virtually likely to occur. At the same
time, recklessness involves more risk than mere carelessness or negligence that most
people encounter daily as illustrated in most of the examples in this dissertation. While
this formulation of recklessness is intentionally coarse, it suffices for my present
purposes.
Here, I am excluding ultra-hazardous acts that are both excessively risky and also
have substantial social value. The common law deals with those acts with under the legal
doctrine of strict liability in tort. I address democratic standard theory’s implication for
strict liability elsewhere. Instead, in this subsection, I am addressing excessively risky
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acts that have little or no social value—especially when compared to the excessive risk.
Usually, reckless acts bring, at most, value to only the actor.
While this dissertation’s primary purpose is to draw the line between nonnegligence and negligence, democratic standard theory also contains the theoretical
resources to draw and justify the boundary between negligence and recklessness. The
boundary between recklessness and negligence need not be set by the actual values of
those individuals locally affected by the kind of act in question. Instead, but still
consistent with democratic standard theory, reckless acts seem to be those acts that have
the following characteristics:
1.

Excessive riskiness either in its probability of occurring or the dire
extent of the probable harm; and

2.

Virtually no or very few fully informed individuals would have a
life plan that included that one’s own ongoing exposure to the risk
in that act.

If an act meets those characteristics, we need not further consider whether the act meets
the democratic standard of care. Additionally, if for some quirky reason the values of an
actual group support a proposition for a reckless act, these individuals’ values may be
permissibly ignored or overridden, while in so doing advancing constitutional democracy,
because those individuals must not be fully informed or must have some gross
misunderstanding about the issues involved.
Another way to identify and justify the boundary between recklessness and
negligence involves borrowing and extending one of the Rawlsian arguments for
constitutional essentials. I suspect that this justification and the previous one are identical
in substance though phrased differently. My previous answer is a version of the reasoning
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underlying why Rawlsian deliberators behind the veil of ignorance adopt and give lexical
priority to the constitutional essentials. This second justification appeals directly to and
fleshes out the constitutional essentials. I keep these two justifications separate because
explicating their connection would take us too far afield.
Getting back on the track of the second justification, individuals not only have
interests in the government or other persons never intentionally depriving them of
constitutional essentials, but they also have interests, generally speaking, in others never
acting in ways that recklessly threaten their constitutional essentials. For example, a
person who tosses construction debris from a tall building without regard to potential
passers-by creates a danger so severe that it improperly restricts their basic liberty of free
movement. Free movement may also be improperly restricted by driving at a highly
excessive speed or in an excessively dangerous manner.
Intentional and knowing infringements on individuals’ constitutional essentials
are often criminalized or remediable in law in various ways. Similarly, reckless acts are
usually criminalized or remediable in law through compensatory or punitive damages
when harm results. Together these legal mechanisms provide various kinds or levels of
legal protection to a person’s right to bodily integrity and other constitutional essentials.
Explicit criminal prohibition of many reckless acts is appropriate because reckless acts
are not a necessary part of social life. [Even ultra-hazardous acts that contribute to a
substantial social good could be eliminated without major disruption to social life even if
eliminating ultra-hazardous acts required some dramatic changes.] Furthermore,
recklessness does not have the same mitigating feature that negligence does. Specifically,
imposing a reckless risk is not generally due to small or momentary lapses in judgment or
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awareness like many of the acts that we generally think fall within the domain of
negligence. We may think of these small or momentary lapses due to human frailties as
partial excuses, to borrow a concept from criminal law, So, recklessness is not mitigated
by the partial excuses common to negligence, making recklessness properly subject to
stiffer legal sanctions like outright criminalization or punitive damages.

Constitutional Essentials Protect Against Too a Restrictive Standard of Care
Similar to setting the boundary between recklessness and negligence, now at the
excessively cautious end of the risk spectrum, democratic standard theory would also
invalidate an excessively restrictive standard of care that prevents individuals from
meaningfully exercising their constitutional essentials. On my stipulated risk magnitude
scale, we could set the problematic region of excessive caution between 0 to 15 for some
kinds of acts. Obviously, some banal or trivial acts have a small risk magnitude, but such
are not burdensome at all.
Conjuring up realistic examples at this end of risk spectrum is tricky because, as
stated earlier, it takes two actors to tango their way into an accident. So, if even a
standard of care always held actors who were traveling in any way other than walking, it
does not mean that no one can travel via car (e.g., a kind of act with a 16-to-100 risk
magnitude). It only means that car drivers are always vulnerable to negligence claims
when one individual’s driving and another’s walking lead to accidental harm. Such would
be similar to placing the boundary between negligence and recklessness so low (e.g., at
16 in risk magnitude) that constitutional essentials are meaningfully burdened.
Presumably, such standard of care would still have to address accidents between, say, two
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car drivers. Even a plausible yet excessively cautious standard of care would distinguish
between one erratic driver and one non-erratic driver even if both drivers would be
negligent vis-à-vis an erratic pedestrian.
Nevertheless, it is possible that, in every form of travel, the values of the most
individuals supported an excessively restrictive standard of care that deemed acts
negligent such as:
•

Automobile driving must not exceed 18 mph;

•

Bicycling must not exceed 5 mph;

•

Only one airplane per hour may take off or land at any airport; and

•

Trains may not exceed the speed of the beloved and aptly named
Heber Creeper.

The standard of care could severely limit all modes of travel including other aspects of
travel aside from speed. If that standard of care led to a screeching halt of these modes of
travel, plausibly such a standard of care would violate the constitutional essential of
freedom of movement in modern societies.
However, keep in mind that, even under such a standard of care, numerous
individuals, even everyone, could continually violate it and continue to travel exactly as
they do today. If no one’s travel conduct changed even slightly, the consequence of
universal, continual violation of the supposed, excessively cautious standard of care
would primarily be that some accident costs would shift to different parties to the
accidents compared to the status quo’s standard of care. The accidents would be the
same, but the assignments of accident costs would differ in some cases (but perhaps not
many).
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For illustration purposes, let’s assume that the excessively cautious standard of
care led to almost no travel by means other than walking and bicycling. Since travel is a
large part of modern life, perhaps this standard of care would also violate constitutional
essentials other than freedom of movement mentioned above, such as:
•

Freedom of Association: One is now unable to visit those far
away as such is practically impossible.

•

Freedom of Thought: Education and other modes of exchanging
ideas are only available to those nearby certain institutions,
although internet technology may counterbalance this concern. In
addition, perhaps the best education, even more than the status
quo, is only available to rich given the burdens of travel.

•

Freedom of Religion: Religious pilgrimages and religious duties
to proselytize would be burdened such that only the rich few could
realistically perform them.

The list could go on. The point is that democratic standard theory provides the theoretical
resources to justifiably trump an excessively cautious standard of care even if supported
by the values of the most individuals locally affected.
I do not think the conclusions in this or the previous subsection are controversial.
Yet, a full defense of how constitutional essentials would limit excessive risk or
excessive caution requires further attention in my future work. As a teaser, though, note
that what constitutes recklessness or excessive caution seems to still depend ultimately, at
a macro level, on individuals’ values in a particular society at a particular point in time
and place. Some isolated groups of individuals in the world rely only on human-only,
unmechanized walking/jogging/running for travel. A standard of care that deems
negligent the first person in such a group who rides a bicycle and collides with a
pedestrian is not obviously violating or even burdening the bicyclist’s freedom of
movement or any other constitutional essential. At the end of the day, we do not utilize to
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only human-only, unmechanized travel, like some isolated tribes, because the values of
individuals in the pertinent groups overwhelmingly do not support exclusively using
human-only, unmechanized travel. In fact, such may seem obvious because we are
virtually unanimous about allowing travel beyond human-only, unmechanized travel
despite the death and serious injury that is virtually certain to occur. For now, let it
suffice that articulating a more detailed normative theory of excessive risk and excessive
caution and their boundaries with negligence justifies more extensive treatment in future
work. For now, I focus on the details of a theory of how to justify the distinction between
negligent acts and non-negligent acts while placing IOUs at both bookends of the risk
spectrum.

Best Interpretation of the Theoretical Commitments of the Kantian Tradition
Among the theories available, democratic standard theory best encapsulates what
it means to treat every individual as free and equal. Democratic standard theory, more
than any competing theory of negligence, provides a standard of care under which the
most individuals possible may pursue their life plans. Given diverse, irreconcilable, and
competing conceptions of the good, not every person’s values can determine negligent
breach. Yet, the overarching theoretical commitments of the Kantian tradition support the
majoritarian standard of care because it furthers the life plans of the most individuals
possible.
As for equal treatment, democratic standard theory handles the latter by counting
each person’s values with equal weight in determining breach of the standard of care.
While practical considerations suggest voting as an inefficient or ineffective way to
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determine each person’s values as they relate to a particular kind of act, the theory sets
the equal input of each person’s values as the ideal that institutions and practices should
attempt to attain.
In democratic standard theory, persons with the minority view are not part of a
persistent minority group. Nevertheless, as is generally true in a democracy with majority
rule, these persons still end up “losing” in the sense that their values are not reflected in
all of the contours of the negligence standard of care. At the same time, persons with the
minority view are not being treated unequally since they may attain their fair share of the
society’s wealth to pursue their life plans, their basic liberties are protected, and their
values are given equal weight in determining what constitutes breach of the negligence
standard of care. Finally, if democratic standard theory is successfully instantiated, the
judge’s or jury’s excessive discretion would be curtailed. With the effective utilization of
democratic standard theory, parties to an accident would not be subject to the possibility
of disparate treatment or privileged ab initio injustice.
Democratic standard theory denies a single answer to what constitutes negligent
breach that universally applies across groups and over time. Instead, negligent breach
varies with the values of the relevant individuals affected by the act at issue. Although
likely too difficult to actually do so, we can, in principle, amalgamate the various
standards of care throughout a society into a sort of macro schematic of what the
acceptable risks are within that society. That schematic would have multiple aspects to
capture the variety and nuances across the numerous individuals with diverse,
irreconcilable, and competing conceptions of the good. Nevertheless, democratic standard
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theory would deem such a schematic that society’s negligence standard of care. Such
would be invariant, if you will, until the values of the individuals themselves change.

Punitive Damages in Democratic Strict Liability
Democratic standard theory has revisionist implications for punitive damages in a
strict liability claim and explanatory power for punitive damages in gross negligence
claims. As Stephen Perry has emphasized from time to time strict liability does not
require that the defendant had exercised any, even minimal, care, i.e., that standard does
not require that the defendant act as a reasonably prudent person would have so acted as
well as requiring some additional amount of care. In other words, setting aside possibly
related foreseeability issues that at least one court, Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 101
Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942) (holding defendant was not strictly liable because the type
of harm that defendant’s blasting actually caused at the neighboring mink farm was not
foreseeable, thereby breaking the legal causal link)), handled as a proximate cause issue,
virtually all that matters is but-for causation for an actor to be vulnerable to a strict
liability claim in tort (assuming all other elements pertinent to that kind of strict liability
claim are also satisfied). So, the actor who acts with no or minimal care is vulnerable to a
strict liability claim in the same way as an actor, in an entirely separate and unrelated act,
who acts with the utmost care as long as each respective act actually caused harm.
In contrast, democratic standard theory requires that the actor at least meet the
negligence standard of care even in regard to abnormally dangerous acts. Such assumes
that most individuals do not want to be subject to that risk at all without a “guarantee,” if
you will, that the actor would be vulnerable to a claim for compensatory damages. One
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implication (and here is the revisionist part) is that democratic standard theory would
require punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages if, even in a strict liability
claim (regarding abnormally dangerous conduct), the defendant’s behavior fell (even a
little) below the negligence standard of care.
Importantly, in democratic standard theory, products liability (even in its quasistrict liability form) would likely be handled (limited here only as it pertains to this
specific aspect of punitive damages) analogously to a negligence claim. In contrast to an
abnormally dangerous act, a product, without a serious defect, may not be abnormally
dangerous. That puts a products liability claim, even for a product with a defect that made
it abnormally dangerous, closer (morally speaking) to negligence.
To restate, under democratic standard theory, with abnormally dangerous acts
(and perhaps others that are morally similar) but-for causation is sufficient for the actor to
be vulnerable to a strict liability claim for compensatory damages. At the same time, butfor causation and breach of the negligence standard of care (or something similar) for an
abnormally dangerous act is sufficient for the actor to be vulnerable to both
compensatory and punitive damages in a strict liability claim.
Interestingly, for abnormally dangerous acts, gross negligence or the like is too
stringent of a standard to use before punitive damages are possible. As a result, punitive
damages could have two tiers, based on how far below the negligence standard of care
the actor’s conduct was with gross negligence requiring a greater amount of damages.
The lesser amount of punitive damages for mere negligence need not be extreme to still
reflect the underlying rationale.
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An insightful, intuitive, and justified asymmetry surfaces here. With negligence,
one’s act, which is not abnormally dangerous, merely needs to fall below the standard of
care for compensatory damages to be possible. For strict liability, one’s act, which is
abnormally dangerous, merely needs to actually cause harm for compensatory damages
and only needs to fall below the negligence standard of care for punitive damages to be
possible.
Why punitive damages for mere negligence regarding abnormally dangerous acts?
Put simply, most, if not virtually all, individuals do not want to be subject to the risk of
harm from abnormally dangerous acts at all. They want even less to be subject to
negligently performed abnormally dangerous acts because, presumably, a negligently
performed abnormally dangerous act is more dangerous along one or more dimensions
compared to an abnormally dangerous act performed with more care than the negligence
standard of care requires.
Dangerousness, up to a point, is still evaluated according to the values of the
individuals locally affected. At the same time, negligently performing an abnormally
dangerous act is analogous to recklessness, which may mean that the actor is vulnerable
to punitive damages based on limits to risk required by constitutional essentials, as
discussed above.
Putting differently the overarching point, the implicit “compromise,” if you will,
is that actors may nonetheless perform abnormally dangerous acts if they pay
compensatory damages for any but-for-caused harm and they pay punitive damages also
if they perform the act negligently (and harm occurs). In this way, damages reflect the
two senses in which other individuals are risked harm. One sense is the danger from the
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abnormally dangerous act; the other is negligently performing that abnormally dangerous
act, which, to repeat, presumably makes the abnormally dangerous act even more
dangerous along one or more dimensions.
From the insights of democratic standard theory, we see that, as to punitive
damages in a strict liability claim for an abnormally dangerous act, existing tort law
doctrine contravenes what virtually everyone would deem sensible and appropriate. If
instantiated in law, democratic standard theory would provide an additional mechanism,
over and above what is doctrinally available in extant tort law, to discourage negligently
performed abnormally dangerous acts.
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